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INTRODUCTION
When the two large passenger airplanes crashed into the World
Trade Center on that September morning-as two other planes
homed in on their Washington targets-the U.S. government hesi-
tated for three days, and then declared that America was more or less
at war. The President declared a state of emergency,1 while Congress
issued a joint declaration authorizing the President to use all "neces-
sary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001."2 These pro-
nouncements were later followed by a series of policy decisions and
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What happened after that time is not reflected here.
Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 14, 2001).
SS.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REC. S9413-01 (2003) (enacted). The resolution also
authorized the President to take similar action against all those who "harbored" such persons.
Id.
3 By "policy decision," I mean reinterpreting laws already on the books to do new things.
For example, the material witness statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000), was not altered after 9/11,
but was used for newly aggressive purposes-to provide a legal basis to simply hold suspicious
people against whom no criminal charges could yet be filed. The legal cover story was that
those detained were material witnesses who were being held to testify before the grand jury that
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legal changes4 that would enable the United States to conduct both a
domestic and a foreign operation to combat international terrorism.
Surprising as 9/11 was in its particulars to nearly all of those who
watched it around the world, it was not at all surprising in general
from the standpoint of political theory, which has wrestled for centu-
ries with the question of what to do with a shock to a political system
that is so great that normal rules seem no longer to apply. Through-
out the history of political thought, the idea of a state of exception
has fascinated and repelled political theorists who have seen in the
idea both the only way to defend a state in peril and the clear road to
dictatorship.
In this Article, I explore how the state of exception has been used
in practice in American domestic and foreign policy after 9/11,
against a backdrop of both political theory and comparative re-
sponses. In Part I, I will explore the idea of the state of exception as
it has been elaborated in modern constitutionalism, focusing on the
work of Carl Schmitt and the collapse of the Weimar Constitution
and working through the way the American constitutional order ab-
sorbed the idea of the state of emergency during the Cold War.
Schmitt, as we will see, saw the ability of a ruler to suspend the rule of
law as the ultimate act of sovereignty. Something like this idea was
carried on into American policy through the idea of "national secu-
rity," providing both the rationale for the Cold War and the justifica-
tion for the suspension of what had been normal practice. Though
the Cold War ended decisively more than a decade before 9/11, the
was convened to look into the 9/11 attacks. Before 9/11, the primary use of the material wit-
ness statute was to hold key witnesses to testify in criminal trials, and even then the power was
used sparingly. See the different judgments about the acceptability of the new interpretation
before the Second Circuit resolved the conflict by ruling in favor of the government. Compare
United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that a person cannot
be detained to secure grand jury testimony under the material witness statute), rev'd, 349 F.3d
42 (2d Cir. 2003), with In reApplication of the United States for a Material Witness Warrant, 213
F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that the material witness statute does permit witnesses
to be detained in conjunction with grand jury proceedings).
4 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to In-
tercept and Obstruct Terrorism ("USA PATRIOT") Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.), was the major statutory change that followed imme-
diately after 9/11, but, as the Congressional Research Service analysis itself noted, much of what
the USA PATRIOT Act did was to codify decisions that federal courts had already made; specifi-
cally, decisions adverse to criminal defendants and to those seeking to challenge state authority.
See CHARLES DOYLE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT RL31200: TERRORISM: SECTION
BY SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT (2001) [hereinafter DOYLE, TERRORISM], avail-
able at http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/011210crs.pdf; see also CHARLES DOYLE,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT RL31377: THE USA PATRIOT ACT: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS (2002) (organizing the analysis thematically), available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/crs/RL31377.pdf; CHARLES DOYLE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT RS21203:
THE USA PATRIOT ACT: A SKETCH (2002) (providing a summary of his legal analysis), available
at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21203.pdf.
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United States never reformulated its guiding ideas about how to
manage serious threats. As a result, confronted with a new enemy af-
ter 9/11, the Bush administration fell back into Cold War habits even
though the present threat and the present world situation are very
different.
Against this background of the exception and its rationales, I next
explore the specific responses of the United States to 9/11 in both
domestic and foreign policy in Part II of this Article. Since 9/11, the
Bush administration has repeatedly invoked its ability to make excep-
tions to normal legality to cope with the terrorist threat in domestic
policy through increasing invocation of military rationales for its ac-
tions. The commander-in-chief powers that have been invoked by the
President have had the effect of undermining both separation of
powers and individual rights at home. In foreign policy, the Bush
administration acted as though 9/11 created the basis not only for a
national state of emergency, but also an international state of emer-
gency that requires other countries to make exceptions to both in-
ternational law and their constitutional orders. The United States, as
a result, has urged its allies to compromise their constitutional and
international commitments to meet the new threat.
As I will show, the Bush administration's response to 9/11 in both
domestic and foreign policy is not what one would typically expect of
a true emergency; namely, quick responses that violate the constitu-
tional order followed by a progressive normalization. Instead, the
American government (including all three branches working to-
gether) responded with much constitutional care right after 9/11,
fully aware that the temptation would be to overreact. The greater
abuses have come as 9/11 recedes and executive policy has turned
toward larger and larger constitutional exceptions, with the active ac-
quiescence so far of both Congress and the courts. The reaction to
9/11 was not the declaration of a sudden emergency that has gradu-
ally abated, but instead has involved a measured immediate response
followed by ever-expanding justifications for the assertion of execu-
tive and unilateral power.
Following a quick tour of American governmental responses to
9/11, I return in Part III to the general idea of the state of exception
and ask why it is that America's democratic allies, also shaken by
9/11, have generally responded so differently. I argue that the
Schmittian conception of the state of exception is no longer consid-
ered an acceptable frame of response for many of our allies, particu-
larly those in Europe. It was precisely the catastrophe of Weimar, the
rise of fascism, the experience of communism, and the history of total
wars in the twentieth century that has caused a revision of the theo-
retical conception of the state of exception among many of our
European allies and among many new democratic governments else-
where. The idea of the state of exception from which the Bush
May 2004] 1003
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
administration has proceeded has met sharp international criticism,
precisely because the international community has moved on from
the Schmittian framework to which the Bush administration's re-
sponse bears strong resemblance. Carl Schmitt's justification for the
state of exception-and by extension the Bush administration's justi-
fication for the response to the terrorist attacks of 2001-presupposes
a world that no longer exists, even after 9/11. As I argue, many of
America's allies have seen 9/11 not as a moment when the rule of law
should be suspended, but precisely a moment when the rule of law
needs to be strengthened.
I. THE EXCEPTION
What is (or more precisely, what has been) the state of exception?
Though it has gone by different names over time, the state of excep-
tion-or reason of state, or state of emergency, or itat de siege-has
referred to the situation in which a state is confronted by a mortal
threat and responds by doing things that would never be justifiable in
normal times, given the working principles of that state. The state of
exception uses justifications that only work in extremis, when the state
is facing a challenge so severe that it must violate its own principles to
save itself. But of course, the state of exception is dangerous precisely
because it is so subject to abuse. Who decides whether the situation is
one that deserves to be called exceptional? If some principles of the
state are suspended in a crisis, what prevents all of them from being
suspended? And how can the normal situation be restored when the
state of exception is over?
As both Clinton Rossiter6 and Carl Friedrich7 noted in their grand
surveys of the historical roots of the idea of the state of exception
during the Cold War, such mortal threats to the political community
have been around since the origin of complex political communities,
and so both politicians and political theorists have always had to con-
front the justifiable limits of the normal state of governance. Aris-
totle's Politics details how an elected dictator was charged with restor-
ing domestic order and fighting off aggressive neighbors in ancient
Greece.! The dictatorship in Rome provided a way to handle severe
threats to the institutions of the Republic by elaborating and
For the terminological fine-tuning, see JOAN FITZPATRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRISIS: THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING RIGHTS DURING STATES OF EMERGENCY 1 n. 1 (1994).
6 CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE
MODERN DEMOCRACIES (1948).
7 C.J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL REASON OF STATE: THE SURVIVAL OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (1957).
8 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS: BOOKS III AND IV (Richard Robinson trans., Clarendon Press 1995).
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following established procedures for doing so.9 For Machiavelli's
Prince, the self-interest that grounded his actions was never regular-
ized in what a modern reader would think of as constitutional institu-
tions. ° But in giving advice to the Prince who would surely face peri-
odic crises, Machiavelli issued prudential warnings:
Now in a well-ordered republic it should never be necessary to resort to
extra-constitutional measures; for although they may for the time be
beneficial, yet the precedent is pernicious, for if the practice is once es-
tablished of disregarding the laws for good objects, they will in a little
while be disregarded under that pretext for evil purposes. Thus no re-
public will ever be perfect if she has not by law provided for everything,
having a remedy for every emergency, and fixed rules for applying it."
Later, Jean Bodin thought that the Prince should be accountable
only to God and not to his fellow mortals for what was done as a mat-
ter of necessity,12 which effectively reduced the normative influence of
anything like representative government or its institutions.
In short, while political theorists wrestled for centuries with the
question of whether emergency government was justifiable, it might
be easy for those of us living in constitutional democracies to dismiss
their analyses because the political and historical contexts about
which they wrote were so different from those of the present day. In
particular, the rise of secular, democratic, and constitutional gov-
ernment seems to have created a different dilemma of justification,
precisely because executives in constitutional democracies are sup-
posed to be accountable to and removable by electorates, and also
because modern constitutions embrace both separation of powers
and justiciable systems of rights. For an executive to seize power and
suspend rights under a democratic constitutional government is an
entirely different matter, normatively speaking, than for a monarch
(even a constitutional monarch) to do so. In a modern constitutional
democracy, the suspension of separation of powers and of substantial
bodies of rights to cope with an emergency requires justification in
terms of both the viability of accountable government and the long-
term respect for rights in the constitutional order. Thus, while mon-
archies generally possess some residual elements of unaccountability
and of extraordinary executive powers, republican government
9 As Rossiter notes, when a situation of emergency was imminent, consent of both the sen-
ate and the consuls was necessary for a dictator to be appointed to fend off the crisis. Dictators
were never permitted to appoint other dictators. ROSsITER, supra note 6, at 19-20. The terms
of the dictators were strictly limited to six months. Id. at 23.
0 FRIEDRICH, supra note 7, at 32.
NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND THE DISCOURSEs 203 (Luigi Ricci & E.R.P. Vin-
cent trans., Random House 1950) (1513).
12 For an elaboration, see FRIEDRICH, supra note 7, at 72-73.
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attempts to purge both. States of emergency, then, pose more diffi-
cult problems of justification in republics than in monarchies.
Written constitutions before the twentieth century did not typi-
cally attempt to regulate a state of exception in detail. The U.S. Con-
stitution forbids suspension of the "[p] rivilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus... unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it."'" This is an indirect admission that there may
be times when the normal rules do not apply and in such times, the
courts may be prohibited from reviewing the legality of detentions.
But the location of this power of suspension as a power of the Con-
gress, given to it along with the power "[t]o declare War,"14 indicates
that emergency government was never meant to be reserved for ex-
ecutive action alone. That Congress's role in a state of emergency
was meant to be primary may be further supported by the Third
Amendment, which says that quartering of troops in private homes in
a time of war shall only be done if there is a law allowing it. 5 Given
that laws must be passed by Congress, the Third Amendment in effect
says that no unilateral commander-in-chief power may intrude upon
the inviolability of the home. In time of war, rebellion, and other
emergencies, then, Congress was given a strong role, almost certainly
the lead role, in the process of emergency governance envisioned in
the U.S. Constitution. While emergencies may result in a temporary
suspension of judicial power through limitation of the writ of habeas
corpus, the emergency provisions of the U.S. Constitution do not al-
low suspension of congressional power. Instead, they seem to require
that the president's own power be subordinate to that of the Con-
gress at such a time.
European constitutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries tentatively began to elaborate the idea of a constitutional state of
emergency, but typically left all important details to statutes. One
could argue that the French Constitutions of 1795 and 1800 were
constitutions written only for a time of emergency. The Constitution
of the Directorate in 1795 established a committee of rulers with
nearly unlimited powers, and the Napoleonic Constitution of 1800
consolidated Napoleon's power grab by proclaiming him, by proper
name, to be the primary head of state.' Neither of these were consti-
tutions in the modern and liberal sense, ensuring separation of pow-
ers and respect for rights. The French Constitution of 1848, however,
IS U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
14 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
15 Id. amend. III ("No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.").
16 R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO WESTERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
186-93 (1995).
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included as Article 106 a general provision that said that a law should
determine when a state of siege could be declared, but left details to
that law. 7 General framework statutes passed in France in 1849 and
again in 1878 specified how a state of siege could be determined,
what new and exceptional powers could be taken by the government
in such a time, and how the state of siege would be ended. 8 In much
of the nineteenth century in Europe, however, even when constitu-
tions did try to establish separation of powers and respect for the
rights of citizens, they typically broke down under stress, and had to
be rewritten when the crises were over. The invocation of emergency
provisions typically spelled the end of the constitutional order itself.
The periods between breakdown and reconstruction were simply
non-constitutional moments.
Against this background, the Weimar Constitution, written in
Germany in the shadow of the First World War, tried harder than
most constitutions to ensure that constitutional failure in a time of
emergency did not occur. To that end, the constitutional drafters in-
serted into the text Article 48, a provision that defined rather pre-
cisely a constitutional state of emergency. 9 Article 48 gave the presi-
dent extraordinary powers to cope with extraordinary threats to the
system, up to and including both the suspension of a particular and
limited set of rights as well as the use of armed forces to quell domes-
tic disturbances. The inclusion of Article 48 in the Weimar Constitu-
tion did not signal a flight of constitutional abstraction; the need to
have a constitutional state of emergency provision was obvious to all
who worked on the text. With Germany in chaos after its defeat in
17 LA CONSTITUTION DE LA SECONDE REPUBLIQUE of 1848 [Constitution], art. 106 (Fr.).
18 ROSSITER, supra note 6, at 81.
19 Article 48 states:
If any state fails to perform the duties imposed upon it by the federal constitution or
by federal laws, the president may hold it to the performance thereof with the aid of the
armed forces.
If the public safety and order in the German Reich is materially disturbed or endan-
gered, the president may take the necessary measures to restore public safety and order,
intervening if necessary with the aid of the armed forces. To this end he may temporar-
ily suspend, in whole or in part, the fundamental rights established by Articles 114 [per-
sonal liberty], 115 [inviolability of dwelling places], 117 [secrecy of postal, telegraphic
and telephonic communications], 118 [freedom in the expression of opinion], 123
[freedom of assembly], 124 [freedom of association] and 153 [private property].
The president must immediately inform the Reichstag of all measures adopted by
authority of the first or second paragraphs of this Article. These measures are to be re-
voked upon demand of the Reichstag.
In cases where delay would be dangerous[,] the cabinet of a state government may
for its own territory take provisional measures as specified in paragraph 2. These meas-
ures are to be revoked on demand of the president or of the Reichstag.
Further details will be regulated by federal law.
WEIMAR CONST. of 1919, art. 48 (F.R.G.), translated in FREDERICK MUNDELL WATKINS, THE
FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS UNDER THE GERMAN REPUBLIC 15 (1939).
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the First World War,0 and with the German political scene marked by
the blossoming of radical political parties advocating extreme reme-
dies for extreme times," some method for the defense of the new
constitutional government had to be inserted into the new constitu-
tion. Article 48 was adopted by a "decisive majority"22 of the constitu-
tional assembly.
In the thirteen years that the Weimar Constitution limped along
before being simply suspended, Article 48 was invoked more than 250
times, 2 130 times in the first few years of the constitutional order
alone. As Rossiter has noted, "[1] acking the emergency competence
provided in Article 48, the rulers of republican Germany could hardly
have launched their infant democracy into the stormy seas of postwar
Europe.'25 At the start, Article 48 seemed to work as planned; it re-
peatedly saved the new democratic order from being undermined by
domestic extremists.
Many of the deepest constitutional issues surrounding the use of
the state of emergency were never solved legally or politically, how-
ever, and the uncertainties surrounding the legitimate use of Article
48 only magnified with time. For one thing, no German parliament
in Weimar ever passed the general framework law that Article 48 re-
quired to regulate the uses of a state of emergency in more detail. As
a result, the specific types of crises that could trigger Article 48 were
never specified, and Article 48 was used for ever-widening types of
state maladies, from civil violence at the start, to economic crises by
the middle, to merely sharp political disagreement by the end. Fur-
thermore, while at the beginning of the Republic, in the early 1920s,
emergency decrees were often backed up by legislation that normal-
ized these decrees quickly thereafter, this legislative validation soon
went missing into the 1930s as the popular support for parties that
opposed the constitutional order translated into more and more ex-
tremist representatives in the parliament, who failed wherever possi-
ble to do what was required to maintain the constitutional system. By
the time the parliament was finally dissolved, 6 making the executive
decrees authorized under Article 48 the only effective source of law,
20 For a dire description, see WATKINS, supra note 19, at 6-7.
21 Id. at 25-35.
ROssITER, supra note 6, at 35. For more on the history of Article 48, see id. at 33-37;
WATKINS, supra note 19, at 13-14.
23 ROSSITER, supra note 6, at 33.
24 Id. at 38.
25 Id.
26 Article 25 of the Weimar Constitution allowed the president to dissolve the parliament
once for any reason. WATKINS, supra note 19, at 22-23. But Article 48's check on emergency
powers indicated that the parliament could, by a majority vote, require the state of emergency
to be lifted. Id. at 15. Obviously, if the parliament were constitutionally dissolved under Article
25, it would not be around to exercise the separation-of-powers check built into Article 48.
[Vol. 6:51008
LA WIN A TIME OF EMERGENCY
the institutions of the Weimar Constitution that might have pre-
vented such a consolidation of power (federalism, independent
courts, parliament) had all been neutralized by the prior creeping
use of an ever-expanding Article 48.7
The well-known story of the collapse of the Weimar Constitution is
recounted here because it is both a cautionary tale for modem con-
stitutionalists and also because the prolonged period of crisis that
Weimar experienced produced theoretical justifications for the state
of emergency that are in many ways more resonant to the modem
ear. As a result, the place to start in thinking about theoretical justifi-
cations for states of emergency in a system of democratically account-
able, representative, and rights-respecting government is with Carl
Schmitt, who not only attempted to justify the state of exception in a
constitutional democracy but who, in the end, played a role in the
demise of the Weimar Constitution itself.
Carl Schmitt famously begins his work Political Theology with the
sentence: "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception."" By
equating the sovereign with the capacity to define when a situation
can be handled within normal rules and when it must be treated as
an exception to normal governance, Schmitt takes as a defining fea-
ture of a political sovereign the ability to operate outside juridical
"normality." In fact, it is precisely the unanticipated nature of the
emergency that calls for such powers. According to Schmitt:
The precise details of an emergency cannot be anticipated, nor can one
spell out what may take place in such a case, especially when it is truly a
matter of an extreme emergency and of how it is to be eliminated. The
precondition as well as the content of jurisdictional competence in such
a case must necessarily be unlimited. From the liberal constitutional
point of view, there would be no jurisdictional competence at all. The
most guidance the constitution can provide is to indicate who can act in
such a case.2
For Schmitt, liberal constitutions fool their citizens if it appears
that these constitutions could have accounted for everything. There
27 In light of the argument to follow, it is interesting to note that one of the first commenta-
tors on the Weimar Constitution to notice the possibility that Article 48 could be used in this
unchecked way was Carl Schmitt, who wrote in 1922:
According to article 48 of the German constitution of 1919, the exception is de-
clared by the president of the Reich but is under the control of parliament, the Reich-
stag, which can at any time demand its suspension. This provision corresponds to the
development and practice of the liberal constitutional state, which attempts to repress
the question of sovereignty by a division and mutual control of competences .... If ap-
plied without check, it would grant exceptional powers in the same way as article 14 of
the [French] Charter of 1815, which made the monarch sovereign.
CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 11
(George Schwab trans., MIT Press 1985) (1922).
28 Id. at 5.
2 Id. at 6-7.
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will always be moments outside the constitutional range of legitimate
expectation, and legitimate constitutional action under unanticipated
and extreme threats can never be fully elucidated within a constitu-
tion's terms. This is a clear challenge to the idea that the rule of law
must constrain rulers and ruled alike, for if the rule of law constrains
the sovereign entirely, then the sovereign should not be able to claim
exception to the rules. But an emergency makes visible the incom-
pleteness of the constitutional design because by its very nature, it
cannot be predicted in its particulars in advance. In practice, Schmitt
seems to say, a liberal constitution can therefore never be complete.
The ability of the sovereign to act outside the rules in the case of
emergency, however, is precisely the signature element that consti-
tutes sovereignty and it is something with which liberal constitutions
cannot dispense unless they are to be destroyed by the exceptional
challenge.
If the sovereign can claim exception, then the sovereign must
have all of the lesser-included powers-for example, the power to de-
cide when the situation has ceased to be "normal," thereby justifying
the declaration of emergency, the power to determine when the
emergency is over so that the rule of law may be safely restored, and
the power to specify which political actors normally protected by the
rule of law lose their protection in the interim. Rather than seeing
the rule of law as something that must be followed for its own sake as
a way of ensuring the integrity of the state, Schmitt argues that the
rule of law may prevent a polity from defending itself in the event of a
serious political crisis, and that the capacity of a ruler to maintain the
very existence of the state may depend on that ruler not being bound
by the rules.30 In fact, it is the most distinctive power of a sovereign-
not simply an incidental and unusual capacity-that he has the power
to suspend the law.
Schmitt justified his view that a sovereign must p ossess the ability
to determine the state of exception in a sociological manner:
Every general norm demands a normal, everyday frame of life to which it
can be factually applied and which is subjected to its regulations. The
norm requires a homogeneous medium. This effective normal situation
is not a mere "superficial presupposition" that a jurist can ignore; that
situation belongs precisely to [the norm's] immanent validity. There ex-
ists no norm that is applicable to chaos. For a legal order to make sense,
30 Id. at 12 ("The state suspends the law in the exception on the basis of its right of self-
preservation, as one would say.").
1 Schmitt, however, said explicitly that the exception is ajuristic and not a sociological cate-
gory: "It would be a distortion of the schematic disjunction between sociology and jurispru-
dence if one were to say that the exception has no juristic significance and is therefore 'sociol-
ogy.'" Id. at 13. By this, he seems to mean that the exception is a category within jurisprudence
even if recognition of its distinctive markers requires sociological judgment to recognize.
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a normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign who definitely decides
whether this normal situation actually exists.
All law is "situational law."
3 2
According to this analysis, the juridical order itself requires for its
maintenance a regular field of life, a habitus or a certain taken-for-
granted predictability, in order for the small deviations that the ju-
ridical order controls to be noticeable. If half the population be-
comes murderers, then the law against murder is no longer a purely
juridical matter. Instead, when the field of life becomes so disor-
dered that the jurist can no longer distinguish between the normal
and the abnormal, then the sovereign must act-in Schmitt's view-
to restore the condition of normality necessary for any rule-of-law sys-
tem to make sense. The state of exception is, as a result, the means
for restoring the order necessary for legality to exist. The political
moment that justifies invoking the state of exception is the moment
when the possibility of restoring a field of order requires that the
rules themselves do not apply to the means of restoration.
Moreover, according to Schmitt, it is the exception that gives
meaning to the rule in the first place, since one cannot understand a
rule except by noting the edges of its applicability." The rule gains
meaning from publicizing what is not covered in its ambit34 It is
therefore the exception that defines the extent and core meaning of
the rule. Through exceptions-and nonexceptions-the juridical
order comes to have its distinctive shape and character.
A more comprehensive "state of exception" of the sort that arises
in political crises implicates not just an individual rule, but the limits
of the juridical field itself. Invoking a state of exception to the juridi-
cal field as a whole indicates, as in the case of the individual excep-
tion, the defining limits of the taken-for-granted condition. The pos-
sibility of a state of exception existing outside the juridical field but
still within the political field creates the condition for the separation
of law and politics. It opens up the practical reality that the rule of
law may cover only part of what politics may do. Consequently, some
of what counts as politics must exist outside the field of law. If, in
Schmitt's formulation, the distinctive capacity of the sovereign is to
define the exception, then the sovereign can never be fully bound by
32 Id.
3s In many ways, this parallels the Durkheimian tradition of argument about the role of de-
viance in maintaining the boundaries of a social community. See KAI T. ERIKSON, WAYWARD
PURITANS (1966) (arguing that the punishment of deviant conduct publicizes the boundaries of
a community and therefore enables the community to better understand its moral architec-
ture).
s4 This point is particularly well-elaborated in the analysis of Schmitt in GIORGIO AGAMBEN,
HoMo SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 15-29 (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., Stanford
Univ. Press 1998) (1995).
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law. The broader significance of the state of exception, then, is to de-
fine the basic qualities of the sovereign's responsibility, only some of
which are legally defined.
Schmitt's analysis echoes some of the logical puzzles of nineteenth
and early twentieth century legal positivism-which is not surprising
since legal positivists were among his main interlocutors in the theo-
retical debates he entered in the 1920s and 1930s in his native Ger-
many.35 For legal positivists, all law is the command of the sovereign;
it exists as a factual matter distinguishable from its normative advis-
ability. But if law is in fact just that which the sovereign commands,
then what can (normatively) bind the sovereign? Schmitt's answer is
broadly consistent with that of the legal positivists of his day: in the
end, the soverei n can only be bound by voluntary acceptance of his
own commands. That meant, for Schmitt, that the sovereign could
also exempt himself from his own commands when the circumstances
dictated. What separated Schmitt from his positivist colleagues was
his concern with the practical realities of governance over the ab-
stract properties of concepts. In the context of Weimar Germany,
where the constitutional order lurched from one unstable govern-
ment to the next and where the economy lurched along with it, de-
termining the legitimate response to immediate crisis was more than
a purely theoretical issue. Schmitt's view-offered against defenders
of parliamentarianism-was that liberal parliamentary systems would
simply collapse without the decisive judgments of a single sovereign
who was vested with the power to suspend the rules in order to save
them. s In fact, before his eyes in Weimar, liberal parliamentary gov-
ernment seemed always on the brink of failure.
Moreover, Schmitt added that it may be the sovereign's obligation
to violate the normal rules of governance because the integrity and
viability of the state itself was the sovereign's responsibility. 9 If the
state were under mortal threat, Schmitt believed, then the sovereign
had to act.Y Preservation of the possibility of an ordered life, so cru-
cial in his analysis of the ordinary juridical field, had to take priority
over the normal operation of that ordinary juridical field in times
that were not ordinary. Exceptional means, then, were warranted in
35 For more on these debates, see ELLEN KENNEDY, CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE: SCHMITT IN
WEIMAR (forthcoming 2004), and PETER C. CALDWELL, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND THE CRISIS
OF GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE THEORY & PRACTICE OF WEIMAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
(1997).
SCHMITT, supra note 27, at 12.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
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exceptional times. And it was the job of the sovereign to decide
which times were exceptional.
As it happened, the Weimar Constitution concretely lacked any
guidance for determining when a situation had gotten to the point of
being constitutionally ungovernable, and its only effective check on
the power of the president to declare a state of emergency turned out
to be relatively easy to undermine. As a consequence, whenever the
president believed that an emergency was imminent, the president
could suspend many ordinary constitutional rules of operation.41
While Article 48 required that the presidentially declared state of
emergency had to end when the lower chamber of the parliament so
demanded, this provision interacted badly with Article 25 of the Con-
stitution, which allowed the president to dissolve the parliament.
Once the president declared a state of emergency under Article 48
and dissolved the parliament for the same reasons under Article 25,
Article 48's "checks and balances provision" (that the lower house of
the parliament could force the president to end the state of emer-
gency) was no longer effective. Through these absolutely constitu-
tional mechanisms, the unconstitutional state of Nazi Germany was
born.
The world viewed (and experienced) with horror what happened
next. Nazi Germany, with Schmitt providing justificatory support for
the use of emergency powers, attacked its neighbors, conquered
much of Europe (with massive devastation of people and property),
launched its purge of European Jews and Roma, created the camps,
and committed genocide. The concrete events are rather a lot to at-
tribute to Schmitt, but his justification of emergency government as-
sisted in rationalizing the early phases of the Nazi seizure of power
precisely because he sketched a compelling portrait of the need and
justification for the state of exception. As Europe struggled to re-
cover from the dislocation and destruction of the Second World War,
it was not surprising that many of those who had suffered from the
consequences of the war had second thoughts about emergency pow-
ers and their legitimate use. I will return to the European story in
Part III of this Article, but suffice it to say for now that much of the
effort to avoid repeating these mistakes involved placing constitu-
tional faith in strengthened courts, which were the least tainted po-
litical institution to emerge from under the rubble of conquered and
conquering states. The solution to the state-of-emergency problem,
as it was elaborated after the war in much of Europe, was to specify
41 See supra note 19 for a listing of the concrete constitutional provisions whose suspension
Article 48 authorized. These included inviolability of both the person and private homes; se-
crecy of mail and postal communications; freedom of speech, assembly and association; and the
right to private property.
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the legal stages of the exception in such a way that an unconstitu-
tional state could never emerge through emergency provisions. For
example, when the post-war German Basic Law was amended in 1968
to include the emergency powers that had been deliberately omitted
when the constitution was first written, the amendment clearly speci-
fied that the Constitutional Court had to remain open and able to
hear challenges throughout any state of emergency and that the ex-
ecutive could not make a declaration of emergency alone.
42
The lessons Americans learned from the horrors of World War II
were quite different from those taken away from the war by the Euro-
peans. The difference can be seen in how American occupying
forces in Germany intervened in the constitutional drafting process
in 1948. Americans took the most substantial interest in ensuring a
strengthened and unamendable federalism,3 rather than in insisting
upon a different way of thinking about emergency powers. The abil-
ity to subvert federalism was, in the American view, the primary struc-
tural weakness of the Weimar Constitution, not the use of emergency
powers to radically increase executive powers.
From the position of their own newly dominant role in the world
after the war, American leaders diagnosed that they had failed in the
1930s to see the signs of an oncoming menace early enough. In the
immediate post-war period in the United States, foreign policy was
guided by the firm conviction that one should not give any benefit of
the doubt to a potential enemy, lest one be guilty of appeasement:
The word appeaser, easily thrown about, became the most pungent of for-
eign policy expletives, the quickest way to silence a dissenter, forestall di-
plomacy. And, of course, appeasement connoted weakness, and so sug-
gested blindness and stupidity or, worse, something approaching treason.
Again and again, the lesson of Munich was explicitly summoned for in-
terpreting events and shaping policies in the postwar years.
So it was that "Hitler's salami tactics" over the years became the
"domino theory."44
Rather than being preoccupied with how to prevent a "regime of
horror,"45 which was the German constitutional challenge after the
war, Americans were more concerned with empowering government to
meet new threats. Rather than finding new ways to strengthen the re-
silience of the constitutional order and to place limits on executive
42 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] arts. 80a, 115g (F.R.G.), translated in CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: GERMANY 67, 87 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 2003).
43 For evidence of the American role in the drafting of the German Basic Law, see generally
PETER MERKL, THE ORIGIN OF THE WEST GERMAN REPUBLIC (1963).
44 DANIEL YERGIN, SHATTERED PEACE: THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR AND THE NATIONAL
SECURITY STATE 198 (1977).
45 Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Interpretation After Regimes of Horror, in STUDIES IN LAA,
POLITICS AND SOCIEIY (Patricia Ewick & Austin Sarat eds., forthcoming 2005).
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power, which were the pressing German constitutional issues, Ameri-
cans were more concerned with expanding executive power to cope
with dangers that faced the United States because of its newly domi-
nant role as the only advanced industrial country left relatively un-
scathed after the war. In this new world, as American policymakers
quickly saw, the threats were quick to materialize and, sooner rather
than later, the Cold War was the result.
The origins of the Cold War have been disputed often enough;
46
for the purposes of this Article, one need only observe that the onset
of the Cold War had substantial constitutional consequences for the
United States. The Cold War was not the first time that the United
States had endured something like a crisis government. But the pre-
vious crises-the Civil War, World War I, the Great Depression, and
World War II-had been imagined to be of limited duration. While
they were accompanied by a serious catalogue of constitutional viola-
tions, such violations were eventually condemned as being excesses of
a particular time, not affecting America's normal constitutional op-
eration or its constitutional aspirations.47 The Cold War was different:
it promised an indefinite future of crises and a perpetual alteration of
both separation of powers and individual rights. In short, the Cold
War ushered in an era of "permanent emergency" in which the con-
stitutional sacrifices that were to be made were not clearly temporary
or reversible.
The constitutional effects of the Cold War have been well-
documented. One was the rise of what Harold Koh has called the
"national security constitution," which concentrated foreign affairs
power almost exclusively in the presidency.48 In the mid-1930s the
46 The dispute roughly centers on who was more at fault for the start of the Cold War-the
Soviet Union or the United States. Immediate post-war American political analysts emphasized
the expansionist and aggressive aims of the Soviet Union as a reason for launching the United
States' new state of permanent war. Later, American historians, writing in the age of Vietnam,
tended to view the historical evidence differently, emphasizing that many domestic considera-
tions led the United States to interpret signals from the Soviet Union in the most negative pos-
sible light when they might have been understood as less threatening to American interests.
For more on the historiographic debate over the origins of the Cold War, see PETER NOVICK,
THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTVTY QUESTION" AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION
447-57 (1988).
47 Some of the major exceptions-Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus upon delegation
of this power by Congress, the Palmer Raids, the various attempts by President Roosevelt to cir-
cumvent judicial disapproval of the economic emergency measures during the Depression, the
initiation of martial law in Hawaii during the Second World War, and the detention of Japa-
nese-Americans during that war-are generally portrayed as being unusual and temporary mo-
ments in American history, at least in constitutional retrospect. But not all have been legally
repudiated. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu ?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in War-
time, 2003 WIS. L. REv. 273 (examining the claim that the U.S. government has often viewed its
abrogation of individual rights during security crises as unnecessary in retrospect).
48 HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 67-69 (1990).
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Supreme Court decision in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.
had, at least in dicta, indicated that the power to conduct foreign af-
fairs lay exclusively with the president. 9 But the institutional en-
trenchment of that extreme understanding of presidential powers in
foreign policy came in the post-World War II period with the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947. The National Security Act emerged
originally as a proposal from the armed services to ward off a serious
effort to merge the services at the end of the war.1 Instead, what re-
sulted from a combination of bureaucratic wrangling (the services
fought back against the merger) and the perception of an external
threat (the Soviet Union tightened its hold over Eastern Europe) was
a new unification of the command structure of the military in the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the creation of a new body, the National Se-
curity Council, that would give foreign policy advice directly to the
president. Perhaps most importantly, a Central Intelligence Agency
("CIA") was formed that was not under the command of the individ-
ual forces, as had been the case before, but that was instead directly
accountable to the president. The National Security Act reorganized
the foreign policy apparatus of the United States and placed it more
firmly in the hands of the president, out of the reach of Congress.
Though Congress had passed this law, Congress seemed to envision
no role for itself in the ongoing operation of the new national secu-
rity bureaucracy.
The National Security Act was accompanied by a new view of the
world, one that had the term "national security" at its heart. The ex-
pression "national security" had not been in common use before
World War 1.52 But its preeminence during and after the war sig-
naled a new understanding of what the foreign policy of the United
States was designed to protect. In particular, it allowed a wide range
of actions far afield in the world to count as direct threats to the
United States. As Daniel Yergin put it:
[W]hat characterizes the concept of national security? It postulates the
interrelatedness of so many different political, economic, and military
factors that developments halfway around the globe are seen to have
automatic and direct impact on America's core interests. Virtually every
development in the world is perceived to be potentially crucial. An ad-
verse turn of events anywhere endangers the United States. Problems in
foreign relations are viewed as urgent and immediate threats. Thus, de-
sirable foreign policy goals are translated into issues of national survival,
and the range of threats becomes limitless. The doctrine is characterized
49 299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936).
50 Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.
ch. 15 (2000)).
51 YERGIN, supra note 44, at 336-38.
512 Id. at 194.
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by expansiveness, a tendency to push the subjective boundaries of secu-
rity outward to more and more areas, to encompass more and more ge-
ography and more and more problems. It demands that the country as-
sume a posture of military preparedness; the nation must be on
permanent alert.... All of this leads to a paradox: the growth of Ameri-
can power did not lead to a greater sense of assuredness, but rather to an
enlargement of the range of perceived threats that must urgently be con-
fronted.53
The idea of national security, permanently emblazoned on the signa-
ture legislation of the Cold War, required that the United States
maintain a permanent army in a state of perpetual readiness because
small events anywhere in the world could be signs of a mortal danger
to the nation. "National security" was eventually filled with the reali-
zation that the primary enemy of the United States had weapons that
could destroy the entire country-and ultimately, the whole world-
on short notice. Little wonder that the Supreme Court's apparent
grant of executive power in Curtiss-Wright was taken up with special
urgency as the Cold War settled in. A president could not possibly
debate policy with Congress while there was an incoming Interconti-
nental Ballistic Missile. Nuclear missiles left no time for democratic
debate.
The edginess that produced the Cold War also produced a very
large number of emergencies. The newly established National Secu-
rity Council got to work and produced Paper 68 in April 1950, an
analysis that provided "the first comprehensive statement of a na-
tional strategy after World War II."54 It predicted "an indefinite pe-
riod of tension and danger. ,55 The perpetual legal state of emergency
began shortly thereafter. President Truman first declared a state of
emergency in response to the deteriorating situation in Korea in De-
cember 1950,56 a state of emergency that lasted nearly a quarter of a
57century. Under the policy of "containment," the United States saw
every attempt-or possible attempt-by the Soviet Union to expand
its influence as a direct threat to the United States. As a result, the
emergency declaration of 1950 was used to justify a number of other
foreign actions in the fight against communism.
Domestically, as part of the same effort, Truman announced the
power to classify government information bearing on national secu-
rity.s This latter move made it very difficult for anyone, including
53 Id. at 196.
54 Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1401 (1989)
(quoting Senator HenryJackson's characterization of National Security Council Paper 68).
55 Id.
5' Proclamation No. 2914, 15 Fed. Reg. 9029 (Dec. 19, 1950).
7 Lobel, supra note 54, at 1401.
58 Exec. Order No. 10,290, 16 Fed. Reg. 9795 (Sept. 24, 1951).
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Congress, to check on what was being done in the name of national
security. Under the cloak of national security secrecy, the U.S. gov-
ernment engaged for decades in abuses of rights to gather informa-
tion relevant in the struggle against the Soviet Union and to do what-
ever was necessary to prepare for imminent war. As the "Church
Committee"-named for its chair, Senator Frank Church-found in
the mid-1970s in its investigations into domestic surveillance since
World War II:
-Nearly a quarter of a million first class letters were opened and photo-
graphed in the United States by the CIA between 1953-1973, producing
a CIA computerized index of nearly one and one-half million names.
-At least 130,000 first class letters were opened and photographed by
the FBI between 1940-1966 in eight U.S. cities.
-Some 300,000 individuals were indexed in a CIA computer system and
separate files were created on approximately 7,200 Americans and over
100 domestic groups during the course of [the] CIA's Operation CHAOS
(1967-1973).
-Millions of private telegrams sent from, to, or through the United
States were obtained by the National Security Agency from 1947 to 1975
under a secret arrangement with three United States telegraph compa-
nies.
-An estimated 100,000 Americans were the subjects of United States
Army intelligence files created between the mid-1960s and 1971.
-Intelligence files on more than 11,000 individuals and groups were
created by the Internal Revenue Service between 1969 and 1973 and tax
investigations were started on the basis of political rather than tax crite-
ria.
-At least 26,000 individuals were at one point catalogued on an FBI list
of persons to be rounded up in the event of a "national emergency. "59
In addition, the U.S. government irradiated, without their consent,
more than 250,000 American citizens (most, but not all, in the mili-
tary) in experiments to test the effects of nuclear weapons. 60 In 1952,
Congress appropriated $775,000 to establish six detention camps un-
der the emergency detention provision of the Internal Security Act of
1950, though the camps were not used in the end . McCarthyism was
the extreme edge of the active attacks on suspected communists 6 2 but
59 S. REP. No. 94-755, bk. 2, at pp. 6-7 (1976) (citations omitted), microformed on CIS No. 76-
S963-2 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
60 Jill Elaine Hasday, Civil War as Paradigm: Reestablishing the Rule of Law at the End of the Cold
War, KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, Winter 1996, at 129, 138.
The details can be found in ROBERTJuSTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN
AMERICA: FROM 1870 TO 1976, at 322-66 (2001).
62 For the history of the McCarthy period in original documents, see generally
MCCARTHYISM: THE GREAT AMERICAN RED SCARE: A DOCUMENTARY HiSTORY (Albert Fried ed.,
1997).
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the domestic fight against communists led to a systematic reinterpre-
tation of the rights of both citizens and aliens.63 The persecution of
suspected communists through blacklisting, criminal prosecution,
and even execution 64 was accompanied by an alarming expansion of
the surveillance powers of the U.S. government, surveillance that also
included actions taken to disrupt groups and the personal lives of
their members well into the 1970s.65 Between the 19 50s and the
1970s, Congress passed about 470 statutes that empowered the execu-
tive branch to act under emergency powers. These statutes delegated
"power to the executive over virtually every facet of American life., 66
Following the intense political battles over Vietnam and Watergate
in the 1970s, when the presidency itself came into disrepute, Con-
gress reclaimed some of its powers in the perpetual state of emer-
gency. In one statute, Congress terminated all existing states of
emergency and provided more stringent rules for how such emer-
gencies should be declared in the future.67 But in another statute,
Congress extended the reach of states of emergency to international
63 I have elaborated elsewhere how this strong influence of the Soviet Union in American
constitutional law generated, upon closer inspection, a mixed legacy. Kim Lane Scheppele, As-
pirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying Cross-Constitutional Influences
Through Negative Models, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 296 (2003). The restrictions on civil liberties evi-
dent during the domestic search for communists occurred at the same time as the expansion of
civil liberties for African Americans, and the two were connected. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD
WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000). The Truman and
Eisenhower administrations, seeing the importance of the outcome of the Cold War in winning
the hearts and minds of the about-to-be-liberated colonies in Africa, repeatedly urged in briefs
to the Supreme Court that African Americans be assisted in their struggle for equality. The So-
viet Union had used the lack of equal rights of blacks in the United States as an effective propa-
ganda tool in its Cold War effort to win over the newly establishing states. Successive U.S. ad-
ministrations saw an important foreign policy interest in providing equal rights for African
Americans in order to counter the Soviet threat. Id.
64 The case of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg has recently been revisited with the opening of
the Soviet archive, which seems to show thatJulius was in fact a spy but not responsible for the
disclosure of atomic secrets, the specific allegation that resulted in his conviction and execu-
tion. There is no evidence to suggest that Ethel was ever a spy. Her brother, David Greenglass,
who has been the key witness against her in the trial, admitted several years ago in an interview
on 60 Minutes II that he lied in his testimony in order to protect himself and his wife. 60 Min-
utes I: The Traitor (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 5, 2001). Some suggest that FBI Director J.
Edgar Hoover knew of Ethel's innocence, but insisted that charges be pressed as a way of lever-
aging information from Julius, who could have secured her release by cooperating with the gov-
ernment.
65 This campaign of domestic surveillance, often starting to root out communist influence,
was documented by the "Church Committee," chaired by Senator Frank Church. The official
name of the committee was the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. See generally S. REP.
No. 94-755 (1976), microformed on CIS No. 76-S963 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
Lobel, supra note 54, at 1408.
67 National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, § 101, 90 Stat. 1255, 1255 (1976) (codified
at 50 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000)).
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economic affairs. s The War Powers Resolution represented another
attempt by Congress in this period to restore a role for the legislative
branch in committing American troops abroad, 69 and the Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") was designed to provide some
judicial check on the ability of the executive to engage in domestic
spying on those who were thought to be part of foreign-originated
plots without having to meet the high hurdles of the Fourth Amend-
ment warrant requirement.7 °
As most observers have noted, however, all of these attempts by
Congress to reclaim some of its lost foreign policy powers were, and
continue to be, quite ineffectual. 7' Not only has the president asked
permission of the Congress before committing the country to military
engagements or foreign policy obligations only as a matter of cour-
tesy rather than as a matter of law (and then only sometimes), but
Congress has typically not attempted to enforce any of its powers un-
der the 1970s-era legislation.72 The Cold War state of affairs, in which
the executive operated under nearly constant emergency powers with
a quiescent Congress refusing to intervene, continued. While one
might have thought that the midcourse correction of the 1970s would
have ended the period of executive government, the Iran-Contra af-
fair in the 1980s suggested otherwise.
Does the experience of Weimar have anything to contribute to
thinking about the U.S. government's uses of emergency powers in
the Cold War? Of course, the uses of emergency powers in Weimar
Germany were very different from those in post-World War II United
States. While in Weimar, the dissolution of the parliament marked
an end to separation of powers and a suspension of the constitutional
68 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 202, 91 Stat. 1625,
1626 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000)).
69 Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-46, 1547-48
(2000)).
70 Pub. L. No. 95-511, §§ 101-11, 92 Stat. 1783, 1783-96 (1978) (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1801-11 (2000)).
71 See KOH, supra note 48, at 116 ("Congress's ambitious attempts during the post-Vietnam
era to reassert its constitutional role in foreign policy making have met with limited success.");
Hasday, supra note 60, at 139 ("Congress's dominant foreign relations strategy during the Cold
War, one that ultimately did more than its emergency legislation to support crisis government,
was consistent acquiescence to presidential assertions of power."); Lobel, supra note 54, at 1414
(describing the success of congressional efforts to limit executive emergency powers as "dis-
mal"); see also Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agree-
ments, 86 CAL. L. REV. 671 (1998) (showing how the president has evaded the constitutional re-
quirement of gaining senate consent to treaties by using the parallel device of executive
agreements).
7 It is hard to tell how much of this was congressional lethargy and how much was caused by
the decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), which struck down the legislative veto, the
primary provision that Congress had inserted into the 1970s reform legislation as a device for
controlling the president.
73 KOH, supra note 48, at 101-16.
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framework altogether, the American government maintained its con-
stitutional institutions through the Cold War. American presidents
generally acted with congressional delegations of power, however
broad and vague they might have been. Courts reviewed and some-
times corrected the worst offenses;"4 Congress occasionally attempted
to curb the executive as well.7' The overall shape of the American
government, however, took on some of the same distinctive features
of crisis government that could be discerned in Weimar as many
powers were swept into the vortex of a constantly expanding execu-
tive branch.
In both Weimar Germany and the United States, executives
gained great powers through declarations of states of emergency,
powers that were used to justify both the use of force abroad and re-
strictions on rights at home. While the emergencies in Weimar
started as domestic ones, they did not remain domestic in their appli-
cation and they had even more devastating consequences when their
effects spread beyond the border. Conversely, while American emer-
gencies might have been triggered by events abroad during the Cold
War, eventually they came home as the U.S. government began to re-
alize that foreign and foreign-influenced enemies could not be kept
outside national borders. In short, in neither case was the state of
emergency confined to the area which had originally triggered its
application. In both Weimar and in the Cold War, states of emer-
gency generally spread from the reasonably perceived threat to a
wider and wider sphere of potential dangers with a smaller and
smaller evidentiary base for each expansion of the threat. Each new
threat, however slight, justified changing what had been the normal
rules of procedure to cope with the new form of danger.
Schmitt had emphasized, for Weimar, the need for the executive
to act unilaterally because parliamentary democracy could not sustain
the decisiveness necessary to cope with a mortal threat to the state.
In fact, according to Schmitt, the nature of the regime could itself be
defined in terms of the ability of the sovereign to put the rule of law
aside in order to cope with a serious danger. Successful democratic
74 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (striking down an
executive order directing the secretary of commerce to seize and operate many of the nation's
steel mills to avert a strike during wartime).
75 See, e.g., War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1541-46, 1547-48 (2000)) (requiring a declaration of war, specific statutory authori-
zation, or a national emergency created by an attack against the United States before the presi-
dent may engage the military in hostilities); S. REP. NO. 94-755 (1976), microformed on CIS No.
76-S963 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (stating that the extensive violations of civil liberties during the
Cold War concluded in a number of recommendations for new laws curbing executive power).
While many of the Church Committee's recommendations went nowhere, some became law.
See supra notes 67-70.
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governments required an illiberal core that could be exposed when
the state was endangered. The sovereign, in Schmitt's view, had ul-
timate responsibility for the continuing existence of the state, and
this was ultimately what gave the sovereign permission to set aside
constitutional rules to act directly to cope with the threat. As with
Schmitt's sovereign, American presidents could, acting in their offi-
cial capacities, slip out from under constitutional constraint at nearly
every turn. 7 While Schmitt imagined that this would occur because
the law would simply fail to cover these actions and the sovereign
would then have to step outside the law, the American constitutional
experience was slightly different. The U.S. Constitution has capa-
ciously expanded to adjust to all expansions of executive power with-
out appearing to fail. The Constitution's meaning has changed as it
has been aggressively interpreted by Cold War executives and as both
Congress and the courts ratified this new meaning through acquies-
cence. The Weimar Constitution may have broken under emergency
government, but the American Constitution bent.
After the end of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union surprisingly
released its satellites and then disbanded itself, one might have ex-
pected the American government to go back to the way it had been
before the Cold War began. At the very least, one might have ex-
pected the United States to rethink the extraordinarily lopsided ex-
ecutive government that had developed to respond to the Soviet
threat. But such was not the case. Though there were calls to "rees-
tablish[] the rule of law at the end of the Cold War,"77 Cold War hab-
its had ossified into permanent traits of constitutional character. The
American presidency is as strong, if not stronger, than ever. The
practical deference of courts to the political branches is nearly uni-
versal on all matters of foreign and military policy, including outsized
claims of national security. Congress has largely ceded its powers in
the realm of foreign policy, providing only lax and fitful oversight.
The balance of powers struck during the Cold War, with a bulked-up
executive, a wizened Congress, their disputes only partly subject to
refereeing by courts, remains largely intact.
76 What has gotten American presidents into serious trouble is either the authorization of
private crimes (Richard Nixon) or the conduct of private affairs (Bill Clinton). While presi-
dents have been defeated for failing to perform adequately, it is usually weakness (Lyndon
Johnson in Vietnam, Jimmy Carter with the Iranian hostage crisis, George H.W. Bush with the
economy) rather than strength that has defeated them. Excesses in the use of emergency pow-
ers or emergency-like powers (Ronald Reagan with Iran-Contra and John F. Kennedy in the
Cuban Missile Crisis) have rarely been the source of general presidential disrepute.
77 Hasday, supra note 60, at 129.
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II. AMERICA AFrER 9/11
A. The State of Exception in Domestic Policy
"Everything has changed," political commentators muttered
darkly, without specifying what "everything" was or in what direction
it had "changed." "The world after 9/11" has become a specific his-
torical moment, referred to as if it has a logic of its own.7' Those who
can clearly recall the United States before 9/11 may compare it with
the present moment and be shocked by the new mentalit, the self-
confident and blithely liberal United States has become haunted by
fear, more inward-looking, and less open to debate. As I will argue,
after 9/11, the Bush administration has declared an ever-expanding
state of exception in which more and more of the taken-for-granted
operating rules of American law have been suspended in the name of
the war against terrorism. This new state of exception bears many of
the features of Cold War exceptionalism at its height.
Terrorism was obviously not new with 9/11, nor were attacks by al
Qaeda against Americans new on that day. What changed was the
framework through which they were seen. As pre-9/11 books on ter-
rorism customarily noted, nations have a choice between thinking of
terrorist attacks as large crimes (on the model of organized crime or
other criminal conspiracies) or as small wars (on the model of insur-
gent attacks). 7  Under the Clinton administration, terrorist attacks
were seen primarily as big crimes with a small war component."" They
78 Historians are already considering what this moment means in the light of their
profession:
[H]ow transformative was September 11? Would it become an iconic historical event,
marking a transition in the history of the United States and of the world? Or was it in-
stead best understood as an aspect of pre-existing historical trajectories? Did it change
law, politics, religion, and culture, or did it instead simply provide a new site for political
and cultural conflicts that were already in play?
... We do not have the luxury to wait for this moment to settle more firmly into his-
torical memory. Understanding September 11 and its impact is a need, and a
responsibility, of our own.
Mary L. Dudziak, Introduction to SEPTEMBER 11 IN HISTORY: A WATERSHED MOMENT? 1, 2, 8
(Mary L. Dudziak ed., 2003).
For perhaps the best such account, see PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA: A
COMMONSENSE STRATEGY FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1998). It is significant that Professor
Heymann's post-9/11 book, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR
(2003), gives up on the crime strategy for confronting terrorism and instead attempts to argue
that in the "war" on terrorism, multilateral strategies and international law should guide Ameri-
can conduct.
80 As this article was in the editing stage, new information about the Clinton-era anti-
terrorism tactics emerged, showing that the Clinton White House had in fact been pursuing
more military options than were apparent at the time or in the several years after 9/11. See
NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, STAFF STATEMENT NO. 6: THE
MILITARY (2004), http://www.9-1 commission.gov/hearings/hearing8/stafflstatement.6.pdf;
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were handled as a first matter by the Department of Justice ("DOJ")
and ordinary criminal courts, even when they pertained to attacks on
U.S. interests overseas. Under the Bush administration, terrorist at-
tacks have been seen within the framework of not just a small war, but
of a world war. Along with that framework has come a reluctance to
81actively use or even to acquiesce in the jurisdiction of the courts,
and a sense that the Department of Defense ("DOD"), the military,
and the intelligence agencies patrol the front lines, even within the
United States.
Under the Clinton administration, the attacks on two American
embassies in Africa on the same day in 1998-one in Kenya and the
other in Tanzania-were treated as both war and crime. Several
cruise missiles were launched on locations in Afghanistan and Sudan
to get rid of what had been flagged as al Qaeda sites. But the most
sustained treatment of the embassy bombings framed them as a large
criminal conspiracy. Eventually, four defendants-including one
American citizen-were tried in the federal District Court for the
Southern District of New York in the spring of 2001 for plotting and
participating in the attacks. Several months of evidence-including
reports from FBI field officers, results of electronic monitoring,
physical evidence obtained through searches in multiple countries,
and confessions gathered in extensive interrogations abroad-
resulted in convictions of all four defendants on all counts."' Other
trials were conducted and resulted in guilty verdicts in the case of the
first World Trade Center bombing, the plot to blow up major sites in
New York City, and the plot to bomb the Los Angeles International
NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, STAFF STATEMENT No. 7:
INTELLIGENCE POLICY (2004), http://www.9-11 commission.gov/hearings/hearing8/staff
statement_7.pdf; RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES: INSIDE AMERICA'S WAR ON TERROR
(2004).
81 George W. Bush's State of the Union Address in January 2004 stated the case strongly:
I know that some people question if America is really in a war at all. They view ter-
rorism more as a crime, a problem to be solved mainly with law enforcement and in-
dictments. After the World Trade Center was first attacked in 1993, some of the guilty
were indicted and tried and convicted, and sent to prison. But the matter was not set-
tled. The terrorists were still training and plotting in other nations, and drawing up
more ambitious plans. After the chaos and carnage of September the 11th, it is not
enough to serve our enemies with legal papers. The terrorists and their supporters de-
clared war on the United States, and war is what they got.
President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html.
85
See United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Transcripts of the
trial, in which the specific uses of evidence can be seen, are available at FINDLAW,
http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/us/terrorism/cases/background.html (last visited May 26,
2004).
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Airport on the eve of the millennium. All were found to be al Qaeda-
related conspiracies .
It appeared from the Clinton administration's antiterrorism ef-
forts that it believed the ordinary criminal justice system was an effec-
tive tool for ensuring that those who plotted against the United States
and attempted to kill its citizens could be brought to justice on the
basis of public evidence in normal criminal proceedings. And the re-
sults-guilty verdicts in all cases-seemed to bear that belief out.
From the standpoint of Schmitt's political theory, the 1990s terrorist
attacks were deemed by the administration then in power to require
no state of exception. Instead, the United States showed itself to be
aggressively unexceptional in these circumstances, treating these at-
tacks on the country through normal procedures as a way of making a
point that the terrorists could not destroy American constitutional
values.s4 Of course, the situation was being monitored to determine if
83 The evidence presented at the trial of the so-called Millennial Bomber is laid out in Front-
line: Trail of a Terrorist (PBS television documentary, Oct. 25, 2001) (transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/trail/etc/script.html). The first World
Trade Center bombing and the subsequent foiled plots by Ramzi Yousef, who is believed to
have masterminded that bombing, are detailed in SIMON REEVE, THE NEW JACKALS: RAMZI
YOUSEF, OSAMA BIN LADEN AND THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM (1999).
That said, there were some elements of these al Qaeda trials that should give human
rights lawyers pause. The confessions that were the centerpiece of the African embassy bomb-
ing trials were obtained through interrogations lasting weeks in some cases, and in every case
without a lawyer present. All of the defendants signed statements saying that they waived their
right to counsel, but the only evidence offered that the confessions made by two of them were
voluntary or that the defendants understood what they were signing came from the interroga-
tors themselves. Thereafter, the confessions were introduced into evidence through the testi-
mony of the interrogators, who often spent days on the witness stand apparently quoting the
exact words of the defendants, even though everyone admitted that no tape recorder was used
and that the investigators only took notes detailing their conversations after the interrogations
were over--sometimes days and weeks later. The issue of whether the U.S. Constitution's right
to counsel applied to noncitizens interrogated abroad by U.S. officials seems to have been an
issue of first impression in this case. See Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 181, 187-89. In his deci-
sion, Judge Sand elaborated a modified version of the doctrine of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966) (holding that prosecutors may not use statements made during custodial interroga-
tion unless the defendant was first advised of his privilege against self-incrimination and his
right to counsel), for interrogations of noncitizens conducted by U.S. officers abroad. Id. at 188
n.16. In addition, some of the searches conducted abroad that netted evidence for this trial
were conducted without even superficial compliance with Fourth Amendment guarantees.
Whether the constitutional procedures for gathering evidence apply to evidence gathered
abroad more generally is a controversial proposition. See M.KB. Darmer, Beyond Bin Laden and
Lindh: Confessions Law in an Age of Terrorism, 12 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'y 319 (2003) (discuss-
ing the changing situation of Miranda warnings after 9/11); Mark A. Godsey, Miranda's Final
Frontier-The International Arena: A Critical Analysis of United States v. Bin Laden, and a Proposal
for a New Miranda Exception Abroad, 51 DUKE L.J. 1703 (2002) (analyzing and mapping out pro-
posals for how to apply Miranda rights internationally); Roberto Iraola, Self-Incrimination and the
Non-Resident Alien, 22 PACE L. REV. 1 (2001) (discussing applications of the self-incrimination
doctrine to non-resident aliens); Irvin B. Nathan & Christopher D. Man, Coordinated Criminal
Investigations Between the United States and Foreign Governments and Their Implications for American
Constitutional Rights, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 821 (2002) (discussing the interplay between the United
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the threat rose to the level of a military response, but by and large,
plots within the United States were thwarted using ordinary policing
methods,85 and their perpetrators were put on trial throughout the
1990s.
The 9/11 attacks changed that calculation, but not immediately.
At first, the Bush administration's DOJ and the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation ("FBI") acted as if the normal legal model were still in
play.6 Two of the first concrete suspects in U.S. custody in the new
war on terrorism-Zacarias Moussaoui and John Walker Lindh-were
charged with crimes in normal criminal proceedings even though
their alleged criminal activity involved participation in terrorist
plots.87
Moussaoui was publicly announced to have been the "twentieth
hijacker" on the presumption of symmetry-three of the four hi-
jacked planes on 9/11 had five hijackers, but one only had four.
Moussaoui, who was arrested prior to 9/11, had been originally
thought by the DOJ to have been slotted for that fifth seat on the
States and foreign governments on American constitutional rights); Jay Shapiro, Terrorism, the
Constitution, and the Courts, 18 N.Y.L. SCH.J. HUM. RTS. 189 (2002) (discussing the application of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to terrorists); Frank Tuerkheimer, Globalization of US. Law
Enforcement: Does the Constitution Come Along?, 39 HOUS. L. REv. 307 (2002) (discussing the use of
American constitutional values in dealing with foreign governments).
95 This may not be completely true, as ordinary criminal investigations were giving way at a
rapid pace to national security investigations. The number of warrants issued by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC") went up sharply in the 1990s, perhaps because of an
increased focus on terrorism investigations. When President Clinton came to power, about 500
warrants were granted annually for FISA searches. Electronic Privacy Information Center, For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act Orders 1979-2002 [hereinafter FISA Statistics], at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa-stats.html (last modified May 6, 2003). By
2000, that number had doubled to 1012. Id. Since no FISA warrant documents are public, it is
impossible to say for sure what caused the increase, but given the evident concern in the Clin-
ton White House with antiterrorism issues, it would not be far-fetched to suppose that the FISA
warrant increase tracked the increased hunt for foreign terrorists inside the United States.
86 The FBI's investigation procedures did not seem to change immediately after 9/11.
Later, on May 30, 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued new guidelines for the FBI to
follow in its terrorism investigations, which substantially lowered the showing necessary to use
intrusive means of surveillance in terrorism investigations. OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., DOJ,
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND
TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS (2002) [hereinafter ASHCROFT GUIDELINES],
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf.
87 The level of security and publicity that these cases received was, of course, far from nor-
mal. Likewise, the Attorney General's statements about the heinous activities of both went be-
yond the normal commentary practices of the office. Ashcroft said that Lindh's "allegiance to
those fanatics and terrorists never faltered, not even with the knowledge that they had mur-
dered thousands of his countrymen." Jane Mayer, Lost in the fihad: Why Did the Government's Case
Against John Walker Lindh Collapse?, NEW YORKER, Mar. 10, 2003, at 50. Ashcroft labeled Mous-
saoui's indictment a "chronicle of evil." Naftali Bendavid, PR War Rages in Terror Cases: U.S.,
Defense Lawyers Battle Relentlessly for Public Sympathy, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 7, 2002, § 1, at 12. In gen-
eral, though, both cases started off as normal serious crimes. In the end, both cases fell victim
to post-9/11 particularities.
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fourth plane. Since the case began, it has become less clear that
Moussaoui was a hijacker. Instead, it seems that Moussaoui was
probably an al Qaeda member in the United States awaiting instruc-
tions that never came for some further attack."8 Moreover, the Mous-
saoui case has become difficult for the DOJ because Moussaoui has
claimed the right to interrogate other high-level al Qaeda operatives
who are in U.S. custody, particularly Ramzi bin al-Shibh.8 9  Bin al-
Shibh has publicly claimed credit for organizing the 9/11 attacks and
may have said that Moussaoui had nothing to do with them.90 Judge
Brinkema, the trial judge assigned to the case, has insisted that Mous-
saoui have access to potentially exculpatory evidence as the normal
rules of criminal procedure require, but the government has insisted
that national security would be compromised by Moussaoui's access
to bin al-Shibh's testimony even under the restricted terms thatJudge
Brinkema approved.9' When the government openly refused to pro-
vide Moussaoui access to exculpatory witnesses, Judge Brinkema
dropped those charges against Moussaoui that would have implicated
him in the 9/11 attacks and that therefore would have carried the
death penalty. She left in place charges that Moussaoui was a mem-
ber of al Qaeda but ordered that no evidence of Moussaoui's connec-
tion with 9/11 could be presented at trial . This ruling was, for the
most part, upheld on appeal. 9 However, the final legal resolution is
88 In fact, at one stage in the proceedings, Moussaoui appeared to attempt to confess tojust
this set of facts. Transcript of Arraignment and Motions Hearing, United States v. Moussaoui,
282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003) (No. Crim. 01-455-A), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/transcripts/textmoussaoui.htm.
89 See, e.g., Philip Shenon, Future of Terror Case Is in Judge's Hands as Government Continues To
Block Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2003, at All (describing Moussaoui's attempts to interview
bin al-Shibh).
90 Id. ("Mr. Moussaoui has insisted that he had nothing to do with the [September l1th]
attacks and that Mr. bin al-Shibh could help prove his innocence.").
91 Judge Brinkema never required that bin al-Shibh be present in court, but instead ruled
that Moussaoui's right to compel witnesses on his behalf was satisfied if U.S. officials asked bin
al-Shibh the relevant questions in whatever location they deemed appropriate. United States v.
Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 487 (E.D. Va. 2003), affd in part and vacated in part, No. 03-
4792, 2004 WL 868261 (4th Cir. Apr. 22, 2004). Since the government refused to do even this,
the judge dropped all 9/11-related charges against Moussaoui. Order, United States v. Mous-
saoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003) (No. Crim. 01-455-A), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/moussaoui/usmouss82903ord.pdf.
Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 487.
United States v. Moussaoui, No. 03-4792, 2004 WL 868261 (4th Cir. Apr. 22, 2004). The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Judge Brinkema's conclusion that Moussaoui
should be granted access to exculpatory witnesses, but remanded the case to the district court
to "craft substitutions under certain guidelines." Id. at *21. Specifically, the court instructed
defense counsel to identify the portions of summarized deposition testimony that Moussaoui
wants to admit into evidence and permitted the government to argue for the inclusion of addi-
tional portions "in the interest of completeness." Id. The court was clear, however, that the
government is not to "attempt to use the substitutions to bolster its own case by offering what it
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far from clear. One possibility, hinted at in the press, is that the gov-
ernment will use the dropped charges as a reason for classifying
Moussaoui with the Guantinamo Bay detainees, eligible only for a
military tribunal where such rules about access to exculpatory evi-
dence do not apply.
94
John Walker Lindh was an American citizen captured while fight-
ing with the Taliban in Afghanistan. At first he was charged with
multiple counts that included charges of al Qaeda membership and
participation in a knowing attack on an American CIA officer. The
plea bargain that was eventually negotiated saw Lindh plead only to
having fought with the Taliban while carrying a gun. Because Lindh
was an American citizen, he was initially handled through ordinary
criminal procedure and his father, a lawyer clever about both the le-
gal and political options available at the time, organized a vigorous
legal defense that called the government's bluff about the concrete
evidence they had against Lindh. Virtually all of the evidence con-
sisted of Lindh's own statements, gathered in conditions that were
arguably coercive. The battle in an ordinary criminal courtroom
might have found (not certainly, but perhaps) that Lindh's self-
incriminating statements were excludable because of the govern-
ment's own misconduct in acquiring them. The government refused,
for example, to provide Lindh with needed medical assistance until
he told investigators what he knew and also refused to notify him that
his father had hired a lawyer on his behalf.9 5 Had these failures been
judged to constitute coercion in producing the incriminating state-
ments, the government's case would have been substantially weak-
ened. Even if the statements were ruled admissible in the end, the
government's handling of Lindh looked bad, and there was television
footage plus an internal leak from the DOJ as proof.96 Seeing the
weakness of their position, the DOJ bargained, a sure sign of business
as usual in the criminal justice system.
considers to be inculpatory statements" and that the substitutions "may be admitted only by
Moussaoui." Id.
94 The rules of evidence that will be in use at the military tribunals indicate at section 8:
"The Accused may obtain witnesses and documents for the Accused's defense, to the extent
necessary and reasonably available as determined by the Presiding Officer." This access may be
limited in order to safeguard "protected information" and to protect state secrets. DOD,
MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER No. 1 (2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/
dod/dod032102milcomord 1.pdf.
95 A DOJ lawyer, Jennifer Radack, went public with the information that she and others in
the DOJ had given the advice to the FBI agents interrogating Lindh in Afghanistan that Lindh
had to be told of counsel hired on his behalf and had to be given the right to have counsel pre-
sent if he so desired. Mayer, supra note 87, at 58-59.
96 Radack, the whistle-blowing DOJ lawyer, has since been dismissed and alleges that her fu-
ture employment has been blocked by government officials trying to retaliate against her. All
Things Gonsidered: Lindh Whistle-Blower Sees Smear Campaign (NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 20, 2004).
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So far, the handling of Moussaoui and Lindh through criminal
indictment and conviction generally has shown the government's
commitment to using ordinary criminal process where it can, just as
the Clinton administration had done. But there were two early signs
even in these cases that the previous status quo for handling terrorists
was changing. One came in matters of jurisdiction. While almost all
of the Clinton-era terrorism cases were handled in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, which by then had developed both the security ap-
paratus and the expertise in investigating and prosecuting al Qaeda-
related crimes, the new cases were brought in a far more conservative
federal jurisdiction, the Eastern District of Virginia. The Southern
District of New York could have been used as a venue since it in-
cluded the World Trade Center and was the location of the primary
grand jury that was convened after 9/11 to investigate the attacks.
But the DOJ decided instead to hold the trials in the district of the
Pentagon attacks, where it could be expected that any random jury
would have in it a number of military families and other federal civil
servants who were no doubt thought to be more sympathetic to the
government's position than New York liberals. Moreover, appeals
from the Eastern District of Virginia go to the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, widely thought to be the most conservative federal circuit
court. The jurisdictional changes did not signal a breakdown of the
normal rules; complex federal cases often present a legitimate choice
of venue. But they did signal that the previous standard operating
procedures were under challenge from within the DOJ and that there
had been a conscious decision not to follow Clinton-era practice by
locating the trials in New York.
The other early warning signal that the handling of terrorism sus-
pects was changing came in the controversy over whether John
Walker Lindh should have been able to consult with the lawyer his fa-
ther had hired for him when Lindh was interrogated in Afghanistan.
In Clinton-era practice, the DOJ's position had apparently been that
suspects interrogated abroad did have the right to counsel and had
to be given Miranda warnings (though in practice counsel turned
out not to be available). 9' The African embassy bombings trial
97 Given the split within American legal conservatism between social conservatives who tend
to be deferential to authority and libertarian conservatives who are not, a conservative federal
court did not necessarily guarantee that the Bush administration would prevail in its "state of
exception" arguments. But it was a surer bet than the more ideologically diverse Second Circuit
that the Southern District of New York appeals would have reached.
98 The Clinton-era practice can be seen most clearly in the testimony of the FBI agentsJohn
Anticev and Stephen Gaudin in the embassy bombings trial, United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F.
Supp. 2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). See also various transcripts of the trial, available at FINDLAW,
http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/us/terrorism/cases/background.html (last visited May 26,
2004). According to these agents, each of the foreign defendants had been informed of their
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prominently featured confessions on the part of two of the four de-
fendants, confessions made without a lawyer present. But in those
cases, there was no evidence that counsel had been alerted to the
suspects' detention and were trying to reach them. Moreover, the Af-
rican embassy bombing defendants questioned abroad were not U.S.
citizens and had never before set foot in the United States, making
their only connection with the United States the fact that they would
be tried there. Even that was sufficient for Judge Sand to rule that
Miranda warnings had to be given and that counsel had to be offered,
consistent with local availability. Though the judge ruled that the
part of the confession that one of the defendants made before the
Miranda warning was given was inadmissible, the bulk of the confes-
sion, which was made after the defendant had signed away his claims
to see counsel, was admissibleY One might imagine that since John
Walker Lindh was a U.S. citizen with counsel ready to provide legal
advice, the full Miranda protocol would have been required without
adjustment in his case. Both alternative explanations for the counsel-
less interrogation that Lindh endured-that either the agents in the
field did not get the information that Lindh had counsel or that the
DOJ knew but explicitly blocked this information from getting to
Lindhl0 -foreshadowed some of the hardball tactics that were to
come in denying counsel to those suspected of involvement with ter-
rorism post-9/11.01 Arguably, the non-American suspects in the em-
bassy bombings case were given more constitutional protection than
John Walker Lindh was given, even though, as later reports seem to
indicate, Lindh had less clear involvement with the terrorists than
had the embassy bombing suspects.
The normal rules of operating procedure for treating terrorists as
criminals broke down altogether after 9/11 in a general round-up of
terrorism suspects, most of whom were Muslim men from countries
right to counsel, told that there was no counsel that was practically available to them when in-
terrogated abroad, and then given the option of either going forward with the interrogation or
refusing to talk. The potentially coercive part of these interrogations could be seen when sus-
pects were told that if they refused to talk to American officials, they would be questioned in-
stead by local officials, whose sense of proper interrogation protocol might be, to say the least,
less polite. Not surprisingly, the suspects agreed to talk to the FBI agents. See Bin Laden, 132 F.
Supp. 2d at 173-81.
" Id. at 194.
100 For evidence of the latter position, see Mayer, supra note 87, at 50.
101 Counsel has been routinely denied to those suspected of being enemy combatants, both
at Guantinamo and within the United States. Moreover, those rounded up after 9/11 in a pre-
ventive detention sweep were routinely denied access to counsel in practical terms, according to
the report of the Office of the Inspector General. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. ("OIG"),
DOJ, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON
IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS
130-42 (2003) [hereinafter OIG REPORT], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/
full.pdf.
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where al Qaeda was active. Overtly pretextual reasons were used for
detaining suspects for whom there was very little (and often no) con-
crete evidence of their involvement with terrorism but whose suspi-
ciousness to federal officials made them targets of investigation any-
way. 02  As then-Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff was
quoted as saying, the policy of the DOJ in the immediate aftermath of
9/11 was that "we have to hold these people until we find out what is
going on."'0 3 Within weeks after the terrorist attacks, it appears that
at least 1200 men 1 4 were rounded up and detained, in many cases for
many months.05 No serious terrorism charge was brought against any
of them-all were eventually absolved of direct involvement in 9/11-
related activities (at least as far as has been made public).10 But many
of the detainees were deported on the basis of immigration viola-
tions, some being quite minor (though it is hard to tell for sure since
most of the deportation hearings were closed upon the insistence
of the DOJ)." 7 Other 9/11 detainees were charged with crimes
102 For the most thorough evidence to date on the detention of non-Americans after 9/11,
see the OIG REPORT, id., required by Congress under the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.), which painted a damning por-
trait of the pretextual reasons for extended detentions of terrorism suspects who were later
cleared.
103 See OIG REPORT, supra note 101, at 39 (quoting Alice Fisher, head of immigration issues
for the Criminal Division of the DOJ). Michael Chertoff has since been confirmed to a seat on
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
104 The exact figures are not known because the government stopped counting at 1200, after
the ever-increasing number had caused much interest from the press. According to the OIG
Report, "the Public Affairs Office stopped reporting the cumulative totals after the number
reached approximately 1,200, because the statistics became confusing." Id. at 1 n.2. The actual
totals will probably never be known.
105 The OIG Report indicates that, of the 762 detainees who entered the OIG's purview in
this report because they were involved with the immigration system, 89 were held for at least
three months, 53 were held for at least four months, 33 were held for at least five months, and
another 18 were held for more than six months. But 130 of the 762 cases were coded as having
"missing values" because the Inspector General's office was not able to determine how long the
men in question had been confined. Id. at 52 tbl.3.
106 The fact that so many were deported is probably a sign that they were not considered
dangerous. It is hard to imagine that the U.S. government would be convinced that someone
was involved with terrorism and then would send them off to plot from afar. But the case of
Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen deported by the United States to Syria where he claims he was
tortured for information, presents another possibility of what may have happened with the de-
portees. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Arar v. Ashcroft, No. 1:04-CV-00249-DGT
(E.D.N.Y. 2004), available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/septemberl 1 th/docs/
ArarComplaint.pdf.
107 The DOJ took the view that all hearings of the 9/11 detainees were to be summarily
closed to the public and to the press since national security information might be released.
This claim met different fates in different circuits. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
the DOJ argument, insisting that each hearing had to be presumptively open until such time as
the government could demonstrate that the release of a specific piece of national-security sensi-
tive information warranted the closure of the hearing. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303
F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). But the Third Circuit came out the other way, upholding the gov-
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unrelated to terrorism, though the maximum sentences in some of
the minor crimes were less than the length of time that the suspect
was held in custody awaiting resolution of these cases.' Still others
were held as "material witnesses" to testify before the grand jury con-
vened after 9/11 to hear terrorism-related evidence, though not all of
them actually testified in the end.'°9
In the meantime, the DOJ's own Office of the Inspector General
found credible evidence that some of the 9/11 domestic detainees
had been beaten while in custody, and that normal rules about access
to counsel, bond hearings, and notification of family members were
honored primarily in the breach. ° In the post-9/11 roundup of
Muslim men, the average length of detention was eighty days, and
more than 25% of the detainees were held for more than three
months."' Even after deportation orders were given, many of the de-
tainees were still held in U.S. custody to allow investigations to
ernment's claim to close all hearings without having to make an individualized showing. See
N.J. Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2215
(2003) (mem.).
108 E.g., United States v. Oulai, No. 02-00046-CR-J-20-TE (M.D. Fla. 2002) (unreported deci-
sion), affd, 88 Fed. Appx. 384 (11th Cir. 2003) (unpublished table decision). Tony Oulai was a
Roman Catholic from West Africa who had been detained trying to board a flight in the United
States with flight manuals, "Arabic language materials," and a stun gun in his checked luggage.
He admitted the flight materials and stun gun, but claimed that the foreign language material
in question was a French Bible. He was held first as a material witness in the terrorism investi-
gation, then detained on immigration charges which turned out to be unfounded, and finally
was jailed because he had allegedly lied to immigration officials who questioned him during his
detention. By the time motions were being filed prior to trial on this offense, he had already
been held for eight months even though the maximum sentence for the crime with which he
was charged was six months. Also, the crime for which he was eventually convicted-lying to
immigration officials-would arguably not have occurred if he had not been detained in harsh
conditions in the first place. For the details of this case, see Amy Goldstein, ' Want to Go Home':
Detainee Tony Oulai Awaits End of 4-Month Legal Limbo, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2002, at Al; Amy
Goldstein, No Longer a Suspect, But Still a Detainee: U.S. Won't Release or Deport Prisoner, WASH.
POST, May 27, 2002, at Al; Amy Goldstein, No Longer Material Witness, West African Still Detained,
WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2002, at A17; Jim Schoettler, September Detainee Cleared of Terrorist Activity:
Visitor Still Faces Charge, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Apr. 2, 2002.
109 The use of material witness warrants for grand jury proceedings was sharply contested and
produced within a few months of each other conflicting district court opinions in the same dis-
trict on the question of whether material witnesses could be detained indefinitely in conjunc-
tion with a grand jury proceeding. The Second Circuit resolved the conflict by ruling in favor
of the government's position that the material witness statute could be used in this way. Com-
pare United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that an innocent
person cannot be detained to secure grand jury testimony under the material witness statute),
rev'd, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003), with In Re Application of the United States for a Material Wit-
ness Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that the material witness statutes
does apply to grand jury witnesses).
110 OIG REPORT, supra note 101, at 111-85.
il Id. at 51.
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continue.' The result was, in practice, a regime of preventive deten-
tion-the holding of suspects in terrorism investigations without ter-
rorism charges and without a sufficient showing of evidence to legally
justify the detentions on that basis.' 1 Knowing that such a system of
pure preventive detention would not be constitutionally permissible
for long in the United States, the DOJ adopted a policy of "preventive
prosecution" 4 in which those suspected of involvement in terrorism
would be charged with whatever violation was ready at hand, such as
credit card fraud or "spitting on the sidewalk."' 1 5 The fig leaf of legal-
ity in the post-9/11 context grew primarily from the insincere asser-
tion that terrorism suspects were really being held for other criminal
or administrative investigations, most commonly for immigration vio-
lations. In the war on terrorism, the real reason for holding the sus-
pects was often not explicitly charged; instead, the reasons presented
to judges for detention were invented to simply hold the suspects in
prison until such time as the government deemed them safe to re-
lease."6
12 According to the OIG Report, the Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") had produced a
memorandum opinion in which it determined that the ninety-day period within which removal
of a deportable alien should be accomplished was not mandatory if the alien's continued deten-
tion was "supported by purposes related to the proper implementation of immigration laws."
Id. at 106. The memorandum concluded that the detainees were held properly because they
were still not yet cleared for terrorist connections, a proper purpose under the immigration
laws. As a result, the ninety-day period for removal could be indefinitely extended, according to
the OLC. Id.
113 Id. at 91-110.
14 The term and the policy were explained by Viet Dinh in his presentation at the annual
meeting of the Association of American Law Schools in Atlanta, Ga. on January 3, 2004. In his
Leventhal lecture before the District of Columbia Bar, Dinh further detailed the importance of
prevention strategies after 9/11. Assistant Attorney General Viet D. Dinh, Harold Leventhal
Annual Talk, Ordered Liberty in the Age of International Terrorism (June 7, 2002),
http://www.dcbar.org/for-lawyers/sections/administrative-law-and-agency-practice/dinh.
cfm.
115 Shortly after 9/11, Attorney General Ashcroft announced that aggressive prosecution of
minor offenses would in fact be his policy:
Robert Kennedy's Justice Department, it is said, would arrest mobsters for spitting on the
sidewalk if it would help in the battle against organized crime. It will be the policy of this
Department ofJustice to use [the] same aggressive arrest and detention tactics in the war
against terror. Let the terrorists among us be warned: If you overstay your visas, even by
one day, we will arrest you. If you violate a local law, we will hope that you will and work
to make sure that you are put in jail and be kept in custody as long as possible. We will
use every available statute. We will seek every prosecutorial advantage. We will use all
our weapons within the law and under the Constitution to protect life and enhance secu-
rity for America.
Morning Edition: President Bush, Tom Ridge and John Ashcroft on Ways to Combat Terrorism (NPR ra-
dio broadcast, Oct. 25, 2001).
116 What I have not been able to figure out, however, is whetherjudges presiding over crimi-
nal proceedings on charges of credit card fraud or perjury, for example, were told about the
suspicions of terrorist activities before or during the trial, or at sentencing time.
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The next departure from previously normal standards came with
the development of new guidelines for surveillance and investigation
of terrorism-related activities. While the USA PATRIOT Act has got-
ten much of the attention in the public criticism of the Bush admini-
stration's approach to the 9/11 investigations, much of what the USA
PATRIOT Act contained was nothing particularly new, even though it
might be justifiably described as disturbing. "7 Moreover, the new
powers were generally attached to sunset provisions that expire at the
end of 2005. As the Federalist Society White Paper on the criminal
procedure provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act put it, "[t]he criminal
procedure and related sections of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001
generally do not 'push the envelope' of constitutional limits. 'n. The
Act did, however, codify practices that had previously been fixed only
in court decisions, which makes these practices harder to change af-
ter the crisis has passed. Further, some of the provisions were both
new and alarming.
The USA PATRIOT Act codified the cramped understanding of
the Fourth Amendment search and seizure provision as it had been
developed in successive judicial retreats from Warren Court prece-
dents-that only nonconsensual, 9 particularly intrusive120 searches
required full-scale "probable cause" warrants under the Fourth
Amendment.12 1 Other searches (including examining private data-
117 See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered
titles of U.S.C.). By pointing out that many of the USA PATRIOT Act's provisions constituted
nothing new, I do not mean to imply that they are not serious. But after the high point of the
Warren Court's criminal procedure jurisprudence, the tendency of American courts had been
to restrict rights granted to criminal defendants, particularly with respect to defendants' rights
in the course of criminal investigations. As a result, many of the "rights" that the USA
PATRIOT Act appeared to limit had already been scaled back by courts. Just as the National
Security Act represented "nothing new" in placing control of foreign affairs directly into the
hands of the president after a particularly hardball interpretation of United States v. Curtiss-
WightExp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), so the USA PATRIOT Act did little new, legally speaking,
in consolidating the growing set of already defendant-hostile federal court decisions.
18 KENT SCHEIDEGGER ET AL., FEDERALIST SOCIETY WHITE PAPER ON THE USA PATRIOT ACT
OF 2001: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SECTIONS, 2001 FEDERALIST SOC'Y FOR L. & PUB. POL'Y STUD. 17,
http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Terrorism/TerrorCrimPro.pdf.
"Nonconsensual" is defined in this area of constitutional criminal procedure as surveil-
lance without the consent of any of the parties to the interactions. So, if one person agrees to
wear a microphone in order to record the conversation of another person, the recording is
considered "consensual" even if the bugged party didn't agree to it. Such surveillance did not
recgire a probable cause warrant in normal criminal investigatory practice before 9/11.
"Particularly intrusive" searches are those that involve physically entering a private dwell-
ing or recording conversations in a nonconsensual manner, or otherwise (for example, virtu-
ally) monitoring a person's activities in private places. Observing someone in public, gaining
access to information about a person through means available to the general public, or gather-
ing information with the consent of someone who does have legitimate access to the informa-
tion did not require a warrant before 9/11.
121 The USA PATRIOT Act authorized the approval of "roving searches" in which a court in
Jurisdiction X is now empowered to authorize a wiretap on all of the phones of a particular tar-
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bases, 2 monitoring public places, and interviewing friends and ac-
quaintances) did not require probable cause warrants even before
the USA PATRIOT Act went into effect, and the USA PATRIOT Act
could be seen as simply consolidating these judicial understandings.
Some, though significantly not all, courts had previously agreed that
"sneak and peek" searches (in which the target of the search would
not be notified immediately that such a search had occurred) were
not violations of Fourth Amendment search standards before such a
provision was included in the USA PATRIOT Act.
12
1
FISA!24 had already allowed senior FBI officials to gain access to
get, even the phones that were not in Jurisdiction X. This provision was urged to streamline the
prior process in which separate warrants were required in each jurisdiction where there was a
target phone. See USA PATRIOT Act § 216 (regarding trap and trace orders). The principle of
roving searches was extended to physical searches in Section 219 and to email content in Sec-
tion 220.
For a particularly helpful review of the circumstances under which warrants were not re-
quired for search, detention and arrest under federal criminal procedure before the USA
PATRIOT Act, see Theodore P. Metzler et al., Thirtieth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: War-
rantless Searches and Seizures, 89 CEO. L.J. 1084 (2001).
12 For example, prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, it had not been clear
whether telephone and electronic communications (cable and Internet) providers had to notify
their customers when law enforcement officers asked for personally identifiable information.
Now it is clear that law enforcement may require communications providers to keep such in-
formation secret from the targets of the investigation. This provision does not sunset. The USA
PATRIOT Act still allows cable operators to keep private video subscription records. DOYLE,
TERRORISM, supra note 4, at 11. Service providers were already under obligation to assist law
enforcement when asked. Id. at 19.
123 The circuits were divided on this issue before Congress wrote the USA PATRIOT Act.
The Fourth Circuit had already ruled that delayed notification of searches and seizures of in-
tangible evidence were not violations of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Simons,
206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000). But the Ninth Circuit had said that they were unconstitutional.
See United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986). The Second Circuit took a position
somewhere in between, declining to address the constitutional question by locating the disclo-
sure requirement in Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See United States v.
Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1993). In a related context, the Supreme Court has held in
the "knock and announce" situation that police do not have to announce their entry into a
dwelling beforehand if "it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime." See Richards v.
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997). More recently, the Court held that a fifteen- to twenty-
second pause between the knock and announcement and a forcible entry passes constitutional
muster if the police believe that evidence may be destroyed with a longer delay. See United
States v. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 521, 526 (2003). If the Court would countenance police knocking
down the door without announcing themselves first or waiting only the briefest time after doing
so, it seems hard to imagine that the Court would require the police to announce surreptitious
searches in the absence of the target contemporaneously with the search. The "sneak and
peek" provision of the USA PATRIOT Act does not sunset.
124 FISA was passed in 1978 as a way of regularizing American spying on foreign spies. For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, §§ 101-11, 92 Stat. 1783, 1783-96
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11 (2000)). But the reach of FISA includes all those
who are "agents of foreign powers." A "foreign power" is, significantly, not limited to govern-
ments. As defined in FISA, a "foreign power" is:
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the
United States;
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the records of common carriers, public accommodation providers,
physical storage facility operators, and vehicle rental agencies in their
surveillance of foreign agents before the USA PATRIOT Act.2 5 The
(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of United States
persons;
(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be
directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments;
(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor;
(5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of United States
persons; or
(6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.
50 U.S.C. § 1801 (a) (2000).
Part 5 is of particular concern since any foreign-based political organization-Amnesty In-
ternational, the Human Rights Committee of the International Bar Association, or the Catholic
Church, for example-could easily count as a foreign power under this definition.
An "agent of a foreign power" is defined in FISA as:
(1) any person other than a United States person, who-
(A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power, or as a
member of a foreign power as defined in subsection (a) (4) [see above-this is a ref-
erence to terrorist groups];
(B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in clandestine intelligence
activities in the United States contrary to the interests of the United States, when the
circumstances of such person's presence in the United States indicate that such per-
son may engage in such activities in the United States, or when such person know-
ingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of such activities or knowingly conspires
with any person to engage in such activities; or
(2) any person who-
(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or on be-
half of a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a violation of the
criminal statutes of the United States;
(B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a foreign
power, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities for or on
behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a viola-
tion of the criminal statutes of the United States;
(C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that are in
preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power;
(D) knowingly enters the United States under a false or fraudulent identity for or on
behalf of a foreign power or, while in the United States, knowingly assumes a false or
fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign power; or
(E) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described in sub-
paragraph (A), (B), or (C) or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in ac-
tivities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
Id. § 1801(b).
For the purposes of FISA, a "United States person" includes citizens, permanent resident
aliens, organizations consisting primarily of U.S. natural persons, and U.S.-registered corpora-
tions. § 1801(i). As a result, there are laxer standards for spying on those who are not U.S. per-
sons; only their connection to a "foreign power" has to be established. For U.S. persons, evi-
dence of some criminal activity seems to be required, though § 1801 (b) (2) (E) seems to allow
the nexus between the individual and criminal activity to consist only of "aiding or abetting" a
crime. All parts of the statute pertaining to U.S. persons require specific knowledge. For more
on FISA, see the Federation of American Scientists' Intelligence Resource Project's listing of
primary documents. Fed'n of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Project: Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Act, at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ (last modified May 6,
2004). See also infra notes 165-76 and accompanying text.
i5 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1810 (2000).
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USA PATRIOT Act extended the range of objects that could be
sought to include "any tangible things (including books, records, pa-
pers, documents and other items)."' It also extends the number of
officials who may ask for such records.'2 The more radical extension
of the FISA search provision is that items that are sought need not di-
rectly relate to an identified "foreign agent," but may be sought in
conjunction with any investigation into international terrorism more
generally. 28  All that the government must demonstrate in these
cases, then, is that the information might be relevant to a terrorism
investigation in general, not that it implicates a particular person who
is the target of the FISA warrant. And the government may then in-
sist that the person or organization on whom the warrant is served
not reveal that the information was ever sought.'2 In another
change, FISA warrants previously had to specify the precise locations
where the surveillance would be carried out; under the USA
PATRIOT Act, so-called "roving warrants" are permitted, broadening
all FISA warrants to include any location (including locations not
named in advance) where the target is likely to be.13  Such warrants
were also extended from having a 90-day limit to having a 120-day
limit.' 3' Nonetheless, all of these provisions broadening the timing
and locations of valid FISA warrants and the set of objects to which
they may apply are set to sunset at the end of 2005 unless they are re-
newed.
To my mind, the most worrisome novel aspect of the USA
PATRIOT Act involves the changes the Act made to the threshold
standard for getting a FISA warrant in the first place. Before the USA
PATRIOT Act, a FISA warrant could only be issued upon a govern-
ment showing that national security surveillance was "the purpose" of
the search. This limited FISA warrants to instances where the gov-
ernment could assert to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
("FISC") that the surveillance was undertaken exclusively for national
'33security purposes.
126 USA PATRIOT Act § 215. This provision sunsets through Section 224.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. Unlike in the "sneak and peek" provisions, where the target of the search has to be
notified eventually, even if with a delay, the FISA provisions require perpetual secrecy.
1o Id. § 206. This provision sunsets through Section 224.
Id. § 207. This provision sunsets through Section 224.
1.2 The sunset provision of the USA PATRIOT Act is contained in Section 224.
13 As Peter Swire notes in a forthcoming article, one way that this assertion was to be accom-
plished was through the range of signatures that had to appear on the warrant. FISA warrants
in their original form under the 1978 legislation had to contain the signatures not only of the
lawyer who drafted the warrant, but also those of the head of the intelligence agency and the
Attorney General personally. These signatures would reassure the FISAjudge that the purpose
of the surveillance was what it claimed to be, and not an attempt to obtain evidence for criminal
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The USA PATRIOT Act, significantly, changed this standard so
that the government need only assert that "a significant purpose" of
the requested surveillance is national security. 4 This implies that
there may be other purposes for surveillance, such as gathering in-
formation for criminal investigations. While a number of courts had
previously admitted in criminal trials evidence collected under the
lower probable cause standards attached to FISA surveillance even
before the USA PATRIOT Act was passed,' 5  there was still a meaning-
ful distinction within the DOJ's investigatory structure between
criminal investigations and national security investigations. Peter
Swire explains that this distinction (also known as "the wall") origi-
nated with FISA and was policed by the head of the Office of Intelli-
gence Policy and Review ("OIPR") within the DOJ. Under OIPR's
strict review, intelligence information was occasionally passed on to
the criminal investigation side for use in trials, and courts had al-
lowed such evidence to be admitted upon a showing that the infor-
mation had been originally collected for bona fide national security
purposes in the first place. As Swire puts it, "there has always been a
gate in the wall. '36 Still, there was a wall. Once the standard for issu-
ing FISA warrants was changed by the USA PATRIOT Act, it was only
a matter of time before the wall collapsed.1 7
Another clear novelty of the USA PATRIOT Act came in allowing
information gathered in the course of a grand jury proceeding to be
shared with intelligence services if it relates to the possibility of for-
eign attack or concerns foreign agents that may be spying or
planning assaults on U.S. interests.' Before the Act, grand jury
investigations through this less rigorous channel. Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Law, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript on file with author).
I" USA PATRIOT Act § 218.
135 In virtually all published opinions in this area, courts seemed always to admit evidence
gathered under FISA warrants, though they were divided on what the relevant test was to admit
this evidence. Some courts indicated that the original FISA warrant had to indicate that seeking
foreign intelligence information was the purpose of the search (where "the" purpose implied
the "only" purpose). United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77-78 (2d Cir. 1984). Other courts
indicated that evidence collected under a FISA warrant was admissible in a criminal trial when
foreign intelligence gathering was the "primary purpose" for the warrant. United States v. Pel-
ton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1074-76 (4th Cir. 1987). The "primary purpose" test was first articulated in
a pre-FISA case, United States v. TruongDinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915-16 (4th Cir. 1980). The
USA PATRIOT Act significantly changed the relevant test to "significant purpose." USA
PATRIOT Act § 218.
136 Swire, supra note 133 (manuscript at 20).
137 The wall was eventually knocked down altogether by the decision of the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Court of Review. See infra notes 157-76 and accompanying text. For now,
we continue our review of the USA PATRIOT Act changes.
138 USA PATRIOT Act § 203.
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information could only be shared outside the grand jury room for law
enforcement purposes.
Changes were also made by the USA PATRIOT Act in the area of
immigration law. The attorney general was given broader powers to
detain aliens without charges-specifically, upon a showing that he
has "reasonable grounds to believe" that those detained are engaged
in activity that threatens national security.'4 The USA PATRIOT Act
limits such detentions to seven days. But Attorney General John
Ashcroft adopted an emergency interim rule for detaining aliens on
less than probable cause for "an additional reasonable period of
time.',4 ' Given the lengths of time that the 9/11 detainees were held
without being charged, 142 one might guess that the government has
been operating on the Attorney General's rule rather than under the
USA PATRIOT Act's more restrictive provisions.
Probably the biggest changes in preexisting law (at least so far as
the non-security-cleared can tell) came in the area of investigatory
methods authorized not by the USA PATRIOT Act, but instead by the
curious legal device known as the "Attorney General Guidelines.' 143 It
may come as a surprise to those who have never tracked the technical
legal basis of the FBI that it has never had a charter statute-one that
sets up the institution in law, explains its mission and generally regu-
lates the contours of its mandate. Instead, the FBI, located within the
DOJ, is regulated piecemeal through statutes that provide legal re-
quirements for particular methods of investigation (e.g., procedures
to follow before wiretaps can be authorized are given by statute).'4
But no statute governs the overall shape of investigations and when
investigatory tools short of warrant-triggering searches can be used.
Instead, these matters are governed by guidelines of the attorney
general. 4 5  These guidelines do not have to pass a notice-and-
comment procedure, and do not exist as formal federal regulations at
139 DOYLE, TERRORISM, supra note 4, at 7.
140 USA PATRIOT Act § 412.
141 Custody Procedures, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,334 (Sept. 20, 2001) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 287).
142 The OIG Report indicates that about 16% of the detainees in the Fall 2001 roundup were
held for more than ten days without being served with an NTA (notice to appear), which signals
the start of the charging process. (For 15% of those detained, there is missing data.) See OIG
REPORT, supra note 101, at 30 tbl.1.
143 On the Attorney General's Guidelines generally, see John T. Elliff, The Attorney General's
Guidelines for FBI Investigations, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 785 (1984), and the set of primary docu-
ments posted on the Electronic Privacy Information Center website at http://www.epic.org/
privacy/fbi.
144 For example, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 regu-
lates electronic searches. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 212 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (2000)).
145 The practice began with Attorney General Edward Levi after the Church Committee had
exposed the excesses of the FBI's surveillance programs. See Elliff, supra note 143.
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all. Any attorney general can modify them at will without using even
the procedure required for the modification of ordinary federal
rules. 46
In May 2002, Attorney General Ashcroft issued a new version of
these little-noticed guidelines and in so doing made, in my view, even
more substantial changes in the normal operating procedure of the
FBI in domestic surveillance and investigation than the USA
PATRIOT Act did. Ashcroft's guidelines lowered the threshold of
suspicion at which agents were allowed to use informants and under-
cover activities to find out more, indicating that only mail openings
and nonconsensual electronic surveillance were categorically prohib-
ited at the "preliminary inquiry" stage. Now such intrusive tech-
niques can be used whenever there is "information or an allegation
which indicates the possibility of criminal activity."147 Whereas earlier
guidelines required that an FBI agent go through a series of stages,
from checking leads, to initiating a preliminary inquiry, to launching
a full investigation, the current guidelines allow agents to move to the
full investigation level without going through the earlier stages.48
The guidelines make explicit the point that "[p]reventing future
criminal activity, as well as solving and prosecuting crimes that have
already occurred, is an explicitly authorized objective of general
crimes investigations"1 49 and that the standard for launching a full in-
vestigation is a "reasonable indication" that a crime "has been, is be-
ing, or will be committed." 150 To drive the point home, the Ashcroft
guidelines note, as had earlier guidelines, that "[t]he 'reasonable
indication' threshold for undertaking such an investigation is
146 They are not, for example, in the Federal Register, and getting copies of the guidelines in
effect before the emergence of the Internet was exceedingly difficult. In the comparisons that
follow, I compare Ashcroft's guidelines with the most recent version that had been used by the
DOJ before 9/11, which were guidelines last amended by Attorney General Dick Thornburgh
in 1989. OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., U.S. DOJ, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON
GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND DOMESTIC SECURITY/TERRORISM
INVESTIGATIONS (1989) [hereinafter THORNBURGH GUIDELINES], http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/
readingroom/generalcrimea.htm. As one might imagine, Reagan-era guidelines were already
substantially more law-and-order oriented than the first regulations written under the tenure of
EdwardJ. Levi in the aftermath of the Church Commission Report. But that comparison is be-
yond the scope of this article.
147 ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 86, at 1. The previous guidelines indicated that these
allegations had to be in writing, a requirement that has apparently been dropped. See
THORNBURGH GUIDELINES, supra note 146, at pt. II(B) (2).
148 ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 86, at 2.
149 Id. The previous guidelines added at this point: "With respect to criminal activity that
may occur in the future but does not yet involve current criminal conspiracy or attempt, par-
ticular care is necessary to assure that there exist facts and circumstances amounting to a rea-
sonable indication that a crime will occur." THORNBURGH GUIDELINES, supra note 146, at pt.
II(C) (2). This sentence has been dropped from the current guidelines.
150 ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 86, at 2.
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substantially lower than probable cause." 5' The previous guidelines
then went on to say: "However, the standard does require specific
facts or circumstances indicating a past, current, or impending viola-
tion. There must be an objective, factual basis for initiating the inves-
tigation; a mere hunch is insufficient.' ' 152  The Ashcroft guidelines
have dropped that cautionary language. In fact, more aggressive in-
vestigations seem to be actively encouraged in the post-9/11 version:
The conduct of preliminary inquiries and investigations may present
choices between the use of investigative methods which are more or less
intrusive, considering such factors as the effect on the privacy of indi-
viduals and potential damage to reputation. Inquiries and investigations
shall be conducted with as little intrusion as the needs of the situation
permit. It is recognized, however, that the choice of techniques is a mat-
ter of judgment. The FBI shall not hesitate to use any lawful techniques
consistent with these Guidelines, even if intrusive, where the intrusive-
ness is warranted in light of the seriousness of a crime or the strength of
the information indicating its commission or potential future commis-
sion. This point is to be particularly observed in the investigation of ter-
rorist crimes and in the investigation of enterprises that engage in terror-
ism. 153
In addition to changing the level of aggressiveness with which ter-
rorism-related investigations may be initiated, the new guidelines
greatly increased the amount of information that may be retained
from these investigations by establishing a "database that identifies all
preliminary inquiries and investigations conducted pursuant to these
Guidelines and that permits the prompt retrieval of information con-
cerning the status (open or closed) and subjects of all such inquiries
and investigations."'5 Such a database appears to be new. Moreover,
in addition to this database of FBI-generated information, another
even more sweeping database is authorized by the guidelines, a data-
base that tracks all information that can be discovered about sus-
pected terrorists:
[The database is authorized to contain] pertinent information from any
source permitted by law, including information derived from past or on-
going investigative activities; other information collected or provided by
governmental entities, such as foreign intelligence information and
lo6kout list information; publicly available information, whether ob-
tained directly or through services or resources (whether nonprofit or
151 Id.
152 THORNBURGH GUIDELINES, supra note 146, at pt. 1I(C) (1).
15 ASHCROF-r GUIDELINES, supra note 86, at 7.
154 Id. at 21.
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commercial) that compile or analyze such information; and information
voluntarily provided by private entities.1
5
5
155 Id. at 21-22. "Private entities" may sound innocuous enough, but there are private groups
which collect information on their own that the government either would be restricted by fed-
eral law in collecting or would have to clear a great many hurdles to gather. The private groups
can get this information without such bureaucratic delays and now can provide it on their own
initiative to the government, which can then add it to the governmental databases.
The scope of such "private investigations" can be quite breathtaking, causing them to raise
serious questions about whether the legal frameworks put in place to regulate the FBI, flexible
as they are, are being evaded. As Steven Emerson, head of the Investigative Project, a group
specializing in private investigations of Islamist terrorism, has revealed:
People in law enforcement would regularly come to me with new data, records, and
documents. The most disturbing were the calls I would get from federal law-
enforcement agents who had information and wanted to follow up, but were being pre-
vented by their superiors who weren't interested in these things. More and more, these
disgruntled agents turned to us with information that they weren't allowed to pursue
themselves.
Our operations became more sophisticated and far-reaching. One of the unex-
plored mountains of evidence we inherited, for example, was the trial exhibits from the
first World Trade Center bombing. Included were the records of thousands of phone
calls made by the suspects to the Middle East and other parts of the world. We knew the
individuals who were placing the calls, but we couldn't tell who had received them. Yet it
was obvious that this was the key to investigating how far the network of international
terrorism had extended.
We divided the list of calls up country by country. Then, we engaged a number of
Arabic speakers and started making cold calls. Every night at midnight-when the tolls
were low and it was daylight on the other side of the world-we would begin dialing
numbers in the Middle East. When someone picked up we would engage him in ran-
dom, nondescript conversation. "How are you? How are things going? I'm calling from
the U.S. Do you want to know what's happening here?" One way or another we tried to
get them to talk to us.
More than 49 out of 50 calls would be a dead end. The person answering would
hang up or wouldn't have any idea of what we were talking about. But that one in fifty
proved to be a treasure trove of information. At one point we ended up talking to the
son of blind Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the infamous Jersey City imam who plotted a
day of terror for Manhattan. Another time we reached the spiritual leader of the Pales-
tinian Islamic Jihad. Little by little it became obvious that all these groups were coordi-
nating their effort in a worldwide network.
Then one day the phone rang, and we hit an absolute gold mine. The caller was a
brave Sudanese who was a member of the Republican Brotherhood, a group opposed to
Dr. Hassan al-Turabi's fundamentalist regime in Sudan. He was now working as a
plumber in Brooklyn. He was in the basement of a building and had just come across
scores of boxes of old records that appeared to be the property of Alkhifa Refugee Cen-
ter, also known as the Office of Services for the Mujahideen, the predecessor to Osama
bin Laden's al Qaeda international network. The records had apparently been moved
there after the World Trade Center bombing from Alkhifa headquarters at the AI-Farooq
Mosque on Atlantic Avenue. He wondered if we would be interested.
We immediately contacted the FBI in New York and Washington. To our utter
amazement, they said they couldn't do anything about it. The field agents were very in-
terested but when they ran it up to their superiors, they were told it wouldn't fly. We
even smuggled out a few pages to pique their interest but the superiors would not
budge. Then we got word that the documents were about to be moved or perhaps even
destroyed in about five days.
So we decided to pull off our own covert operation. Our Sudanese contact went
into the building at midnight to do his job carrying several large toolboxes. He then
immediately emptied the toolboxes and filled them with documents. We met him at the
rear of the building in a rented van. We grabbed the toolboxes, each containing about
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In addition to creating new databases for storing information
about terrorist suspects and terrorism investigations, the guidelines
also indicate that the FBI will be authorized (in a change of policy) to
"visit any place and attend any event that is open to the public," as
well as "to conduct online search activity and to access online sites
and forums on the same terms and conditions as members of the
public generally."1 56 These practices had been explicitly disallowed
under the previous guidelines because undercover infiltration of po-
litical groups had previously led to shocking abuses.
What is disturbing about the Ashcroft guidelines in the context of
a discussion about emergency powers is how unaccountable they are
to anything resembling a democratic process. The attorney general
can change policy quite radically on just his own say-so without either
congressional approval or even a rule-making process that requires
public input. And given the secrecy surrounding the authorized in-
vestigations, it will be difficult for anyone illegally surveilled to chal-
lenge the practices until visible damage has been done. Since the
guidelines were issued, Attorney General Ashcroft shows every sign of
expanding his powers as far as he can.
Under these new guidelines, Ashcroft pushed the envelope of
prior practice by seeking FISA157 warrants in cases where the clear in-
tent of the FBI was to engage simultaneously in foreign intelligence
collection and criminal investigation. The USA PATRIOT Act had
officially changed the standard for obtaining FISA warrants from a
showing that foreign intelligence was "the purpose" of the surveil-
lance or search to a showing that foreign intelligence was "a signifi-
cant purpose" of the investigation. 8 The tricky part, legally speaking,
came when FISA warrants were requested in order to spy not just on
non-resident aliens, who have little protection under FISA, but also
4,000-5,000 documents, and raced off to a Kinko's in Manhattan where we spent all
night feverishly photocopying the material. Then we would race back to the building by
6:00 A.M. and return them to the plumber so he could put them back before the build-
ing owners showed up for work. We did this for three straight nights.
The papers contained financial records, address books, information about the fabri-
cation of passports, and countless other materials showing the Alkhifa Refugee Center's
involvement in the worldwide jihad movement. When we returned to the building the
fourth night, however, our contact didn't show up. We waited and waited but by 7:00
A.M. we were very fearful that something had happened to him. We left and found out
later that something had triggered the building owners' suspicion and they had caught
him. While we were waiting outside he was being questioned and threatened in the
basement. He is a tough guy, however, and somehow got out of it. We ended up keep-
ing the original records instead of copies. Altogether, we only retrieved about one-
quarter of the information that was there, but it was great material. We got thousands of
leads. Nonetheless, I still think it would have been much better had the FBI gone in.
STEVEN EMERSON, AMERICANJIHAD: THE TERRORISTS LIVING AMONG US 19-22 (2002).
156 ASHcROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 86, at 22.
157 For the details of FISA warrants, see supra note 124.
158 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291.
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on American citizens and green-card holders, who have more. When
FISA was first passed, Congress had inserted a special protection that
required the government to "minimize" 9 the amount of personal in-
formation gathered and retained on "United States person [s]" 61 who
were the targets of FISA warrants. This provision was not amended by
the USA PATRIOT Act. But Attorney General Ashcroft wanted to in-
crease the amount of information gathered and retained under FISA
on U.S. persons for use in criminal investigations related to terrorism.
In fact, his memo on the subject indicated that he took the view that
the "significant purpose" standard newly introduced to FISA through
the USA PATRIOT Act "allows FISA to be used primarily for a law en-
forcement purpose, as long as a significant foreign intelligence pur-
pose remains. ' He indicated that requests for FISA warrants could
originate with the criminal investigation side of the DOJ rather than
the intelligence investigation side.' 
While the question of who gets to request a FISA warrant may
sound like an arcane organizational matter within the DOJ, it is a dis-
tinction of constitutional importance. The Fourth Amendment ap-
plies in full to warrants sought for ordinary criminal searches and
surveillance, and the specific grounds for getting those warrants is
given in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968.163 For Title III surveillance warrants, the standard is that
probable cause be shown that a crime has been, is being or is about
to be committed before such a warrant shall be given. FISA war-
rants also have a probable cause standard, but the only probable
cause that must be shown in the case of "non-U.S. persons" is that the
target of the warrant is an agent of a foreign power,' 65 both an easier
159 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h), 1821(4) (2000).
16D § 1801(i). This is the term of art used in FISA to refer primarily to American citizens and
green-card holders.
161 Memorandum from John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney General, to Director, FBI, et al., at pt. I
(Mar. 6, 2002), available at http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/agO30602.html. The memo in-
dicates that "[t] he Criminal Division and OIPR [Office of Intelligence Policy and Review] shall
have access to all information developed in full field FI [foreign intelligence] and FCI [foreign
counterintelligence] investigations," id. at pt. II.A., which meant that there were, in essence, no
minimization procedures that would consistently redact information about American citizens or
green-card holders who came under foreign intelligence surveillance. While the previous rule
was that information would stay within foreign intelligence investigations unless there were spe-
cial permission to share it with the criminal side, the new rule implies that all information will
be shared unless there are special reasons not to.
162 Id. at pt. I ("Correspondingly, the Attorney General can most effectively direct and con-
trol such FI and FCI investigations only if all relevant DOJ components are free to offer advice
and make recommendations, both strategic and tactical, about the conduct and goals of the
investigations.").
163 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Star. 197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (2000)).
164 § 802, 82 Stat. at 218 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2000)).
165 For a more detailed contrast between Fourth Amendment and FISA warrants, see Swire,
supra note 133. See also supra note 124 (quoting relevant provisions of FISA). For U.S. persons,
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and a different thing to prove. But even though Title III and FISA
warrants both authorize intrusive surveillance, FISA warrants are eas-
ier to get in the first place and more powerful when gotten. FISA
warrants are authorized for longer periods of time, require no notice
to the surveilled party, and allow all records of the surveillance to be
kept secret, even if the information is later introduced at trial.1 66 If all
criminal investigations in the terrorism field can proceed with FISA
warrants instead of Title III warrants, then the Fourth Amendment
has been effectively bypassed. By indicating that the DOJ would share
all information between the criminal side and the intelligence inves-
tigation side of the department, Ashcroft was proposing to eliminate
altogether the Fourth Amendment requirements that might other-
wise apply to terrorism-related searches and surveillance.
And the changes do not just affect aliens. The FISA statute re-
quires that the information collected and stored on U.S. persons be
"minimized," which is to say that when citizens and green-card hold-
ers are under surveillance, a narrower range of information can be
collected in the first place and this narrower range of information is
subject to stricter rules about retention and distribution than would
be the case if non-U.S. persons were under surveillance. As part of
his newly aggressive posture post-9/11, Ashcroft proposed new
"minimization procedures" to apply to U.S. persons in the context of
specific applications for FISA warrants before the FISC. 1 7 But the
court balked at approving these minimization procedures, even
though the court approved the warrants themselves. This was signifi-
cant, because in its nearly twenty-five years of operation, there is no
evidence that the FISC had ever refused to approve the full request of
the DOJ Convening an unprecedented en banc panel of all the
FISC judges, the court ruled that the Ashcroft request went too far
and that the proposed unlimited information sharing between those
an additional showing that the target knowingly engage in potentially criminal activity is also
required. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (2000).
166 Id.
167 The FISC, which was set up by Congress in FISA, is an Article III court staffed with district
court judges who are empowered to approve FISA warrant requests. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)
(2000).
168 Though the warrants themselves and everything they produce is secret, under the terms of
FISA, the FISC must report on the number of warrant requests and the number of warrants
granted each year. 50 U.S.C. § 1807. These reports are publicly available, and it is from these
reports that we can see that the FISC has never rejected a warrant request. For FISC statistics,
see FISA Statistics, supra note 85. The secrecy surrounding FISA warrants is otherwise so com-
plete that any details of the warrant requests to this court are secret not just at the moment
when they are made, but perpetually. Even when parts of a FISA wiretap are used against a de-
fendant in a criminal case, the defendant may not be allowed to see the raw material from
which quotations were selected or even to see the original in a foreign language when all that is
introduced in court is the translation. For a more detailed explanation, see Swire, supra note
133 (manuscript at 31).
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who were authorized to conduct intelligence investigations and those
who were authorized to conduct criminal investigations within the
DOJ violated FISA with respect to U.S. persons. 6' Though the court
might have gone further to say that the Ashcroft practices violated
the U.S. Constitution by circumventing the Fourth Amendment alto-
gether, the court refrained from dealing with the constitutional is-
170sues.
Though the specific warrants requested were in fact issued (with
some modifications pertaining to proposed minimization stan-
dards),'' the DOJ fought the FISC's judgment on the new minimiza-
tion procedures by appealing to the never-before-convened Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review ("FISCOR") 7 2 for a further
ruling. FISCOR, in a decision far more sweeping than the decision
below, ruled that the USA PATRIOT Act had changed the ground
rules for sharing information between intelligence and criminal in-
vestigations and that the DOJ could therefore get FISA warrants to
investigate even U.S. persons regardless of whether the search or sur-
veillance was used for intelligence purposes or criminal investigation
purposes. 7 3 As long as the search or surveillance gathered informa-
tion that could be used for intelligence purposes, criminal investiga-
tion could even be the primary motive for the information.
With this substantial victory, there is no reason for the DOJ to go
the more onerous Fourth Amendment route to gather information in
international terrorism investigations. As a result, the Fourth
Amendment "probable cause" standard has been replaced by the
FISA "probable cause" standard, which requires only probable cause
that the non-U.S. person to be investigated is an agent of a foreign
power, not necessarily that they have committed or are about to
commit a crime. And even though a FISA warrant still requires dem-
onstration of some connection to a criminal activity in the case of
U.S. persons, Ashcroft's statement that he intends to throw the book
at potential terrorism suspects for "spitting on the sidewalk," indicates
that the criminal nexus can be quite minimal. As a result, FISA can
10 In reAll Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d
611, 625 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2002).
170 Id. at 615 (noting that the constitutional issues are not addressed).
171 Under the terms of FISA, an appeal can only be made from denial of a warrant request.
50 U.S.C. § 1803(b). Because the warrant requests in this case were modified before being
granted, the DOJ appealed the modification even though the warrant was granted. This might
have raised questions about whether the decision below could in fact be appealed, but the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review was not deterred from ruling because of this mi-
nor point.
172 The FISCOR is another special court created by FISA. See§ 1803(b).
173 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 734 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
174 Id. at 731 (noting that the prosecutor's ability to advise the FBI in intelligence investiga-
tions should not be limited).
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be used quite widely to substitute for the traditional Title III, Fourth-
Amendment-based warrant, even for U.S. citizens and green-card
holders.
The impact of this extraordinary change on the application of the
Fourth Amendment to terrorism investigations was itself deliberately
minimized by the FISCOR in the rather stunning statement:
Our case may well involve the most serious threat our country faces.
Even without taking into account the President's inherent constitutional
authority to conduct warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance, we
think the procedures and government showings required under FISA, if
they do not meet the minimum Fourth Amendment warrant standards, certainly
come close. We, therefore, believe firmly... that FISA as amended is con-
stitutional because the surveillances it authorizes are reasonable.1
75
As the court slipped from requiring that a statute actually meet the
tests that the Constitution sets to being satisfied if the statute "comes
close," the statutory requirement that there be minimization proce-
dures to redact information gathered about American citizens and
green-card holders also seemed to disappear. The FISCOR decision
breathtakingly permitted both the protections for U.S. persons Con-
gress had put into the Act (and had not amended with the USA
PATRIOT Act) and the more general requirements of the Fourth
Amendment to vanish amid the claims that the country is under seri-
ous threat. When this decision was issued in November 2002, more
than a year after the terrorist attacks, the state of emergency became
firmly entrenched .
The changed trigger mechanisms for when investigations may be
performed, who has to approve them, how much judicial oversight
they require, and what can be done with the evidence collected are
all, in my view, bigger changes in existing law than those made di-
rectly under the USA PATRIOT Act. They have also moved the
United States further and further away from what had been estab-
lished as the normal operating rules for domestic criminal and intel-
ligence investigations. Though the Constitution does not seem to
contemplate any situation in which the Fourth Amendment might be
suspended in a time of crisis, the Fourth Amendment has effectively
been suspended for the purposes of terrorism-related investigations.
Finally, there has been the very serious move away from anything
resembling normal procedure in the case of the two U.S. citizens who
have been detained indefinitely without charges, without counsel,
and with almost no constitutional review. According to the govern-
ment, Yaser Hamdi was captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan,
175 Id. at 746 (emphasis added).
176 Proceedings before the FISA courts are ex parte proceedings, so there is no knowledge-
able losing party who could appeal this decision. See50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (2000).
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taken to the special detainees' camp at Guantdinamo Bay, and then
discovered to be a U.S. citizen." He was removed from Guantinamo,
taken to the U.S. mainland, and put in a military jail as an "enemy
combatant" without access to counsel and, as far as the courts have
been concerned thus far, without the ability to require the govern-
ment to put forward more than a small amount of evidence to justify
his indefinite detention. The government has presented as evi-
dence only a second-hand declaration by a political appointee in the
DOD to the effect that Hamdi was indeed captured on the battlefield
and has been classified by the President as an enemy combatant."
9
While at a trial this evidence would be considered multiple hearsay
and would not be admissible, this declaration was enough to satisfy
the Fourth Circuit, which approved Hamdi's indefinite detention
without counsel, formal charges, or trial.' The Supreme Court re-
cently granted certiorari and heard arguments on this case. 8'
The other case of a domestic "enemy combatant" involves Jos6
Padilla, an American citizen of Puerto Rican descent who was born in
177 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 2003)
178 The Fourth Circuit upheld the government's detention of Hamdi but limited its holding
almost entirely to its asserted facts:
Because it is undisputed that Hamdi was captured in a zone of active combat in a foreign
theater of conflict, we hold that the submitted declaration is a sufficient basis upon
which to conclude that the Commander in Chief has constitutionally detained Hamdi
pursuant to the war powers entrusted to him by the U.S. Constitution. No further factual
inquiry is necessary or proper, and we remand the case with directions to dismiss the
[habeas] petition.
Id. at 459.
As critics of the decision have noted, one reason why the evidence against Hamdi is "undis-
puted" is that he was never allowed to meet with a lawyer or to put forward evidence on his own
behalf.
179 The "Mobbs Declaration," named after Michael Mobbs, Special Advisor to the Under Sec-
retary of Defense for Policy, listed only bare bones facts against Hamdi without indicating
sources and without providing vital context. A summary of what the Mobbs Declaration said in
Hamdi can be found in the petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court filed by Hamdi's
lawyer, Frank Dunham, who has never met his client. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004) (No. 03-6696), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/
docs/hamdi/hamdirums1l OO 3pet.pdf.
is0 On this, even the normally deferential Fourth Circuit almost balked. As the court said:
We did not order the petition [for habeas review] dismissed outright, however, noting
our reluctance to "embrac[e] [the] sweeping proposition . . . that, with no meaningful
judicial review, any American citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant could be de-
tained indefinitely without charges or counsel on the government's say-so." Rather, we
sanctioned a limited and deferential inquiry into Hamdi's status, noting "that if Hamdi is
indeed an 'enemy combatant' who was captured during hostilities in Afghanistan, the
government's present detention of him is a lawful one."
Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 461 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002)) (altera-
tions in original).
181 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004) (mem.). The Court heard oral arguments on
Wednesday, April 28, 2004, but as of the time I write, no decision has been issued.
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New York and convicted of murder in Chicago. s2 While in prison,
Padilla apparently converted to Islam, and upon his release, sought to
join al Qaeda, according to the government's statement. Padilla flew
to Pakistan and crossed over into Afghanistan where he allegedly vol-
unteered his services to al Qaeda, although it is not clear from the
government's statements in the matter whether, or for what purposes,
his offer was taken up. Upon his return to the United States,
Padilla was arrested at O'Hare Airport in Chicago, and flown to New
York City to appear as a material witness before the grand jury con-
vened there."ST But before he could testify, he was taken into military
custody and removed from New York. His lawyer first learned about
Padilla's disappearance when she went to meet with him and found
that he was no longer held in New York.
Donna Newman, Padilla's court-appointed lawyer under the mate-
rial witness warrant, started a long fight in which she attempted to
figure out where her client had been taken. Once she determined
that Padilla had been sent to a military brig and declared an enemy
combatant by President Bush, she began a legal battle to have his case
reviewed by the federal courts on a habeas petition. The DOJ, how-
ever, took the position that Padilla was not entitled to see his lawyer,
that he could be held indefinitely as an enemy combatant in a mili-
taryjail without charges or without any means of communication with
the outside world, and that he was in general beyond the reach of the
ordinary legal system. The DOJ argued that habeas review was simply
not available to those whom the President had deemed enemy com-
batants. i5
Since Padilla was not captured on the battlefield, his case has re-
ceived different treatment in the courts from that of Hamdi. Padilla's
case was heard in the federal District Court for the Southern District
of New York because his original detention was in New York, so the
direct conflict with the rulings from the Eastern District of Virginia
were also muted. Judge Michael Mukasey held that Padilla was enti-
tled to challenge his detention on a habeas petition but, unlike
182 For the only facts we know about Padilla's case, see Declaration of Michael H. Mobbs,
Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 2 (Aug. 27, 2002),
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/padillabush82702mobbs.pdf.
183 Here, too, the only evidence presented by the government tojustify indefinite detention
without the right to counsel is yet another hearsay upon hearsay declaration by Michael Mobbs.
See id.
18s4 Id. at 4.
185 For the government's argument, see the Respondents' Response to, and Motion to Dis-
miss, the Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Padilla v. Bush (S.D.N.Y.) (No. 02 Civ.
4445 (MBM)), http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/padillabush82702grsp.pdf, as
well as the government's brief on the merits in the case before the Supreme Court, Brief for
Petitioner, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, (2004) (No. 03-1027), http://www.jenner.com/files/
tbls69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload500/192/PadillaBriefForThePetitioner.pdf.
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Hamdi, Padilla was also entitled to meet with his lawyer and prepare a
defense. 86 Unfortunately for Padilla, however, the judge also ruled
that the government could hold him upon the showing of only "some
evidence" that he was an enemy combatant.'8 7 "Some evidence" is a
far cry from the level of proof that would normally be required for
long-term detention if this case were treated within the normal
criminal justice system. Furthermore, it has been unclear how Padilla
could successfully show that the government had failed to meet this
low standard. Even with this government-friendly ruling, the DOJ
challenged Mukasey's decision, refusing to allow Padilla's lawyer ac-
cess to him, 8 and, having obtained certification from Judge Mukasey,
the government launched an interlocutory appeal of Judge Mukasey's
decision to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Second Circuit made an even more forceful decision on
Padilla's behalf.'9 Ruling that Padilla had the right to consult with
counsel (all three judges on the panel agreed on this), the two-judge
majority held that the President had no authority to detain a U.S.
citizen as an enemy combatant on American soil, absent explicit au-
thorization of Congress.' 9° Aware of the seriousness of the situation,
the court reframed the legal question as one about separation and
sharing of powers,' 9' rather than about presidential power, taken
alone. The court took particular note of the Non-Detention Act,
which specifies that "[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise
detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Con-
,,192 incgress, and indicated that the President had no power, even under
the Commander-in-Chief Clause of the Constitution, to detain an
American citizen on American soil without the express authorization
of Congress.9  The Joint Resolution passed by Congress in the
186 Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
187 Id. at 608.
18 Padilla v. Bush was adhered to, on reconsideration, by Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d
42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), application granted, 256 F. Supp. 2d 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), which found that
because the petitioner was not apprehended on the battlefield, counsel for petitioner had to be
able to meet with him to develop the facts of the case; otherwise the court could not assess
whether the petitioner had been detained arbitrarily.
189 See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003).
190 Id. at 720.
191 The opinion states:
As this Court sits only a short distance from where the World Trade Center once
stood, we are as keenly aware as anyone of the threat al Qaeda poses to our country and
of the responsibilities the President and law enforcement officials bear for protecting the
nation. But presidential authority does not exist in a vacuum, and this case involves not
whether those responsibilities should be aggressively pursued, but whether the President
is obligated, in the circumstances presented here, to share them with Congress.
Id. at 699.
192 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (a) (2000).
193 Padilla, 352 F.3d at 720.
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immediate aftermath of 9/11 failed to provide such explicit authori-
zation, the court held, ordering Padilla released from military custody
within thirty days."" But Padilla has not yet been released, pending a
determination by the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari in his
195
case.
The domestic enemy combatant cases have generated a great deal
of criticism, from human rights organizations to the American BarAS • • 197
Association. The cases have generated an unusual number of
amicus briefs in the Supreme Court.98 Even those who have other-
wise taken the view that the war on terrorism requires exceptional
means have found that the enemy combatant cases go too far. In-
stead of altering the usual rules of criminal procedure, the enemy
combatant cases infringe on more fundamental structural principles
of American constitutional government, like the separation of powers
which requires independent judicial review of executive action, espe-
cially as it pertains to the treatment of individual citizens and the ba-
sic right of personal liberty.
Since 9/11 there has been a steady erosion of normality in the
government's response to terrorism. While one may have expected
the sharpest violations of the state of normality to come right after
the attacks in a kind of emotional reaction to the shock of the event,
the trajectory has actually been quite different. Instead of declining
over time, the number of efforts to claim exception-to argue that
unusual times call for unusual measures-has in fact increased over
time as the shock of 9/11 fades.
Perhaps most pronounced is the Bush administration's increasing
effort to avoid regular judicial procedures at all by trying to bring the
war on terrorism entirely within the executive branch and minimizing
the influence of both Congress and the courts. While the earliest
194 The government filed a motion to stay the decision until the case could be heard by the
Supreme Court. See Affirmation in Support of Respondent's Motion to Stay the Mandate,
Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) (Nos. 03-2235(L.) and 03-2438(Con.)),
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/padrums11604staymot.pdf. Oral argument was
held on Wednesday, April 28, 2004, but as of the time I write, no decision has been issued.
195 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 1353 (2004) (mem.) (granting certiorari).
196 See, e.g., Press Release, Amnesty International, USA: One Year in Detention Without
Charge (June 9, 2003), at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAMR510852003; HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2002: UNITED STATES, at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/us.html
(last visited May 3, 2004).
197 See AM. BAR ASSOC., TASK FORCE ON TREATMENT OF ENEMY COMBATANTS, REVISED REPORT
TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2003), http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aba/
abarpt2l003cmbtnts.pdf.
198 An archive of the amicus briefs in the Hamdi and Padilla cases can be found in collections
maintained by the law firm Jenner & Block. See U.S. Supreme Court BriefResource Center: Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, at http://www.jenner.com/hamdi (last visited May 3, 2004); U.S. Supreme Court Brief
Resource Center: Rumsfeld v. Padilla, at http://www.jenner.com/padilla (last visited May 3,
2004).
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9/11-related cases were in fact brought in the federal courts under
regular criminal procedure (United States v. Moussaou'99 and United
States v. Lindh 0°), the post-9/11 roundup cases have been handled on
a different model. They were processed primarily through adminis-
trative law courts," ' rather than through regular Article III courts, be-
cause they were assimilated, often pretextually, into the system of
immigration control rather than the system of crime control. As 2002
progressed, the Attorney General guidelines were promulgated,
changing the ground rules for terrorism investigations quite radi-
cally. 2 From all an outsider can see, the DOJ's methods for handling
terrorism investigations have gotten more extreme and more "excep-
tional" the further we get from 9/11.
There is also a sign that terrorism investigations have been in-
creasingly using methods that no longer require regular Fourth
Amendment judicial warrants. Instead, the DOJ has indicated that it
prefers to go to the FISC,2°5 which proceeds on the basis of evidence
that never has to be revealed and which has never in its twenty-five-
year history refused to grant a warrant when asked.0 4 In addition, de-
spite being required to do so by the USA PATRIOT Act,20 5 the DOJ
has reported only grudgingly on its use of USA PATRIOT Act provi-
sions to the Congress. And the minimal information given so far
199 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003).
200 227 F. Supp. 2d 565 (E.D. Va. 2002).
201 Administrative law judges do not have the same formal guarantees of independence as
their Article III counterparts. In general, also, administrative proceedings, like deportation
hearings, have been deemed by regular court decisions prior to 9/11 not to require the full
constitutional criminal procedure protections that would be mandated in a criminal trial. To
take one particularly relevant example, since the mid-1990s (as a result of the anti-terrorism
laws passed after the Oklahoma City bombing), immigration hearings can use "secret evidence"
that the defendant and his/her lawyer cannot see, but that is only shown to the judge. This se-
rious abridgment of the Confrontation Clause would clearly not be tolerated in an ordinary
criminal case.
See supra notes 145-56 and accompanying text.
203 By now, Title III warrants account for only 25% of the total warrants obtained at the fed-
eral level. FISA warrants constitute 75% of electronic surveillance orders. Compare FISA Statis-
tics, supra note 85, with ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2001 WIRETAP REPORT 15-17 tbl. 2
(2002), http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap01/table20l.pdf.
M For the FISC review statistics, see FISA Statistics, supra note 85.
205 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 1001, 115 Stat. 272, 391 (instructing the
Ins ector General to prepare reports on civil liberties abuses).
The fourth such report was issued by the Inspector General ("IG") of the DOJ on January
27, 2004. But the report provides few specifics compared with the more in-depth report done
on the 9/11 detainees. In particular, the IG seems to have ruled almost all complaints out of
his jurisdiction because they do not involve actions by DOJ employees. See OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DOJ, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 1001 OF THE
USA PATRIOT ACT, http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/040la/final.pdf. But in a world where
at least some of the most important information in the war on terrorism is collected privately,
see, e.g., supra note 168, it may well be that information that would come into government hands
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has not enabled the Congress to engage in reasonable oversight of
the terrorism investigations, as both Republican and Democratic
members of Congress have noted.0 7
The avoidance of separation of powers constraints in the domestic
war on terrorism has reached its height with the claimed presidential
power to label suspect individuals as enemy combatants who are im-
mune from legal process altogether. The "enemy combatant" label
has dispensed with the need to provide substantial evidence to hold a
suspect in custody, according to the Bush administration-and this
pertains not only to aliens, but also to American citizens. But the
ability of the president to designate "enemy combatants" is given nei-
ther directly by the Constitution nor by statute. It has been asserted
on the basis of the constitutional commander-in-chief power to con-
duct wars as the president sees fit. The arguments in these cases have
so far revealed that the President is willing to provide little more than
general assertions about the alleged enemy's activities. And the ex-
ecutive branch has denied that the courts even have jurisdiction to
208hear these cases. The government has neither to bring charges,
nor to present evidence in a public forum, nor to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that the detained person has done what the gov-
ernment believes the detainee has done. The "enemy combatant" la-
bel is the logical endpoint of a process in which the rule of law has
been progressively undermined by assertions of executive power to
determine when the rules no longer apply. Though the courts have
so far shown some substantial nervousness about the breadth of the
President's claims in the enemy combatant cases and the Second Cir-
cuit has held that the President flatly does not have this power, the
Bush administration has persisted in insisting that it alone can safe-
guard the nation by determining unilaterally how to fight the "war"
on terrorism.
in violation of the civil liberties of citizens and residents of the United States would not involve
DOJ employees.
207 As one contemporary news story noted:
Many lawmakers said Ashcroft continues to be guarded or unresponsive when pre-
sented with questions from Congress about the department's use of the broad new sur-
veillance and investigative powers given to them by the post-Sept. 11, 2001, USA Patriot
Act, despite recent reports that have raised questions about the treatment of immigrant
detainees, the increased use of wiretap surveillance, and the use of Patriot Act provisions
for non-terrorist crimes.
Emily Pierce, Ashcroft Rapped Over Oversight, ROLL CALL, June 9, 2003, at 1.
208 Calling the President's judgment in the matter of enemy combatants a "quintessentially
military judgment," the government argued that the military was better able to handle these
cases than Article III courts. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 16, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
124 S. Ct. 981 (2004) (No. 03-6696), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/hamdi/
hamdirums120303gopp.pdf,
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B. The State of Exception in Foreign Policy
Having sketched the contours of the U.S. government's post-9/11
domestic policy on terrorism, it should not be surprising to find
roughly the same general outlines in U.S. foreign policy.209- At first,
the deviations from rule-of-law-based practice were minor, but the in-
vocations of the state of exception, justifying a release from the rules,
have increased as 9/11 recedes into the distance.
The most visible foreign policy response of the U.S. government
right after 9/11 was to look for a military target against which to re-
taliate. But al Qaeda was not a country, and military doctrine typi-
cally operates with countries as targets. The language that had been
inserted into the congressional joint resolution authorizing the
President to take all "necessary and appropriate force" against those
who attacked the United States also included language that extended
the authorized use of force to those who "harbored" the attackers. l°
The "harboring" language gave the Bush administration domestic
permission to launch its military attack against Afghanistan, where
the Taliban government had given explicit protection to the al Qaeda
forces still there. Furthermore, Afghanistan had clearly served as the
physical headquarters of al Qaeda until just before the attacks.
Much of world opinion was on the side of the United States as it
prosecuted a war against the battered and impoverished country of
211Afghanistan. Many allies offered to fight alongside the United
States.2" The international press offered relatively little criticism,
while occasionally wondering whether it was either humane or
worthwhile to bomb a country where little was left from previous
2I should note that I will only discuss those aspects of foreign policy that are visible to
someone who does not have a security clearance. There were no doubt other major changes-
such as alterations in the CIA's rules of engagement or in clandestine collaboration among se-
curity services or even an increase in extraordinary renditions, much of which would be outside
the public eye.
10 S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REc. S9413-01 (2001) (enacted).
211 SeeRobin Wright, Coalition of Exceptional Depth is Forming, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at A3
(describing the wide support among nations for the war in Afghanistan). But see Ewen Ma-
cAskill et al., Cracks Appear in Coalition, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Sept. 15, 2001, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/wtccrash/story/0,1300,552410,00.html.
212 On September 11, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ("NATO") indicated that its
eighteen (at that time) members would provide "assistance and support" to the United States.
Press Release, NATO, Statement by the North Atlantic Council (Sept. 11, 2001),
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/pO1-122e.htm. On September 12, NATO invoked Article
5 of its charter for the first time in its history, declaring that a member state had been attacked
from abroad and that the mutual defense pact would therefore be activated. Press Release,
NATO, Statement by the North Atlantic Council (Sept. 12, 2001),
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/pOl-124e.htm. This was confirmed in detail with a further
finding on October 12 that the attacks had been carried out by al Qaeda, harbored by the Tali-
ban government in Afghanistan. Update, NATO, Invocation of Article 5 Confirmed (Oct. 2,
2001), http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1001/elO02a.htm.
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wars. 2 1  Understood as a reaction of self-defense in response to a
prior military attack, however, the U.S. war against the Taliban gov-
ernment and their al Qaeda friends was widely thought to be justi-fi1214
fied, even if the U.N. Security Council's blessing had not been ex-
plicitly sought as international law required. 1  While the U.S. military
was nervous about invading a country that had never been success-
fully conquered, they were convinced in the end by the support from
various allies who made the task easier. For example, the Russians
gave permission to the United States to base its troops in former So-
viet military bases in the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia.
President Musharraf of Pakistan (a country that had been subject to
U.S. sanctions since May 1998 for having tested a nuclear weapon)
was brought back into the pro-United States fold when he pledged
his substantial support for the war against Afghanistan. 6 Since their
own government had supported the Taliban and had in fact been
crucial in helping it come to power, the Pakistanis were thought cru-
cial to bringing the Taliban down. In any event, the war in Afghani-
stan went far more quickly than pundits had predicted as the Taliban
government rather rapidly collapsed. Al Qaeda's top leadership,
however, went underground and was not captured during the war.
No sooner had the main fighting in Afghanistan stopped, how-
ever, when the United States started to claim a new state of exception
against well-understood rules of international law. This turned out to
be more controversial than taking military action against Afghanistan
without a Security Council resolution had been. Confronted with
many detainees captured on the battlefield by the various local
213 Soviet Invasion, TIMES (London), Oct. 5, 2001 ("If ever there was a place that could do
without another war, it is Afghanistan; on the other hand, Afghanistan is already so soaked in
blood and bullets that perhaps a just war, fought cleverly, for honest aims, might yet rescue it
from its own history."), available at 2001 WL 4935167.
214 See, for example, the open letter signed by a number of prominent American intellectuals
that supported the attack. Statement, David Blankenhorn et al., Pre-emption, Iraq, and Just
War: A Statement of Principles (Nov. 14, 2002), http://www.americanvalues.org/html/
lb___pre-emption.html. Richard Falk defended the limited use of force in Afghanistan in
RICHARD FALK, THE GREAT TERROR WAR (2003), but seems to have recanted. See Richard Falk,
Letter to the Editor, NATION, Nov. 26, 2001, at 60.
.215 The United States probably could have gotten Security Council backing for its attack on
Afghanistan but it failed to do so and thus acted, strictly speaking, in violation of the U.N. Char-
ter. SeeJonathan I. Charney, Editorial Comments, The Use of Force Against Terrorism and Interna-
tional Law, 95 AM.J. INT'L L. 835, 836 (2001).
216 The United States had slapped sanctions on both India and Pakistan for their nuclear
tests, and sanctions against both came off together. See Stephen Collinson, Bush Administration
Moves Towards Lifting India-Pakistan Sanctions, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 22, 2001, 2001 WL
25018917. The fact that President Musharraf seized power in a military coup had resulted in
additional sanctions against Pakistan. For the long history of military coups and the attempts of
the Pakistani Supreme Court to develop an informed and detailed jurisprudence of emergency,
see Tayyab Mahmud, Praetorianism and Common Law in Post-Colonial Settings: Judicial Responses to
Constitutional Breakdowns in Pakistan, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 1225.
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militias that the United States had pressed into assistance, the U.S.
government made a decision to take direct control of some of the
captives for interrogation. The government, however, did this with-
out giving the detainees the protection that international law ac-
corded them under the Geneva Conventions by providing access to a
"competent tribunal" to establish their status. Many of the detain-
ees were taken to a hastily constructed camp located in the American
military base at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba, halfway around the world.
Why Guantdnamo Bay? It appears that this location was chosen
because Guantdnamo had been previously determined by a number
of American courts to be an area that was explicitly not U.S. sovereign
territory even though the United States had effective and sole control
217 The treatment of prisoners of war is generally covered in the Third Geneva Convention,
and the "competent tribunal" requirement is contained in Article 5. See Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Feb 2, 1956) [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]. The
legal advisor to the International Committee of the Red Cross, writing in a personal and not an
institutional capacity, urged that the treatment of at least some "unlawful combatants" is cov-
ered in the Fourth Geneva Convention. Knut Dbrmann, The Legal Situation of 'Unlaw-
ful/Unprivileged Combatants, INT'L REV. RED CROSS, at 45 (March 2003), http://www.icrc.org/
Web/eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/5LPHBV/$File/irrc_849 Dorman.pdf. But the view that there
are no gaps in international humanitarian law and that all persons caught in a conflict situation
are protected in one way or another under the Geneva Conventions is commonplace. The
Bush administration, asserting that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to "enemy combat-
ants" (not a term in use in international law) never attempted to fully justify its exceptions to
the Geneva Conventions in legal terms. In one press conference, (former) White House Press
Secretary Ari Fleischer said that neither al Qaeda nor the Taliban captives would automatically
get Geneva Convention protections, noting that such things depended on whether those cap-
tured fought by carrying weapons openly and whether they wore uniforms. But then, under
more persistent questioning, Fleischer seemed to admit that the detentions were made subject
to no law in particular. A reporter, exasperated at not getting a straight answer about whether
the detainees were covered by the Geneva Convention or not, asked, "There's no international
convention or there's no law on which we're detaining them, it's basically, they're dangerous,
they want to kill Americans, and we're going to keep them in detention." And Fleischer seemed
to grant the point in his answer: "[P]ut it this way: There's a war in Afghanistan. These people
did not stop fighting; it was either be killed or be captured. These people were captured." See
Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, White House (Jan. 9, 2002). This was, obviously, far from the
sort of compelling legal analysis that one generally expects a government to undertake when it
is going to make exception to a widely agreed upon international convention. The White
House eventually issued a fact sheet summarizing the status of Guantinamo detainees under
the Geneva Convention on February 7, 2002, indicating that the Taliban detainees would in fact
be accorded POW status. See Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at
Guant~namo, (Feb. 7, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-
13.html; see also Katharine Q. Seelye, In Shift, Bush Says Geneva Rules Fit Taliban Captives, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at Al (reporting that the shift in position had been strongly urged by
European allies and had been advocated by Secretary of State Colin Powell). The international
objections to U.S. conduct in the matter of the detainees are not to the possibility that a particu-
lar detainee would eventually be found guilty of war crimes (though as we will see, the specific
form of the military tribunals has caused an international outcry). The objections are instead
that the United States never held individualized review of particular cases to determine whether
those detained were combatants (and if so, for which party) or civilians.
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there.2 '8 The absence of U.S. sovereignty meant that American fed-
eral courts were quite likely to claim they were largely powerless for
jurisdictional reasons to review what occurred there.
Bird v. United States was a pre-9/11 case outside the terrorism
context, but it gives the most complete historical account of the spe-
cial situation at Guantinamo and its juridical implications. The base
had been leased from Cuba in 1903 in order "to enable the United
States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the
people thereof, as well as for its own defense. 220 The treaty was re-
newed in 1934 and while "the current government in Cuba may not
recognize these treaties, the 1903 agreement does remain in effect."
22'
The treaty was still valid because it explicitly specifies that it can be
terminated only by mutual agreement or by unilateral abandonment
by the United States, neither of which had happened.222 In response
to the argument that the United States had effective sovereignty over the
territory even though the legal sovereign may have officially been an-
other state, Judge Arterton noted that the 1903 treaty explicitly speci-
fied that Cuba has ultimate sovereignty over Guantdinamo and this
was what was crucial. Guantdnamo, then, was deemed foreign terri-
tory and as a result federal courts had no jurisdiction over what the
U.S. government did there.224 Successive executive branch opinions
had held the same.225
218 Eg., Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995). In that case,
Cuban refugees sought admission to the United States once they got to Guantginamo and were
denied access to U.S. courts with the statement, "we ... reject the argument that our leased
military bases abroad which continue under the sovereignty of foreign nations, hostile or
friendly, are 'functional[ly] equivalent' to being land borders or ports of entry of the United
States or otherwise within the United States." Id. at 1425 (alteration in original) (citations omit-
ted).
219 923 F. Supp. 338 (D. Conn. 1996).
M Id. at 340 (quoting Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 16-23, 1903, U.S.-
Cuba, T.S. 418).
221 Id. at 341 (footnote omitted).
M The U.S. government sends annual rent checks of $4,085 to the Cuban government which
has not cashed these cheeks since the year after Fidel Castro came to power. Id. at 341 n.6 (ref-
erencing Jim Wolf, US. Pays Cuba $4,085 Yearly for Leased Guantdnamo Base, ROcKY MTN. NEWS,
Au 25, 1994, 1994 WL 6673251).
Id. at 342 ("[T]he leased land is subject to the ultimate sovereignty of Cuba.").
See Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1342 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Interest-
ingly, both United States citizens and aliens alike, charged with the commission of crimes on
Guantdnamo Bay, are prosecuted under United States laws."), cert. granted and vacated as moot
sub nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 918 (1993) (mem.). This case found that
certain Haitian detainees could be "screened in" to the United States from Guantdnamo to pur-
sue their claims for refugee status, but the reasoning relied on their refugee status, not on a
general claim about the sovereign status of Guantdnamo.
225 See 35 Op. Att'y Gen. 536, 537 (1929) (analyzing Guantinamo's status in the context of a
review of other military bases); 6 Op Off. Legal Counsel 236, 238 (1982) (finding that the sta-
tion at GuantSnamo is not a "possession" of the United States). See the more detailed discus-
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Given this strong authority, then, the Bush administration located
Taliban and al Qaeda detainees at Guantinamo, a place that they
could reasonably have expected would not trigger the jurisdiction of
U.S. courts. In an early challenge that arose within American domes-
tic courts to the detentions, Rasul v. Bush, Judge Kollar-Kotelly found
that Guantfinamo was, indeed, not part of the sovereign territory of
the United States.226 In fact, the proposition had been so well estab-
lished that plaintiffs did not even seek to question Guantinamo's ul-
timate status.227 Instead, plaintiffs claimed that the United States ex-
ercised de facto sovereignty at GuantAnamo, and that this was
sufficient for the application both of the Foreign Tort Claims Act (on
which a group of Kuwaiti detainees were basing their claim) as well as
for grounds to request a habeas writ (which two British detainees
were seeking). Judge Kollar-Kotelly dismissed both claims, rejecting
the de facto sovereignty test urged by the plaintiffs, citing the Bird
229case.
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed. 230 Family
members who had been permitted to proceed as the next friends of
the detainees23' challenged Guantinamo's status more directly, but
sion of the status of Guant~namo in Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1197,
1228-34 (1996).
215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 72 (D.D.C. 2002).
27 See id. at 69 ("It is undisputed, even by the parties, that Guant~namo Bay is not part of the
sovereign territory of the United States."). Oral argument was held on April 20, 2004, but as I
write, the opinion had not yet been issued.
228 Id.
Id. at 71 (arguing that Guantinamo was outside the sovereign territory of the United
States and those detained were aliens). That meant, according tojudge Kollar-Kotelly, that the
relevant precedent on the habeas claim was Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). In Eisen-
trager, the Supreme Court denied habeas to German nationals first captured and convicted of
war crimes by an American military tribunal convened in China and then imprisoned in Ger-
many under U.S. military occupation, at the end of World War II. Id. at 790. Even though the
United States had functional military control in Germany, such functional control did not give
U.S. courts jurisdiction in the Eisentrager case. Judge Kollar-Kotelly argued that it was the same
at Guantinamo. Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 68 ('Eisentrager is applicable to the aliens.., at
Guanthnamo Bay."). There were, as a result, no grounds on which to extend a writ of habeas
corpus. Aliens detained abroad and held abroad could not access American courts simply be-
cause their captors were the U.S. military. The Foreign Tort Claims Act claim was rejected as
being a habeas petition in disguise. Id. at 62.
2SC-Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted in part, 124 S. Ct.
534 (2003) (mem.). Al Odah affirmed the district court judgment in Rasu/, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55
(D.D.C. 2002). The Supreme Court consolidated Al Odah and Rasul and granted certiorari
limited to the question: "Whether United States courts lack jurisdiction to consider challenges
to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in connection with hostili-
ties and incarcerated at the Guantdnamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba." Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 534
(2003) (mem.); Al Odah v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003) (mem.).
251 The Guanthinamo detainees have been held without being able to consult with counsel or
meet with family members. Some of the detainees are allowed to exchange letters with family
members, but such letters (and the ones back from family members) pass through military
screening. In the U.S.-court cases consolidated in the Al Odah ruling, family members were
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the court held that determinations of sovereignty were "for the legis-
lative and executive departments" to make and no such determina-
tion had been made here.2 2 As a result, Guantdinamo was not U.S.
sovereign territory because no law made it so. 2 3 3 Instead, the court
emphasized the similarity between the Guantinamo detainees and
the petitioning prisoners in Johnson v. Eisentrager.234 In Eisentrager, pe-
titioners were Germans captured in China after the German surren-
der at the end of the Second World War and accused of continuing
to spy on Americans despite the end of hostilities. The Germans were
detained, tried by military commission, sentenced to prison, and
taken to Germany to serve their sentences in that occupied country,
from which they brought a habeas action in U.S. court. The Supreme
Court held, according to the Al Odah court, that no habeas writ could
issue because the prisoners were beyond the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States, even though the prison where they were held was
entirely within the functional control of American authorities at the
time.235 Eisentrager so closed the door on habeas petitions from
Guantinamo in the court's view that it noted, "[w] e cannot see why,
or how, the writ [of habeas corpus] may be made available to aliens
abroad when basic constitutional protections are not. This much is at
the heart of Eisentrager.
2 3 6
The detainees petitioned the Supreme Court to hear their case, a
petition which the Court agreed to hear.237 The petitioners and the
government include in their briefs sharply different readings of Eisen-
trager. Petitioners assert that Eisentrager is a wholly different case from
the present one, involving prisoners of war from an enemy state who
had in fact been convicted of violating the laws in a military tribunal
authorized by Congress. By contrast, petitioners claim, the
Guantarnamo detainees are from friendly states (Britain and Kuwait)
and they have been neither charged nor convicted in any legal proc-
ess. While the Eisentrager petitioners asked to be released, the
Guant~namo detainees want only to have their status determined by
an independent tribunal.2 8 The government asserts that Eisentrager is
bringing the habeas petitions as next friends because the detainees were not able to approach
the court themselves. The court permitted the family members to be designated as next
friends. Id. at 1138.
2 Id. at 1143 (quoting Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 380 (1948)).
233 Id. at 1143-44.
24 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
235 Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1139.
236 Id. at 1141.
237 See supra note 230 (explaining the Supreme Court's consolidation of both detainees' peti-
tions).
238 See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, Rasul v. Bush (2003) (No. 03-334), available at
http://www.jenner.com/f les/tbl-s69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload5O/77/petitionersbri
ef onmerits2.pdf; Brief for Petitioners, A] Odah v. United States (2003) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343),
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on all fours with the present case: aliens captured abroad and held
abroad with no substantial connection to the United States do not
have the writ available to them. 9
As I write, no opinion has yet been forthcoming. Thus far, there
has been no possibility for anyone to assert on behalf of these prison-
ers that they were wrongly detained because the Geneva Conventions
have no enforcement mechanism, save for the reciprocal self-interest
of those engaged in hostilities and the power that the armies and the
domestic courts of the hostile parties choose to give the treaties.
While the U.S. military generally accords the Geneva Conventions
substantial weight in its own internal regulations,2'4 the Supreme
Court in Eisentrager explicitly held that the Geneva Conventions gave
rise to no private rights of action in U.S. courts. The effectiveness of
the Geneva Conventions generally relies on the calculation that if
one side treats the other side's POWs well, then their POWs will be
treated well in return. The Geneva Conventions, according to the
Eisentrager court, place "responsibility for observance and enforce-
ment of these rights . . . upon political and military authorities.
241
As it turned out, it was impossible to challenge the U.S. detentions
in foreign courts as well. In The Queen on the Application of Abbasi v.
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,42 family members
of some British nationals being held at Guant~inamo attempted to get
the British courts to order the foreign secretary to intervene on their
behalf to have the detainees' status clarified, consistent with the
Third Geneva Convention. The solicitors for Feroz Ali Abbasi, one of
the detainees, and his mother had attempted to approach the U.S.
government directly through the American Embassy in London but
had received word that Abbasi and others detained at Guantnamo
were "enemy combatants" and would be held for the duration of the
war without legal process. They sued to get the British government to
intervene.
The Court of Appeal ultimately ruled against Abbasi on the
grounds that the court had no authority to order the foreign
available at http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload500/78/
BriefForPetitioners.pdf.
239 Brief for the Respondents, Al Odah v. United States (2003) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), avail-
able at http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl~s69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload500/170/
respondent~brief.pdf.
240 The amicus brief filed by the National Institute for Military Justice in the Guantdnamo
cases before the Supreme Court discusses the regulations of the American military and the way
in which those regulations incorporate the Geneva Convention requirements for treatment of
prisoners of war. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Institute of Military Justice, Rasul v. Bush
(2003) (Nos. 03-334 and 03-343), http://www.jenner.com/files/tbls69NewsDocumentOrder/
FileUpload500/92/amicuscuriae-national_instituteof.military_justice.pdf.
241 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 n.14 (1950).
242 [2002] All E.R. (D) 70 (Nov.) (Eng. C.A.), 2002 WL 31452052.
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secretary to act in any particular way with respect to a matter within
the scope of the British government's foreign policy. But the judg-
ment is particularly interesting for the harsh terms in which it treats
American claims that the detainees have no legal status cognizable by
any court. Calling the Guantinamo detention a "legal black hole,"
the court made much of the fact that the United States had failed to
comply with the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war because it
had not allowed those who were detained to have a hearing on their
status. Instead, the United States had asserted that the detainees
were, by the definition of the conflict in which they had been cap-
tured, necessarily "enemy combatants" not subject to prisoner-of-war
protections.
With its tone fairly dripping with disdain for the American posi-
tion, the Court of Appeal noted that the status of "enemy combat-
ant," on which the Bush administration relied, was not a conception
recognizable in international law. Instead, the term appeared only in
Ex Parte Quirin, an American case approving the trial before a mili-
tary commission of foreign nationals who had entered U.S. territory
to commit sabotage. As the Court of Appeal pointed out, however,
even on the Quifin standard, it was impossible to determine whether
the status of enemy combatant in fact applied to Abbasi because the
circumstances of his capture had never been reviewed by any court.
While expressing hope that American courts might find jurisdiction
to review the Guantinamo cases, the Court of Appeal nonetheless
found that British courts could do nothing within their own jurisdic-
tion to compel the British government to intervene in the matter.
The Abbasi case is notable because it reflects a view expressed by a
number of the United States' allies abroad: not only that the Geneva
Conventions should be followed in the war on terrorism, but also that
all detainees should be able to have the bases for their detention re-
viewed by an independent court to assess whether in fact the deten-
tion is warranted. The protection that habeas review is supposed to
offer those in U.S. detention has been generalized as a principle of
international law, both in the Geneva Conventions and generally in
other human rights bodies, such as the Inter-American Commission,
which condemned the U.S. position on Guantanamo,2 4 and the
European Court of Human Rights which, while having no jurisdiction
over Guantinamo, has a substantial jurisprudence under Article 6 of
243 317 U.S. 1 (1942)
244 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights took "precautionary measures"
against the United States in its session of March 12, 2002. Decision on Request for Precaution-
ary Measures (Detainees at Guantnamo Bay, Cuba), 41 I.L.M. 532 (Inter-Am. C.H.R. 2002); see
also Response of the United States to Request for Precautionary Measures-Detainees in
Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba, 41 I.L.M. 1015 (Inter-Am. C.H.R. 2002).
May 2004]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
the European Convention on Human Rights, ensuring access to court
review of all detentions.4 ' Thus, when the Bush administration put
the Guantdinamo detainees into a position where their detentions
could not be reviewed, they created an exceptional state that has
been roundly condemned.46
The condemnation has only increased as the Bush administration
has made public its plans to constitute specialized tribunals exclu-
sively to try the post-9/11 captives who have been held in
Guantinamo. These military tribunals were announced in a military
order by President Bush shortly after the 9/11 attacks.247 At the start,
the order indicated that such proceedings were to be limited to non-
citizens and that they were to be run by the U.S. military with proce-
dural rules that were not the equal of those in normal American
courts or in ordinary courts-martial, for that matter. As the rules have
been elaborated, 8 they have been simultaneously better and worse
than the critics feared. They are better because they require ajudg-
ment of guilt only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, they
start with the presumption of innocence and require unanimous ver-
dicts before a death penalty can be imposed.49
Nonetheless, the tribunals have been at least as bad as critics
feared because all aspects of the procedure are controlled by the sec-
retary of defense or the secretary's designee, the appointing authority
("AA").250 The AA approves all charges to be brought and supervises
the procedure (including security clearances) for qualifying any pri-
vate defense counsel that the defendant may hire at his own cost.
All judges on the tribunal and all staff members-including the
245 The European Court of Human Rights has a lot of experience in this area, largely in re-
viewing British legal strategy in Northern Ireland during the "troubles," specifying rule-of-law
guarantees even for those suspected of terrorism. See Brogan v. United Kingdom, 145 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 14 (1988) (holding that even terrorism suspects could not be held without re-
view and without charges for as long as four days).
246 For example, two British law lords have explicitly condemned the detentions. Robert
Verkaik, Another Law Lord Criticises Detentions at Guantdnamo Bay, INDEP. (London), Jan. 28,
2004, at 2, 2004 WL 67162485.
247 See Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
248 The more specific framework was provided by DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MILITARY COMMISSION
ORDER NO. 1 (2002), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/mco/mcol.pdf [hereinafter
DOD ORDER]. Later, in a series of eight Military Commission Instructions dated April 30, 2003,
the DOD published detailed rules of procedure. All of these documents can be found at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/commissions.html, along with a ninth Military Commission
Instruction dated December 26, 2003.
29 The general international acceptance that the death penalty is an inhumane punishment
also hurts the tribunals in international public opinion. For example, the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights requires the forty-six signatory states to forswear use of the death pen-
alty. For more on the European attitude toward punishment generally, see JAMES Q. WHITMAN,
HARSHJUSTIcE 200-03 (2003).
250 The AA's powers are given in the DOD Order. DOD ORDER, supra note 248.
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prosecutor-are appointed by the AA. The defendant is assigned (by
the AA) to a military counsel, who is the only one on the defense
team allowed to see all of the evidence against the defendant. Evi-
dence does not have to be offered orally 2 -1 and the defendant has no
right to confront witnesses against him. Instead, indirect (hearsay)
evidence may be admitted2 5s and the defendant himself may not be
allowed to learn all the evidence against him if it is national-security
sensitive.54 While the defendant has some right to call witnesses,
such rights are limited to those witnesses whose presence will not dis-
close national-security sensitive secrets and all witnesses called by the
defense must be approved by the presiding judge.2" At the end of
the proceedings, the AA reviews the transcript and signs off on the
verdict before it is final, unless the president of the United States
chooses to review the record for ultimate approval.2 6 There is no ap-
peal to anyone outside the DOD, except the president of the United
States, who was the one to designate which individuals could be tried
before the military tribunals in the first place.
Such procedures have not only elicited a great deal of domestic
criticism, but they have generated perhaps even more protests from• 2581
outside the United States. Under the Third Geneva Convention,
prisoners of war may only be tried by a tribunal exhibiting "the essen-
tial guarantees of independence and impartiality,"259 which the pro-
posed military tribunals fail to do because they are under the direct
251 The procedures specify that witnesses may appear in person, "by telephone, by audiovisual
means, or other means," id. § 6(D) (2) (a), a list which does not exclude evidence given in writ-
ing. In fact, the rules explicitly note that evidence given by unsworn or sworn written state-
ments is admissible. Id. § 6(D) (3).
22 Id. § 6(D) (2) (c). The rules indicate that witnesses who appear before the commission
would be subject to direct and cross-examination but are silent about what opportunities for
challenging testimony would be given to those witnesses who are permitted by the earlier pas-
sage to testify through means other than in-person appearance before the commission. Id.
253 Id. § 6(D)(1). The rules state that evidence is admissible if it "would have probative value
to a reasonable person," a standard that does not exclude the introduction of hearsay. Id.
2 Id. § 6(D) (5) (providing for the protection of information that discloses sources or meth-
ods or affects national security). Secret information may be deleted from documents available
to both the defense and the defense's personal lawyer. Id. § 6(D) (5) (b) (i). The AA-appointed
defense lawyer may still see this information. Id.
255 Id. § 5(H) ("The Accused may obtain witnesses and documents for the Accused's defense,
to the extent necessary and reasonably available as determined by the Presiding Officer.").
256 Id. § 6(H) (providing for post-commission review of the proceedings by the AA and the
secretary of defense or, in some cases, the president). There is no other appeal allowed. Id.
257 See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM AND THE LAW, American Bar Ass'n, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON MILITARY COMMISSIONS (2002) (condemning the Bush administration's
use of military tribunals), http://www.abanet.org/leadership/military.pdf.
258 See, e.g., Sandro Contenta, Detained Britons Won't Face Death Penalty For Now, TORONTO
STAR, July 20, 2003, at F3 (discussing the critical reaction in the United Kingdom to the tribunal
procedures), 2003 WL 59323921.
259 Third Geneva Convention, art. 84, supra note 217, 6 U.S.T. at 3364-65, 75 U.N.T.S. at 202.
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control of the president and defense secretary.2 60  When President
Bush finally designated a few of the Guantinamo detainees for possi-
ble trial before the military commissions, the British Prime Minister
Tony Blair immediately asked that the two British detainees in that
first set not be subjected to this procedure.261  The Australian Prime
Minister, John Howard, learning that there was an Australian citizen
in that first military tribunals list, asked also for his national to be ex-
empted.62 The Bush administration promised to negotiate the pro-
cedures to be used in the case of nationals of U.S. allies, but it is un-
clear just what such promises mean. In spring 2004, charges were
brought against two Guantdinamo detainees, one of whom is alleged
to be a bodyguard and driver for Osama bin Laden 26" and the other
an associate of bin Laden who made a video glorifying the attack on
the USS Cole.264
But however much international protest U.S. actions have caused
to date, nothing equals the international opposition mounted against
the war in Iraq-opposition which, as I write a year later, is still a
fresh wound. Here again, the United States essentially declared a
state of exception from the normal rules in play for the declaration of
war, in which only the justification of imminent self-defense works to
exempt a state from first going through the U.N. Security Council
procedures.265 While the United States and its staunch ally Britain
had started to go down the Security Council road toward seeking a
U.N. authorization of military intervention with a resolution on
point, in the end the impossibility of getting such a resolution meant
260 For critical analyses of the military tribunal rules, see HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (formerly
LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS), TRIALS UNDER MILITARY ORDER: A GUIDE TO THE FINAL
RULES FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS (2003), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/
a-guide-to.the-final rules.pdf, and HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BRIEFING PAPER ON MILITARY
COMMISSIONS (2003), http://hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/military-commissions.pdf.
261 Hamish MacDonell & Fraser Nelson, Blair the Showman's Ultimate Performance, SCOTSMAN,
July 19, 2003, at 3, 2003 WL 63935338.
262 Australian national David Hicks has since been assigned a military defense lawyer though
he has not yet been charged. His lawyer has criticized the Guantinamo tribunals and has
joined a brief to the U.S. Supreme Court in the Al Odah case. Marian Wilkinson & Jonathan
Pearlman, Military Trial Only Option for Hicks, Says Ruddock, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Jan. 23,
2004, at 6, 2004 WL 55403140. For the brief, see Brief of Amicus Curiae Military Attorneys As-
signed to the Defense in the Office of Military Commissions, A] Odah v. United States (2003)
(No. 03-343), http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl-s69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload500/91/
AmicusCuriaeMilitary.Attorneys.pdf.
263 See Charge: Conspiracy, United States v. Al Qosi, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Feb2004/d20040224A1Qosi.pdf.
264 See Charge: Conspiracy, United States v. Al Bahlul, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Feb2004/d20040224A1Bahlul.pdf.
265 The U.N. Charter requires a state to bring its grievances to the Security Council instead of
launching a war on its own. A war is legitimate only if the U.N. agrees with the grievances and
agrees to sponsor an international military operation against the offender. U.N. CHARTER ch.
VII. The only exception to this is for immediate self-defense. Id. at ch. VII, art. 51.
1064 [Vol. 6:5
LA WIN A TIME OF EMERGENCY
that the United States and Britain had to go it nearly alone, without
such authorization. France, Germany, and Russia-two with Security
Council vetoes and the third on the council at the time-opposed the
war; mass populations all over Europe and in the Middle East o P.
posed it too, along with substantial numbers in the United States.
Nonetheless, the United States and the United Kingdom went for-
ward, claiming that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruc-
tion that might fall into the hands of terrorists, even though the
proof they presented did not convince even the countries that had
recently authorized the weapons inspections."'
Much of the international community felt that either the U.N.
procedures should be followed or that the war should not be
launched. For the U.N. to fail to support the war in a second resolu-
tion and for the war to be launched anyway signaled to many that the
United States had become lawless in international affairs. (Never
mind that getting Security Council resolutions before going to war
had not been common practice since the middle of the twentieth
century, despite their endorsement by the U.N. Charter.)2 69  The
266 On February 16, 2003, about five million people around the world demonstrated against
the start of the Iraq war. See Peter Conradi, Demos Follow Sun Around the Globe, SUNDAY TIMES
(London), Feb. 16, 2003, at 2 (describing anti-war protests in Iraq, New York City, and
throughout Europe).
267 Judy Dempsey, Anti-War Axis: Three Capitals Stand Firm on Opposing Strike, FIN. TIMES (Lon-
don), Mar. 15, 2003, at 2.
268 The Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department of State failed to produce a formal justification
for the war. For a review of the variety of opinions expressed on this subject by experts in the
American Journal of International Law symposium on the legality of the Iraq war, see Lori Fisler
Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman, Editors'Introduction: Agora: Future Implications of The Iraq Con-
flict, 97 AM.J. INT'L L. 553 (2003).
269 There is an interesting story to be told here about how the U.N. Security Council proce-
dures came to be normalized, despite having not been actually used very many times before this
conflict. The Security Council had been paralyzed during the Cold War because any military
venture the United States was likely to support would have been vetoed by the Soviet Union and
vice versa. But even after the end of the Cold War, the United States had bypassed the Security
Council in the 1990s. For example, the United States considered support from NATO to be
sufficient international cover for the operation in Kosovo, and there had been much more
muted criticism on that occasion. Even though the Security Council procedure has been used
very rarely in the way it seems to have been envisioned, by the time of the Iraq war in spring
2003, nearly all the parties who spoke about the legitimacy of the war did so as if it required
such a resolution from the Security Council. As a result, the failure of the United States and
Britain to win support from the Security Council for a second resolution on Iraq was then met
with strong protests that military action without such a resolution was clearly illegitimate. Giv-
ing some acknowledgment to this argument, the United States and Britain used the fact that
there had been a prior resolution, ordering Saddam Hussein to let in weapons inspectors and
to cooperate with them or face "consequences," as a basis forjustifying their eventual initiation
of war. The resort to the first resolution for legitimacy was an indirect affirmation of the posi-
tion that the Security Council did need to authorize a war that was not conducted for immedi-
ate self-defense. As a result, the Iraq war may have established for the first time the widespread
recognition that Security Council resolutions are in fact needed for a state to legitimately go to
war.
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arguments for the need to follow international law rang out even in
places that have not had a history of supporting international law
themselves. 70
Moreover, the pressure that the United States put on its allies
amounted to trying to force them into a state of exception under
their own laws. The United States pressed hard on Turkey, which
had a fragile new moderate Islamist government, a history of military
intervention in civilian government, and a historical stake in fighting
Kurdish nationalism. When the civilian government refused to per-
mit the United States to base its troops in Turkey for an attack on
Northern Iraq, the Turkish military made noise as if it wanted to un-
dermine the civilian government with a decision to the contrary.
Furthermore, the United States did not discourage this, but pressed
as hard as possible for it (to the point of cutting off aid) right up until
the war started. 27  With other allies-the Philippines and Germany,
for example-whose constitutions forbid foreign military commit-
ments, the United States pressed hard to get them to support a mili-
tary engagement that their own governments would be constitution-
ally forbidden from entering into on their own. Russia, which
started out as a strong supporter of the U.S. war on terrorism, looked
at the United States' Iraqi strategy in conjunction with the other
270 During the lead-up to the Iraq War, I was living in Moscow, where television reports and
the daily print media were full of arguments about the need to follow international law. Russia,
like the United States, had shown mostly disdain for international law during the Cold War.
271 Karl Vick, After Calls on Turkey, U.S. Put on Hold: Heeding Public Opposition, Ankara Delays
Decision on Use of Bases Against Iraq, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2003, at A14 (discussing concerns about
Turkish opinion regarding the war in Iraq).
272 See Andrew Buncombe, Iraq Cisis: US. Rexes Economic Muscle To Ensure Diplomatic Success,
INDEP. (London), Feb. 25, 2003, at 2, 2003 WL 14682283. When Turkey backed out later, the
United States cut off all aid.
273 See, for example, Articles 25 and 26 of the German Constitution:
Article 25 (International law and Federal law)
The general rules of international law are an integral part of federal law. They shall take
precedence over the laws and directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the
federal territory.
Article 26 (Prohibition of preparations for a war of aggression)
(1) Acts tending to and undertaken with the intent of disturbing the peaceful relations
between nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression, are unconstitutional.
They shall be made a punishable offense.
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] arts. 25-26 (F.R.G.), translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: GERMANY (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 2003). The Federal Constitutional
Court ruled in a decision on July 12, 1994 that German troops could serve with peacekeeping
forces authorized by the United Nations without violating this constitutional provision. Judg-
ment ofJuly 12, 1994, 90 BVerfGE 286 (F.R.G.).
The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines also references international law:
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
PHIL. CONST. art. II, § 2, translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD:
PHILIPPINES (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., Supp. 1986).
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military efforts in the war on terrorism and thought that it too might
be an eventual target of U.S. aggression. 4 This turned the Russian
population firmly, and the Russian government tepidly (at the very
least), against the war and against new American military campaigns,
even though they were done in the name of the war on terrorism.
Suffice it to say that many of the United States' allies, no less than
its enemies, were pushed hard to violate both international agree-
ments and their own domestic constitutional provisions in order to
be "with us" instead of "with the terrorists." The price that allies paid
for not supporting the U.S. war on terrorism came either in financial
terms (aid was cut to Turkey and Russia and trade restrictions were
threatened with France and Germany) or in military terms (Russia
believed itself to be surrounded and Germany was threatened with a
pull-out of American bases there). Those who supported the United
States, even at the cost of their own constitutional compliance, were
generally rewarded for the use of the state of exception in their own
countries. For example, in Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf rammed
through a package of constitutional amendments making himself
president, extending his term of office, and increasing the formal
role of the military in government without protest from the United
States.275
In the foreign policy sphere, then, we can see the same sort of
progression from the small exceptions to legality right after 9/11 to
increasingly large violations conducted with impunity that have be-
come more blatant and more common as 9/11 has receded. While
the Bush administration seems to have entered the war on terrorism
after 9/11 with relative caution, this quickly broke down as first the
274 This view was never stated directly by the Kremlin but it appeared with surprising fre-
quency in the Russian media. There is some evidence of the view, however: when Russia gave
permission to the United States to base its military in the Central Asian states and to use former
Soviet military bases to do so, the permission was conditioned on the promise that the troops'
presence would be temporary. But now the United States is building permanent bases in these
states. In addition, the United States has dispatched special forces trainers to Georgia, on Rus-
sia's border with Chechnya, and has been using military air surveillance (some allegedly have
broken into Russian airspace) to keep track of what is going on in Chechnya. The United
States is now talking about moving its European bases farther "forward" to get closer to the
troublesome Middle East, but putting military bases in Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland also
brings the U.S. military closer to Russia. As a result, many Russians have gotten prickly over
what they see as an attempt by the United States to use the war on terrorism as an excuse to sur-
round its former adversary with military bases. See Seth Mydans, Free of Marx, But Now in the Grip
of a Dynasty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2003, at A4 (describing political transitions in Russia and the
"potentially explosive" issue of U.S. military presence).
275 See David Rohde, Musharraf Redraws Constitution, Blocking Promise of Democracy, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 22, 2002, at Al (discussing Musharraf's political maneuvers after pledging support to the
United States); Karl Vick, Pakistani Leader Accused of Trying to Grab Power; Restructuring Plan Is
Broadly Condemned, WASH. POST, June 28, 2002, at A18 (discussing Musharraf's plan to replace
Pakistan's parliamentary system).
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Geneva Conventions and then the U.N. Convention itself were
breached against strong opposition. The United States has also been
urging other countries to break their treaty obligations as well as their
own constitutions to enter the war on terrorism on the terms set by
the United States. Sometimes it even appears as though the Bush
administration would not mind bringing down the international sys-
tem as a by-product of its war on terrorism, since the international
system acts as a limitation to an endless state of exception.
III. POST-SCHMITT, POST-9/11
With this rather breathless tour of post-9/11 legal developments
in mind, what is to be said about the idea of the state of exception?
As I noted before, the state of exception according to Carl Schmitt is
not just about governance in unusual times; it is one of the defining
characteristics of sovereignty at all times and, as a result, it is the
power whose exercise defines the very character of the sovereign.
276
At a superficial level, the quality of President Bush's presidency does
seem to have been radically affected by the events of 9/11 and the
need to respond to them. Political commentary in the wake of 9/11
has frequently noted how the attacks gave George W. Bush a rationale
for his presidency, a missionary project that has defined his entire
term of office. 77 Bush's invocation of national security rationales has
meant that he has not needed to otherwise justify or explain his
course of action, except to say that, based on information that cannot
be widely shared, he understands that he must do what he proposes.
At this most obvious level, the use of exceptional powers to meet ex-
ceptional situations has in fact defined the specific quality of this ad-
ministration.
But the state of exception in Schmitt's terms goes deeper than
this. Schmitt is interested not only in the effects of using emergency
powers on a current head of state's reputation or the mission a leader
has when there is a sudden need to meet a sudden threat. Schmitt is
also interested in the character of regimes, of the possible limits to
the rule of law (or the very idea of normality) that must be acknowl-
edged if a threat is to be met. For Schmitt, it is the exception, not the
state of normality, that defines what normal means. 278 The exception,
then, has transformative powers over the very nature of the state. In
this sense, I think, the Bush administration's use of exceptional logics
has failed because the world in which the Bush administration acts is
276 SCHMITT, supra note 27, at 12.
277 Patrick E. Tyler, A Reminder of a Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2003, at Al (discussing the
attacks as a defining moment of Bush's presidency).
278 SCHMITT, supra note 27, at 13.
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not the early twentieth century world that Schmitt took as his back-
drop, a world of national and fragmented power. Even though the
Bush administration has been able to do virtually everything it has
wanted to in the war on terrorism, it has not succeeded in justifying
what it has done to an international public or, increasingly, to sub-
stantial segments of the American public either.
Americans, beaten down in their constitutional expectations by
the permanent changes brought about during the Cold War, have
become used to the logic of the exception. The American presidency
is supposed to take the lead in responding to threats, and virtually all
other constitutional checks on his power are temporarily sus-
pended-or work with a substantial bias in favor of approving emer-
gency-justified presidential action while it is still deemed necessary.
As I argued earlier, the American response to World War II and its
aftermath was immediately tied up with defending the state against
foreign threats that the Soviet Union posed and thus, the United
States has rarely gone through a substantial questioning of the limits
of emergency powers. 9  Instead, the American constitutional order
has learned to live with them.
Nonetheless, a number of America's European allies have taken a
different trajectory since the defeat of Nazi Germany. Both in new
constitutions that have been written and in the elaboration of inter-
national law, states of emergency have been filled up with more legal
content, rather than with overt exceptions to legality.80  States of
279 The 1970s debates around the findings of the Church Committee and the subsequent en-
actment of a statute ending existing states of emergency and putting eventual expiration dates
on new ones were rare exceptions. See National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat.
1255 (1976) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000)).
280 The legal content is defined in a variety of different ways. While Germany's new post-war
constitution deliberately did not contain a provision for a state of emergency at all out of fear it
would be used, Article 16 of the French Constitution of 1958 gave emergency powers almost
exclusively to the president, in contrast with the shared-powers approach that had characterized
the previous regime of legally regulated itats de siege. Even so, there are official roles for the Na-
tional Assembly and the Constitutional Council to play in the state of emergency:
When the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the nation, the integrity
of its territory or the fulfillment of its international commitments are threatened in a
grave and immediate manner and when the regular functioning of the constitutional
governmental authorities is interrupted, the President of the Republic shall take the
measures commanded by these circumstances, after official consultation with the Pre-
mier, the Presidents of the assemblies and the Constitutional Council.
He shall inform the nation of these measures in a message.
These measures must be prompted by the desire to ensure to the constitutional
governmental authorities, in the shortest possible time, the means of fulfilling their as-
signed functions. The Constitutional Council shall be consulted with regard to such
measures.
Parliament shall meet by right.
The National Assembly may not be dissolved during the exercise of emergency pow-
ers by the President.
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emergency, as a result, are moments that call for an even stricter ap-
plication of law than might usually be the case, even as particular le-
gal restrictions are loosened. 8'
FR. CONST. art. 16, translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: FRANCE (Gis-
bert H. Flanz ed., Supp. 1999).
281 The German constitution stands as a model for how a state of emergency may be legally
regulated. When Germany eventually amended its constitution in 1968 to give definite legal
shape to its understanding of the "state of defense," it added an extraordinary amount of detail
to the precise procedures that had to be followed in this exceptional state. As a result, the
German state of defense is at least as much under the rule of law as normal governance is:
Article 80a (State of tension)
(1) Where this Basic Law or a federal law on defence, including the protection of the ci-
vilian population, stipulates that legal provisions may only be applied in accordance
with this Article, their application shall, except when a state of defence exists, be ad-
missible only after the Bundestag has determined that a state of tension (Spannungs-
fall) exists or if it has specifically approved such application. In respect of the cases
mentioned in the first sentence of paragraph (5) and the second sentence of para-
graph (6) of Article 12a, such determination of a state of tension and such specific
approval shall require a two-thirds majority of the votes cast.
(2) Any measures taken by virtue of legal provisions enacted under paragraph (1) of this
Article shall be revoked whenever the Bundestag so requests.
(3) In derogation of paragraph (1) of this Article, the application of such legal provi-
sions shall also be admissible by virtue of, and in accordance with, a decision taken
with the consent of the Federal Government by an international organ within the
framework of a treaty of alliance. Any measures taken pursuant to this paragraph
shall be revoked whenever the Bundestag so requests with the majority of its mem-
bers.
Article I 15a (Determination of a state of defence)
(1) The determination that the federal territory is being attacked by armed force or that
such an attack is directly imminent (state of defence) shall be made by the
Bundestag with the consent of the Bundesrat. Such determination shall be made at
the request of the Federal Government and shall require a two-thirds majority of the
votes cast, which shall include at least the majority of the members of the Bundestag.
(2) If the situation imperatively calls for immediate action and if insurmountable obsta-
cles prevent the timely meeting of the Bundestag, or if there is no quorum in the
Bundestag, the Joint Committee shall make this determination with a two-thirds ma-
jority of the votes cast, which shall include at least the majority of its members.
(3) The determination shall be promulgated in the Federal Law Gazette by the Federal
President pursuant to Article 82. If this cannot be done in time, the promulgation
shall be effected in another manner; it shall subsequently be printed in the Federal
Law Gazette as soon as circumstances permit.
(4) If the Federal territory is being attacked by armed force and if the competent organs
of the Federation are not in a position at once to make the determination provided
for in the first sentence of paragraph (1) of this Article, such determination shall be
deemed to have been made and promulgated at the time the attack began. The
Federal President shall announce such time as soon as circumstances permit.
(5) When the determination of the existence of a state of defence has been promulgated
and if the federal territory is being attacked by armed force, the Federal President
may, with the consent of the Bundestag, issue internationally valid declarations re-
garding the existence of such state of defence subject to the conditions mentioned in
paragraph (2) of this Article, the Joint Committee shall thereupon deputize for the
Bundestag.
Article 115b (Power of command during state of defence)
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Upon the promulgation of a state of defence, the power of command over the
Armed Forces shall pass to the Federal Chancellor.
Article 115c (Legislative compliance of the Federation during state of defence)
(1) The Federation shall have the right to exercise concurrent legislation even in mat-
ters belonging to the legislative competence of the Laender by enacting laws to be
applicable upon the occurrence of a state of defence. Such laws shall require the
consent of the Bundesrat.
(2) Federal legislation to be applicable upon the occurrence of a state of defence to the
extent required by conditions obtaining while such state of defence exists, may make
provision for:
1. preliminary compensation to be made in the event of expropriations, thus diverg-
ing from the second sentence of paragraph (3) of Article 14;
2. deprivations of liberty for a period not exceeding four days, if no judge has been
able to act within the period applying in normal times, thus diverging from the
third sentence of paragraph (2) and the first sentence of paragraph (3) of Article
104.
(3) Federal legislation to be applicable upon the occurrence of a state of defence to the
extent required for averting an existing or directly imminent attack, may, subject to
the consent of the Bundesrat, regulate the administration and the fiscal system of the
Federation and the Laender in divergence from Sections VIII, VIIIa and X, provided
that the viability of the Laender, communes and associations of communes is safe-
guarded, particularly in fiscal matters.
(4) Federal laws enacted pursuant to paragraph (1) or subparagraph (1) of paragraph
(2) of this Article may, for the purpose of preparing for their execution, be applied
even prior to the occurrence of a state of defence.
Article 115d (Shortened procedure in the case of urgent bills during state of defence)
(1) While a state of defence exists, the provisions of paragraphs (2) and (3) of this Arti-
cle shall apply in respect of federal legislation, notwithstanding the provisions of
paragraph (2) of Article 76, the second sentence of paragraph (1) and paragraphs
(2) to (4) of Article 77, Article 78, and paragraph (1) of Article 82.
(2) Bills submitted as urgent by the Federal Government shall be forwarded to the
Bundesrat at the same time as they are submitted to the Bundestag. The Bundestag
and the Bundesrat shall debate such bills in common without delay. In so far as the
consent of the Bundesrat is necessary, the majority of its votes shall be required for
any such bill to become a law. Details shall be regulated by rules of procedure
adopted by the Bundestag and requiring the consent of the Bundesrat.
(3) The second sentence of paragraph (3) of Article 115a shall apply mutatis mutandis
in respect of the promulgation of such laws.
Article 115e (Status and functions of the Joint Committee)
(1) If, while a state of defence exists, the Joint Committee determines with a two-thirds
majority of the votes cast, which shall include at least the majority of its members,
that insurmountable obstacles prevent the timely meeting of the Bundestag, or that
there is no quorum in the Bundestag, the Joint Committee shall have the status of
both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat and shall exercises their rights as one body.
(2) The Joint Committee may not enact any law to amend this Basic Law or to deprive it
of effect or application either in whole or in part. The Joint Committee shall not be
authorized to enact laws pursuant to paragraph (1) of Article 24 or to Article 29.
Article 115f (Extraordinary powers of the Federation during state of defence)
(1) While a state of defence exists, the Federal Government may to the extent necessi-
tated by circumstances:
1. commit the Federal Border Guard throughout the federal territory;
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2. issue instructions not only to federal administrative authorities but also to Land
governments and, if it deems the matter urgent, to Land authorities, and may
delegate this power to members of Land governments to be designated by it.
(2) The Bundestag, the Bundesrat and the Joint Committee, shall be informed without
delay of the measures taken in accordance with paragraph (1) of this Article.
Article 1 15g (States and functions of the Federal Constitutional Court during state of de-
fence)
The constitutional status and the exercise of the constitutional functions of the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court and its judges must not be impaired. The Law on the Federal
Constitutional Court may not be amended by a law enacted by the Joint Committee ex-
cept insofar as such amendment is required, also in the opinion of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court, to maintain the capability of the Court to function. Pending the enact-
ment of such a law, the Federal Constitutional Court may take such measures as are
necessary to maintain the capability of the Court to carry out its work. Any decisions by
the Federal Constitutional Court in pursuance of the second and third sentence of this
Article shall require a two-thirds majority of the judges present.
Article 115h (Legislative terms and terms of office during state of defence)
(1) Any legislative terms of the Bundestag or of Land diets due to expire while a state of
defence exists shall end six months after the termination of such state of defence. A
term of office of the Federal President due to expire while a state of defence exists,
and the exercise of his functions by the President of the Bundesrat in case of the
premature vacancy of the Federal President's office, shall end nine months after the
termination of such state of defence. The term of office of a member of the Federal
Constitutional Court due to expire while a state of defence exists shall end six
months after the termination of such state of defence.
(2) Should the necessity arise for the Joint Committee to elect a new Federal Chancellor,
the Committee shall do so with the majority of its members; the Federal President
shall propose a candidate to the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee can express
its lack of confidence in the Chancellor only by electing a successor with a two-thirds
majority of its members.
(3) The Bundestag shall not be dissolved while a state of defence exists.
Article 115i (Extraordinary power of the Land governments)
(1) If the competent federal organs are incapable of taking the measures necessary to
avert the danger, and if the situation imperatively calls for immediate independent
action in individual parts of the federal territory, the Land governments or the au-
thorities or commissioners designated by them shall be authorized to take, within
their respective spheres of competence, the measures provided for in paragraph (1)
of Article 115f.
(2) Any measures taken in accordance with paragraph (1) of the present Article may be
revoked at any time by the Federal Government, or in the case of Land authorities
and subordinate federal authorities, by Land Prime Ministers.
Article 115k (Grade and duration of validity of extraordinary laws and ordinances having
the force of law)
(1) Laws enacted in accordance with Articles 115c, 115e, and l15g, as well as ordinances
having the force of law issued by virtue of such laws, shall, for the duration of their
applicability, suspend legislation contrary to such laws or ordinances. This shall not
apply to earlier legislation enacted by virtue of Articles 115c, 115e or 115g.
(2) Laws adopted by the Joint Committee, and ordinances having the force of law issued
by virtue of such laws, shall cease to have effect not later than six months after the
termination of a state of defence.
(3) Laws containing provisions that diverge from Articles 91a, 91b, 104a, 106 and 107,
shall apply no longer than the end of the second fiscal year following upon the ter-
mination of the state of defence. After such termination they may, with the consent
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To see why the Schmittian logic of exception has much less attrac-
tion for American allies in much of Europe, it is necessary to briefly
revisit the historical period in which Schmitt claimed that a state of
exception could and should have this transformative effect on ordi-
nary politics. When Schmitt wrote, parliamentary government was
teetering on the brink of breakdown not only in Germany but in
much of continental Europe, and the democratic republic estab-
lished by the Weimar Constitution was fraught with internal inconsis-
tencies, irreconcilable differences, and a growing sense of crisis. The
Weimar Constitution's Article 48 seemed to Realpolitik theorists like
Schmitt to be the constitutional way out of the mess. Schmitt had ad-
vocated the strengthening of executive power against the weakness of
parliamentarism as the only strategy that would ensure the mainte-
nance of the republic. History knows what happened later: the rise
of fascism, the destruction of democratic government, war, and the
camps. Schmitt was himself a convert to and justifier of the fascist
cause; many have seen in Schmitt's idea of the exception the seeds-
even the seedlings and whole forests-of fascism.
But however powerful we believe ideas can be in the world, they
only can be played out on the world stage if there are other historical
and material circumstances that allow them to be realized. And there
were many features of both Weimar Germany and inter-war Europe
that allowed Schmitt's exceptional justifications to take hold at that
time. I will not rehearse them all here-there has been plenty of
scholarship on the point.282  But I will mention just a few of the
of the Bundesrat, be amended by federal legislation so as to lead up to the settlement
provided for in Sections VIlla and X.
Article 1151 (Repealing of extraordinary laws, Termination of state of defence, Conclu-
sion of peace)
(1) The Bundestag, with the consent of the Bundesrat, may at any time repeal laws en-
acted by the Joint Committee. The Bundesrat may request the Bundestag to make a
decision in any such matter. Any measures taken by the Joint Committee or the Fed-
eral Government to avert a danger shall be revoked if the Bundestag and the Bundes-
rat so decide.
(2) The Bundestag, with the consent of the Bundesrat, may at any time declare the state
of defence terminated by a decision to be promulgated by the Federal President.
The Bundesrat may request the Bundestag to make a decision in any such matter.
The state of defence must be declared terminated without delay when the prerequi-
sites for the determination thereof no longer exist.
(3) The conclusion of peace shall be the subject of a federal law.
GRUNDGESETZ [CGG] arts. 80a, 115a-1151 (F.R.G.) (provisions cited were inserted by federal law
in 1968), translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1974). For a discussion of these provi-
sions, see C.C. Schweitzer, Emergency Powers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 22 W. POL. Q. 112
(1969).
282 By now, the literature on Schmitt, his historical moment, and the political and theoretical
debates surrounding him is enormous. Some of the most recent book-length contributions in
English include JOSEPH W. BENDERSKY, CARL SCHMITT: THEORIST FOR THE REICH (1983);
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elements. While constitutional monarchies were more stable in
Europe at that time, republican governments established in inter-war
Europe were generally fragile. The conception of executive power in
the new republics had generally not made a complete practical or in-
tellectual transition from the model of the monarchy to the model of
a democratically accountable head of state. The settlements at the
end of the First World War had left resentment in their wake among
the losers and leaders could whip ug popular sentiment by promising
a return to the pre-War status quo.2  The Russian Revolution created
enormous sympathies both toward communism and toward revolu-
tionary change in the rest of Europe, while also inspiring strong reac-
tion against such revolutionary movements. 24 Anxiety about national
belonging was easily channeled into nationalism, and nationalism was
at that time in Europe premised on the idea of a "people" whose
boundaries of membership were inflexible because they were tied to
birth and ethnicity. Law, in consequence, was national law, and the
devices and justifications for sovereignty were national justifications.
Against this background, Schmitt's idea of the state of exception
can be seen as a distinctly national and nationalist idea. He imagines a
sovereign of a nation, one who (as we learn in some of Schmitt's
other work) 25 has as a primary job defining who is inside the sphere
of protection (the friend) and who is outside (the enemy), locked in
perpetual and mortal combat. The idea of the exception is related to
this fundamentally agonistic conception of politics; the exception is
what allows the sovereign to strike out against the enemy with the ra-
tionale that he is protecting the friend. But this conception of poli-
tics presupposes that all that is relevant about sovereignty can be
RENATO CRISTI, CARL SCHMITT AND AUTHORITARIAN LIBERALISM: STRONG STATE, FREE ECONOMY
(1998); DAVID DYZENHAUS, LAW AS POLITICS: CARL SCHMITr'S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM (1998);
DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL SCHMITT, HANS KELSEN AND HERMANN
HELLER IN WEIMAR (1997); HEINRICH MEIER, FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
SCHMITr, POLITICAL THEOLOGY AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (Marcus Brainard trans., 1998);
CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE CHALLENGE OF CARL SCHMITT (1999); WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, CARL
SCHMITT: THE END OF LAW 181-251 (1999); GEORGE SCHWAB, THE CHALLENGE OF THE
EXCEPTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF CARL SCHMITT BETWEEN 1921 AND
1936 (2d ed. 1989). Special issues ofjoumals have been devoted to assessing Schmitt's legacy-
see, for example, 10 CANADIANJ.L. &JURISPRUDENCE (1997), and the exposition dedicated to
Schmitt that started the modem debate in English, Special Issue on Carl Schmitt, 72 TELOS 3
(1987).
283 See generally SALLY MARKS, THE ILLUSION OF PEACE: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN EUROPE
1918-1933 (2d. ed. 2003) (tracing the effects of the post-war agreements on European politics
from the signing of the peace treaties to the collapse of the Weimar Republic).
284 See generally DONALD F. BUSKY, COMMUNISM IN HISTORY AND THEORY: THE EUROPEAN
EXPERIENCE (2002) (documenting how the Russian Revolution made communism attractive as a
theory and present as a live political option in European politics for much of the twentieth cen-
tury).
285 CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL U. Harvey Lomax trans., Univ. of Chi.
Press 1996) (1928).
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captured in a single person who is sovereign of a nation that provides
a first approximation of the universe of friends. The nation-state is
the only sort of entity from whose perspective such clear dividing
lines can be drawn. As democratic constitutional governments have
replaced monarchies, and as immigration has become common in
states once defined primarily by ethnic affiliation, Schmitt's idea of
sovereignty no longer reflects facts on the ground. Nationalism is no
longer an ideology that attracts sympathies outside the sphere of the
nationalists themselves. s6
The negative lessons of fascism, and also the negative lessons of
Stalinism, were taken on board in the construction of new national
governments and new transnational institutions after World War II.
The horror of the camps, the unspeakable destruction of total wars,
even the later shadow of nuclear catastrophe-these living night-
mares constituted the new forms of destruction that appeared simul-
taneously with the abolition of empires and monarchies, with the rise
of both democratic and republican governments, with the ever-
widening victory of constitutionalism and with the increasing appeals
to the idea of universal human rights. Much of the first two-thirds of
the twentieth century287 was dominated by the simultaneous develop-
ment of two contradictory trends-the headlong rush to new forms of
international destruction alongside the development of new forms of
the protection of the individual as a political subject. The new hu-
man-rights promoting democracies that emerged in Europe in the
shadow of the world wars are far from perfect, but they improved ori
the records of the governments that had been destroyed by World
War II.
During the Cold War, Realpolitik foreign policy dominated inter-
national developments led by the United States and the Soviet Union.
Serious conflict in this period was typically recast as a proxy war
among superpowers whose self-interest served as their primary moti-
vations. But while international relations were dominated by pros-
pects of superpower conflict, international law was growing in the
shadows among powers that were less "super." Institutions that were
to the superpowers merely symbolic debating clubs developed both
institutional stability and defining sets of principles that struck out in
directions different from the guiding ideas of the superpowers. The
development of the U.N. system outside of the Security Council, of
286 See generally ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONALISM (1997) (providing a theoretical account of
what nationalism believes itself to be); ANTHONY SMITH, NATIONALISM: THEORY, IDEOLOGY AND
HISTORY (2001) (describing the rise of nationalism, its consolidation, and its critics).
287 My argument here applies primarily to those countries that defined themselves as world
powers; obviously, in much of the less-powerful world, the concerns and trajectories were
somewhat different.
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international conventions and their non-coercive monitoring frame-
works, of regional human rights bodies and the increasing human
rights orientation of the successive waves of new constitutions that
emerged following the Second World War, were all largely ignored by
the realist-driven superpowers. But develop they did. By the time the
Cold War ended rather surprisingly at the end of the 1980s, the
Schmittian framework of friend and enemy that had oriented world
politics among the superpowers for decades after the last total war
simultaneously collapsed.
The result was the rise to real prominence of what had been
thought by the superpowers to be merely symbolic institutions. The
U.N. and its system of international human rights protections as-
sumed new powers and new status precisely because the old order
had vanished. The regional human rights bodies (backed up in the
case of Europe with an ever-increasing union) provided order that
substituted for the old Cold War orientations. Out from under the
constant threat of nuclear catastrophe and the sense that only sover-
eigns with "realist" views could manage the bipolar world, the inter-
national institutions that had developed with the luxury of having the
sources of real power ignore them suddenly became sources of real
power themselves. International law, disparaged by realists through-
out the Cold War 288 suddenly became more law-like, at least in the
sense that more countries were willing to take its principles as bind-
ing on domestic decisions.
But even in the absence of transnational bodies that could enforce
principles of international law, new constitutions (particularly those
written as soviet communism and other repressive regimes collapsed)
often include a prominent place for international law in domestic
constitutional law. International law is, then, increasingly viewed as
288 The ultimate realist, Henry Kissinger, famously taught a course on international politics at
Harvard. One class each term was devoted to international law. As legend would have it, each
year Kissinger sent one of his research assistants to that class to announce that Professor Kiss-
inger did not believe that there was such a thing as international law and that therefore the
class was cancelled.
29 The Constitution of Hungary, for example, is typical in this regard:
Article 6
(1) The Republic of Hungary repudiates war as a means of dealing with conflicts be-
tween nations and refrains from the use of force against the independence or terri-
torial integrity of other states. It also refrains from making threats implying recourse
to force.
(2) The Republic of Hungary is working for co-operation with all peoples and countries
of the world.
Article 7
(1) The legal system of the Republic of Hungary accepts the universally recognised of in-
ternational law, and shall harmonises the internal laws and statutes of the country
with the obligateons assumed under international law.
1076 [Vol. 6:5
LA WIN A TIME OF EMERGENCY
a species of domestic law-as binding legal norms that are integral
parts of the domestic legal system and that give fundamental provi-
sions of the domestic legal system their meaning. Part of this interna-
tional law is the law of war, including the U.N. Charter, the Geneva
Conventions and, most recently, the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court. While the United States may have been oblivious (or
opposed) to these developments since international law is still not
considered part of a basic legal education in the United States and
not widely respected either by U.S. courts 90 or U.S. politicians, 9'
many other countries have been eagerly learning, adopting, and
elaborating this system.
As a result, regimes of law and regimes of war are no longer op-
posed conceptions for many of the United States' constitutional-
democratic allies. Instead, the increasing density of international
norms in the period since Schmitt wrote has produced a conception
of war that is almost entirely filled with legal content. Precisely in re-
sponse to the horrors that Schmitt saw coming (and perhaps assisted
in producing), much of the international community has pulled back
from the brink of catastrophe and realized that the very idea of war
had to be governed by law.
Of course, creating a law of war no more ensures that wars follow
the law than creating a criminal code ensures that there is no crime
in a society. But the legal framework, if agreed upon widely, provides
the basis for condemnation of individual country practices in the
same way that a domestic criminal code provides the basis for the
A MAGYAR K(ZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] arts. 6-7 (Hung.), translated in
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: HUNGARY (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 1995).
20 This may be changing with the rather sudden appearance in the case law of the U.S. Su-
preme Court at the end of the 2002-2003 term of nontrivial references to international law in
two of the judgments. The most visible is the reference to decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights in Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), where the majority opinion uses
those decisions to show that Western civilization has not had a uniform or unchanging view of
homosexuality. Id. at 2481-83. The other was the reference in the concurring opinion of Jus-
tice Ginsburg in Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003), where she indicates that the
affirmative action principles upheld by the majority in that case also are supported by two in-
ternational agreements, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (which the United States has signed and ratified) and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms Discrimination against Women (which the United States has signed
but not ratified). For more along these lines by another distinguished commentator, see Harry
A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 40 (1994) (noting that
certain constitutional touchstones like the "evolving standard of decency" require reference to
the practices of other countries).
291 Recently, several resolutions have been introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives
cautioning federal courts not to use foreign law. See, e.g., Constitutional Preservation Resolu-
tion, H.R. Res. 446, 108th Cong. (2003) ("Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives
that the Supreme Court should base its decisions on the Constitution and the Laws of the
United States, and not on the law of any foreign country or any international law or agreement
not made under the authority of the United States.").
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condemnation of individual acts. The United States has not been in
the forefront of the development-or for that matter the adherence
to-these international norms. In fact, even before 9/11, the United
States was already one of the primary outlaws in this field.292 But vir-
tually no other country, with the exception of truly brutal dictator-
ships, denies the binding alicability of international law in the way
that the United States 
does.
This is why the United States has received so much criticism for
the way that it has conducted its foreign policy after 9/11 when its
small public vestiges of support for international norms collapsed en-
tirely. The Iraq War and the Guantdnamo camps, to take the two
most egregious cases, violate the now-well-established principles of in-
ternational law so thoroughly that the U.S. position in taking excep-
tion to them succeeds not in deeply reconstituting international poli-
tics, but instead in branding the United States as the attempted
wrecker of the international system. With few exceptions, other
countries have failed to reconize the legitimacy of the positions that
the United States has taken.2
Even in its domestic policy, the Bush administration has drawn
both international and domestic criticism. As we have seen, Ameri-
can domestic courts, while initially more constitutionally alert, have
since become quite deferential to the Bush administration's ration-
ales for the declarations of exception to states of normal legality. At
times of crisis, the system of separation of powers and the system for
protection of human rights seem to collapse into the one constitu-
tional clause that gives the commander in chief his powers. This, as
292 The United States' adherence to the death penalty is one of the leading causes of con-
sternation among its constitutional allies. In 2003, the United States placed third in the world
in the number of people it executed, behind China and Iran, and with Vietnam and Saudi Ara-
bia in close pursuit. Slight Fall in Capital Punishment, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Apr. 7, 2004,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/intemational/story/0,3604,1187137,00.html.
293 By saying this, I am of course not implying that the United States operates like a brutal
dictatorship. Instead, I want to make the point that many constitutional democracies now em-
bed principles of international law in their own constitutional orders not just in symbolic ways,
but as real backstops for domestic abuses of power. Because the United States by and large ig-
nores international human rights law as a source of legal authority, more pressure is placed on
the U.S. Constitution to be the one and only line of defense against serious assaults on rights. If
the Constitution fails, the United States as a legal matter goes into free fall apart from the po-
tential protections available through state constitutions. When countries whose constitutions
and international commitments bind them to international law fail their own internal obliga-
tions, the international law system provides a second line of defense.
24 In another article, I attempt to show that most of the other constitutional democracies in
the world have responded to 9/11 by using their domestic court systems to prosecute terrorists,
much as the United States did before 9/11. As a result, there have been trials of al Qaeda
members in Germany, Italy, France, Spain, and the U.K. Even Russia, which faces a terrorist
threat (or civil war) from Chechen rebels, has reaffirmed its commitment to the maintenance
of constitutional criminal procedure even as it has prosecuted a war against the province. See
Kim Lane Scheppele, OtherPeople's PATRIOTActs, LOY. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
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constitutional historians are quick to note, generally does happen
during wartime in the United States.2 5
But this sort of general collapse of constitutionalism does not
generally happen during wartime anymore in many of the world's
most respected constitutional regimes. New constitutions often ex-
plicitly draw from the failure of the Weimar Constitution in hedging
their own states of exception with legal guarantees. As we have seen,
Germany's constitution builds in substantial and detailed protections
against abuse of emergency powers."' Later constitutions in other
countries recovering from "regimes of horror""9 7 in the 1990s were
even stronger on this point. It has now become a matter of standard
constitutional drafting practice to constitutionally regulate states of
emergency within the constitution, so that the state of emergency-
like the idea of war itself-has become an idea filled with legality.
One of the strongest protections among recently drafted constitu-
tions can be found in the South African Constitution, which allows a
state of emergency to exist, but protects basic human rights and re-
quires constant parliamentary review of related executive decisions.
2 98
295 Perhaps the most alarming of the defenders of the practice that the law is silent in war is
Chief Justice William Rehnquist. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998) (tracing the history of civil liberties during times of national
emergency).
See supra note 281.
297 Scheppele, supra note 45.
298 The legal regulation of the state of emergency is so exemplary that it is worth quoting the
South African Constitution at length:
(1) A state of emergency may be declared only in terms of an Act of Parliament, and
only when-
(a) the life of the nation is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disor-
der, natural disaster or other public emergency; and
(b) the declaration is necessary to restore peace and order.
(2) A declaration of a state of emergency, and any legislation enacted or other action
taken in consequence of that declaration, may be effective only-
(a) prospectively; and
(b) for no more than 21 days from the date of the declaration, unless the National
Assembly resolves to extend the declaration. The Assembly may extend a declara-
tion of a state of emergency for no more than three months at a time. The first
extension of the state of emergency must be by a resolution adopted with a sup-
porting vote of a majority of the members of the Assembly. Any subsequent ex-
tension must be by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of at least 60 per
cent of the members of the Assembly. A resolution in terms of this paragraph
may be adopted only following a public debate in the Assembly.
(3) Any competent court may decide on the validity of-
(a) a declaration of a state of emergency;
(b) any extension of a declaration of a state of emergency; or
(c) any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in consequence of a declaration of
a state of emergency.
(4) Any legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a state of emergency may
derogate from the Bill of Rights only to the extent that-
(a) the derogation is strictly required by the emergency; and
(b) the legislation-
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(i) is consistent with the Republic's obligations under international law applicable
to states of emergency;
(ii) conforms to subsection (5); and
(iii) is published in the national Government Gazette as soon as reasonably possi-
ble after being enacted.
(5) No Act of Parliament that authorises a declaration of a state of emergency, and no
legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of a declaration, may per-
mit or authorise-
(a) indemnifying the state, or any person, in respect of any unlawful act;
(b) any derogation from this section; or
(c) any derogation from a section mentioned in column I of the Table of Non-
Derogable Rights, to the extent indicated opposite that section in column 3 of
the Table. [This is followed by a detailed list of which rights must be protected
even in a state of emergency.]
(6) Whenever anyone is detained without trial in consequence of a derogation of rights
resulting from a declaration of a state of emergency, the following conditions must
be observed:
(a) An adult family member or friend of the detainee must be contacted as soon as
reasonably possible, and informed that the person has been detained.
(b) A notice must be published in the national Government Gazette within five days
of the person being detained, stating the detainee's name and place of detention
and referring to the emergency measure in terms of which that person has been
detained.
(c) The detainee must be allowed to choose, and be visited at any reasonable time
by, a medical practitioner.
(d) The detainee must be allowed to choose, and be visited at any reasonable time
by, a legal representative.
(e) A court must review the detention as soon as reasonably possible, but no later
than 10 days after the date the person was detained, and the court must release
the detainee unless it is necessary to continue the detention to restore peace and
order.
(f) A detainee who is not released in terms of a review under paragraph (e), or who
is not released in terms of a review under this paragraph, may apply to a court for
a further review of the detention at any time after 10 days have passed since the
previous review, and the court must release the detainee unless it is still necessary
to continue the detention to restore peace and order.
(g) The detainee must be allowed to appear in person before any court considering
the detention, to be represented by a legal practitioner at those hearings, and to
make representations against continued detention.
(h) The state must present written reasons to the court to justify the continued de-
tention of the detainee, and must give a copy of those reasons to the detainee at
least two days before the court reviews the detention.
(7) If a court releases a detainee, that person may not be detained again on the same
grounds unless the state first shows a court good cause for re-detaining that person.
(8) Subsections (6) and (7) do not apply to persons who are not South African citizens
and who are detained in consequence of an international armed conflict. Instead,
the state must comply with the standards binding on the Republic under interna-
tional humanitarian law in respect of the detention of such persons.
S. AFR. CONST. § 37, translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA (Gisbert H. Flanz ed. & Patricie H. Ward assoc. ed., 2004).
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Another more typical example is the 1993 Russian Constitution,'"
which also requires both that a state of emergency be legally de-
clared, and also that a long list of rights be protected during the on-
going emergency. These provisions have become typical of the new
constitutions so that the very idea of a state of emergency has become
a constitutional idea and not an extra-constitutional one. Rather
than defining the edges of the sovereign regime, as Schmitt argued,
states of exception are now in practical terms defined as states inside,
not outside the constitutional framework. States of emergency, like
states of war, have been filled with legal content.
This is not to say that a Schmittian world view is impossible post-
9/11. The Bush administration has seemed to proceed from the pre-
sumption that exceptional times demand exceptional means and that
it is either naive or suicidal for a state to follow the rules in the cur-
rent state of affairs. Perhaps because other countries have experi-
enced the horror of the collapse of the rule of law firsthand in more
extreme ways than has the United States in the last century, much of
the international community (and particularly those democratic rule-
of-law countries that count themselves among the United States' tra-
ditional allies) definitely rejected the Realpolitik presumptions under-
lying the Schmittian analysis of the state of exception.
The outrage and repulsion with which Schmitt's views have been
received in recent years0 0 provide some measure of the extent to
which Schmitt's critique of liberalism and his proposed solutions to
Article 56 of the Russian Constitution reads:
1. Under conditions of a state of emergency in order to ensure the safety of citizens and
protection of the constitutional system, individual restriction of rights and freedoms
with the identification of the extent and term of their duration may be instituted in
conformity with the federal constitutional law.
2. A state of emergency throughout the territory of the Russian Federation and in spe-
cific areas thereof may be introduced in circumstances and in conformity with the
procedures defined by the federal constitutional law.
3. The rights and freedoms specified in Articles 20, 21, 23 (part 1), 24, 28, 34 (part 1), 40
(part 1), 46-54 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation are not subject to restric-
tion.
KONST. RF art. 56 (1993), translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 2002).
300 For an early example of the controversy, see the intense debate that erupted in the jour-
nal Telos, when Ellen Kennedy first attempted a discussion of Schmitt's intellectual legacy in
modern German political theory. Ellen Kennedy, Carl Schmitt and the Frankfurt School, 71 TELOS
37 (1987) (arguing that Schmitt is one of the intellectual sources of the Frankfurt School but
showing that many of the members of that school attempted to hide his influence after
Schmitt's association with fascism became clear). The responses published in the same issue
include: Martin Jay, Reconciling the Irreconcilable? Rejoinder to Kennedy, 71 TELOS 67 (1987); Al-
fons S6llner, Beyond Carl Schmitt: Political Theory in the Frankfurt School, 71 TELOS 81(1987); Ul-
rich K. Preuss, The Critique of German Liberalism: Reply to Kennedy, 71 TELOS 97 (1987). Kennedy
responded, Ellen Kennedy, Carl Schmitt and the Frankfurt School: A Rejoinder, 73 TELOS 101
(1987).
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liberalism's weaknesses have been rejected. Schmitt's anti-liberalism
has either been attributed to his fascist conversion, which is then
taken as answer enough to the intellectual challenges he may have
posed, or it has been met with the rule-of-law defenses of liberalism
that, to Schmitt's defenders, only serve to reinforce the point that
liberals are bad at dealing with political crises. But over the last sev-
eral decades, there is a growing condemnation of the legitimacy of
suspending the rule of law in order to defend a country--at least not
in "advanced" constitutional democracies.'O In fact, there has been
an expansion of the rule of law to cover more and more situations
previously judged to be practically and perhaps even morally extra-
legal. Instead of following the logic of the exception, the rule of law
has become coterminous in both the intellectual debate and in the
public mind in most constitutional democracies with the democratic
political order itself. The rule of law has become an article of faith
and not a controversial or internally fraught idea that needs public
philosophical attention. 30
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have tried to explain why the logic of Schmitt's
analyses no longer work as a practical matter to justify states of excep-
tion, even when it is clear to the international community that some-
thing fundamental has changed in the world system since 9/11. The
institutional elaboration of a new international system that has oc-
curred since Schmitt's time make his ideas seem all the more dan-
gerous, and yet all the more dated. There are simply fewer states in
the world willing to tolerate either Schmitt's conception of politics or
his conception of the defining qualities of sovereignty. Schmitt's phi-
losophy has, in short, been met with a different sociology. For his
ideas to be either persuasive or effective, they must be more than in-
ternally coherent or even plausible; they must be loosed in a context
in which they can win against other competing ideas. Precisely be-
cause of the horrors of the twentieth century, much of the interna-
tional community that has entrenched both democracy and the rule
of law has turned away from these extra-legal justifications for states
of exception. Instead, such states have attempted to embed excep-
tionality as an instance of the normal, and not as a repudiation of the
301 For a discussion of the developing comparative constitutional jurisprudence on the rule
of law, see Kim Lane Scheppele, Mhen the Law Doesn't Count: The 2000 Elections and the Failure of
the Rule of Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1370-85 (2001).
302 This obviously does not apply quite as fully to political theorists and legal philosophers for
whom such debates are their main stock in trade. Such debates have probably had a more and
more "academic" quality because it has been hard to imagine them breaking into the public
discourse without serious misunderstanding.
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possibility of normality. Only the United States, with its eighteenth-
century constitution and Cold War legacy of exceptionalism, seems to
be soldiering on in this new legal space of conflict unaware that the
defining aspect of the new sovereignty is that even the new sovereign
is bound by rules.
